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INTRODUCTION 
A. THE PROBLEM OF THE DISSERTATION 
Perhaps no more significant point of contact between 
theology and.man's social life exists than in the study of 
the nature of the sta~e. Concomitantly, ho~ever, diversity 
•·: ' . . . 
in theolQgieal .. ori.ent~~:L;on. is reflected in a variety of 
interpretations of both the natu:r:e and fu;nctions of the 
. . ' . ~: . ' . . . ' 
state. In recent years s~vera,~ fcy.:tc;n~s · hflve stimulated a 
reconsideration of the state: the widespread. phe:n~p.on of, 
centralization of power and fun:ction in states, acceler~ted 
totalitarian clai¥1s o~ the state., resurg~nce of secl:ll.ariSllJ, 
. . . ·. . . . . .. . . ' . . ;, ., ·.'···· 
as. a.·· stel;t~ po:~i~y, e~~~ This revitali~.a,.tion of .. in~ere~t .. in 
the st::atf!; i.s· mani:fE.!st among religiOl.lS and other g;-~ps~ con:""" 
. . . . .. . ·'. ·.. .-_·_: .. ~ .\. ' . . - . . : ( ... -.. '.... . ..•... 
cerned. wi~h, IIlCl)~alt ty in ·the socia~ stru9~l:"e• Witlliu 
... ' ,•, -·.·•:.·. ,. : .•· . ,, : ·.·.- ,,·'· . ..; .;:;:.:."''· ·'. :· :;·-_._.. : .,. 
Christian circles a 11ew concern for defining the Christian 
, .'' ,; .:.:·,' P. ,.;i' • .:} :-; • • ·!' . • • . ., 
a~titude .tOW4%"d~the.state has.£:atmd eX:pression, largely re-
. - .; -·· . ~ . . .:· \ . ' . . .'· .. . ·. ' :· ·: '·· <·. ,. . . ··. . .. . . ' . ·,_ 
sulting from the twin ehal.lenges of Fascism and Communism., 
·. '.. . .. . ... . . . . . .. ·. 
Not sine.e . the ~r~te~tant Reformation, when the new movement 
l '· ,.' ·' • :·.. • • : -~: .:: • ' ;.:.. ·, ' .. .• ••· :, ./.-.--;: ·_:: ·")~: ·, •. · • • • .. • .•• ·. --·. ' • '. : • ;, > 
sought founda'tion for its indepe:nd~nce f~Qm Roml:lll power 7 
. .. • '' • . • ~~ • ; ' • • •'. • . ; ... ,· • •. " ·~ I . l .. ~·: . '· .· • 
.. 
have _tl.le numer~~· element~. 'd.~l:J..!n Chx-ist;endom be~n so. ag~~ 
~~t.ed .about ~ na:ture and scope of the stat.e. 
- 1 -
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Yet there exisi;:s no unanimous Christi~ doctrine o.f 
the state. Roman Catholic and :Protestant concepts of the 
state appear, on the surface at le,as~, quite di~simila~. 
This d.issertatioa is designed to present s()lD.e o.f tl;le ba.sic· 
~ ; ' . . : - ~· . . .... .... :. ~-·. ~: . . - ·. ' ·. ·. . . . . . . ~- . . ..... ·. . . . . :.. . ':, ' . ' 
ChJ;;i~ti~ COli\V~.o_-ts~ons .al?,o~t the. st~te. Througl.l a d;_s43us~ 
sion of the VfiLryi.ngbeliets of thes~.groups an4.a consider-
•• • •• , • • ' ... : • • ' • ~ • • • • •• ·k • • • ':. • • 
atiolil o.f similarities and di£fereuc~s in their convictions~ 
. . . . ' -. .· ' ' ~ ·" . . . . ·: . :: . ... : .. ··.. . ·' ·. . '. '. . .. , ~ ..... · .. : . . . . ' . .' . . .: . :: ' . ·. ' . 
a full,er awaren~ss of a Christiali). do_etri11e of. the state, 
• .. ., : '. . . • ., ' .. ~- l • . ' • •• •. ! : . . . • • ~ • ' : :j : ; . . . . . . 
and. a lllore tb.oroogh. apprepiation Gf, .. the problems involved 
.J ;· • ,··· •.• •·.·.·,·,· o' • •''. ·,, ',· ,:,• '. I ' ' '•: .· 
in attaining a commoD Clu:'~stian perspee~iv~, lll&Y result. It 
. •' - . . .· .• ·•· .·: _;. ,,r..·· -•. ,·,; . .:...... . . : . . ' . .... \ 
is propos.~~ th~t thi~ _resul;t ma.y b~ .aqhi.eyed by comp~ritig 
'·· . ,. . . . ·~: .. . . .. . ..• . . . . . . ,• . ' . - l.. . . ' . . . . 
the ~ll Catholic con.cep:ti.on of . the sta,te_, a~ pro:nounce,d .. in. 
·.. ·...... . . . , ... ·,· '. '.· . ·,-: ,. '· .··;.''· .... ,. . 
the. papal em.cyclicals and in works bearing the Igrimatur ofi 
. .,• ' . .. . . . ·' . ' ~~ .. , . . . :: . .' ... :.'." . . 
the Roman Church, and the concept of the._state ·which seems 
,·· . .. : ·- : '·; . . : . . - ...... ·. .... . , .. , ... : .. : . ... . 
to be ev~lv~ng, out of t?:~. di,scus:sions of the,:,.·E~t:LD1enical 
Movement since the Stockholm Conferep.ce_of-1925, as seen in 
' .. \ ... . . . . . . 
the reports of the confe~enc~s of the Mov~ent, and occ~­
sional .. butt~e$sing remarks by individuals who have been 
. . ..· ..... ~ . . ' . . ; .. : ·.' . . . .. ' . : . . .' :, . . .·· ~. ' ' 
influ.enti.al in the Movement, but whose retQB.lt,ks do. nat appear 
. . ... ~ . .' ..• ~ ·. ; '; .. ·• .' . . . .. . . . '• . .. ·• .. . ·. .. .. 
:tf the limitB:tions and problems 
. . . ~: . .. . . . . . . ~ 
involved in such an en~~rprise ~~ l~gion, the majo.r ones 
:·· • · •. ·--.·. . • ·· .. '! . • • . . . , .• 
are suggested in .tll.e section on uLimitations'~: which will 
fo~:J:ow. 
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B. DEFINITIONS 
1. THE STATE 
Maciver comments tJ:lat uit .may seem curious that. so 
great and obvious a fact ~s .. the st~te sho~ld be the .. object 
.·. -. . . . . 
of quite co.nfli,cti11g. definitions, y~t such is certainly the 
' ' ' I •> • ' , : ' ' • < '• ."I ' ' ' , >. ~ , ' ' ' '· • ' • • ' ", '> ., ' o • • • .. .' I , 
eaa,e. ul The de~initi~n of the .sta:!=e pr~~ppgsed in this 
. . '· .. . .. ' . . :·· .. ,. . . '• . ·- . 
sb:idy is not arbitrarily .assumed, .. but ~he reasons for its 
. . . . ., '. :._·_. . : .· ': ' 
use n.eed :not be defended. here. It is pa.~tul~t~d that the 
state is "the body politic .as organized for supreme civil 
. . .. ·- . . . · .. ,·"... ·. .. . . . ' 
rule and government; the political.organization which is 
.· ' . ·. . . ~ . . . ' . . . . ;. '. . . . .': ... 
the basis of civil government. (eit:ll.er generally and 
. . . . .. '· ~ ., ' ·- . '.. . . - - . 
1 .. Robert M •. Maciver, The Modera State (Oxfordi The 
·Ctarendon P.re.:ss, 192·6); p~·· 3~·· ,usome writer's define the. 
state as es.s·entially a class· stru;ctur~, •an orfanization 
of C:me cl~s·s dominating .·over ' the. _other clasfJ.~.$ '·t o'ther_s 
reg~r(l. it ~s the one orgapi,z~tion tl:u~t tra.n,~c~e~ds class 
a.na· st,aQds for the wblle c~irl.ty.· SOll,l.e interpret it 
as a p~we;t sys~em~ others as a .W'elfar~ ·system •• · ~ .. 
Some v~ew lteil,tirely:·as a legat:·constniction, eithe,r in 
· the: old .. Au$t,.nian sense whicb,.made it a ·relatio~ship. of 
gove~p:r.s>·and gC\lvernad;. or, in . $-e langllllge · of· modern · 
jurisprudence, as a eOtmnttiJlity 'org4Jlized ~or action under 
legal rules' ·. Some id~ntify ·it Wi.th the nation, others 
rega,l:'d natio~lity· as inc!dent~l·or unnecessary or even 
as a fa:lsifying element· which perverts the nature atid 
function of···tp.e:.sta,te. Smue regard.it as·na·mo.re than a 
mutual insurance society, · oth~rs as the very ·texture of 
our life.· To some·· it is a. necessary. evil, and -ta a. very 
fe~. &11 evil' that is or will some day be unnecessary' . . 
While to' others it is 'the world the spirit has made for 
itself' •. Some class the state as ·one in an: order of 
'corporations', and.others think of it as indistinguish-
able from society itself.u pp. 3-4. 
4 
abstractly~ or in a particular country); hence, the supreme 
civil power and government vested in a country or nation.tt1 
This neutral definition of the state ~y be complemented by 
that of -R. M. Maciver wi_thout doing violence to the presup-
posed concept of the state use~in this study; it also pro-
vides more substantive teac.hing of the function of the state. 
He comments: "The state is an association which~ acting 
through law as promulgated by a government endowed to this 
end with coercive power, maint8:i-ns within a community 
territorially demarcated the universal external conditions 
of social order.n2 The state is, therefore, strictly dis-
tinguished from society and culture, and from the nation. 
• t • ~ 
It is herein assumed that the state is the political organ 
or aspect of society and; the nation. 
2. ECUMENICAL MOVEMENT 
The Ecumenical Movement has a long history, trace-
able in a scholarly History of th~ Ecumenical Movement, 
edited by Ruth Rouse and Stephen Neill. It generally 
describes efforts of the Christian Churches to speak 
together across the world, and to provide a common 
Christian witness to the world. Impetus for this Movement 
1. "State, tt Oxford En~lish Dictiona¥. (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, I 33), X, p. 85 • 
The 
2. Maciver, 2E.· ~·, 22. 
5 
in recent times springs from missionary concerns represented 
through the International Missionary Council. More recently 
two branches of the Movement, which were to merge --
spiritually from their inception, practically from 1938, and 
officially since 1948 -- have carried on a major portion of 
ecumenical activity. The nLife and Work" Movement and the 
"Faith and Ordern Conttnission joined in the Amsterdam 
Assembly of 1948, which inaugurated the World Council of 
Churches. The scope of this dissertation is primarily con-
cerned with promulgations of the Ecumenical Movement includ-
ing and following the 1925 Stockholm Conference. Four 
major conferences have convened during this period --
(1) Stockholm, 1925; (2) Oxford, 1937; (3) Amsterdam, 1948; 
and (4) Evanston, 1954. Several smaller conferences have 
also been sponsored in interim years. It is upon these 
four major and several minor conferences between 1925 and 
1959 that the position of the _"Ecumenical Movement" regard-
ing the state will be considered. It is not suggested that 
the Ecumenical Movement has such a short history. 
The World Council of Churches, which has evolved 
from the Ecumenical Movement, should not be understood as 
a super-church counterpoising the authority of the Vatican. 
It has never intended that, and such an attitude would 
preclude participation by many delegates from the various 
churches who would not share in such a design. The intent 
of the World Council is, by definition, nto stimulate 
rather than to centralize ecumenical thinking; it may not 
impose answers. 111 Kenneth Grubb, representing the 
Anglican communion, states the following regarding the 
nature of . the World Council: 
The kind of authority Which belongs to the Vatican 
does not represent anything desired by the World 
Council. On the contrary, the World Council must 
demonstrate that there is another way of influenc-
ing political decisions much more difficult to 
express and subtle to pursue, being derived from 
common understanding of the Word of God, albeit 
painf~lly achieved, and a common sense of fellow-
ship. 
The First Assembly of the World Council, meeting 
6 
at Amsterdam in 1949 and drawing up the Constitution for the 
Council, spoke of its intent to steer clear of a super-church 
structure: nwhile earnestly seeking fellowship in thought 
and action for all its members, the Council disavows any 
~bought of becoming a single unified church structure 
independent of the churches which have joined in constituting 
the Council, or a structure dominated by a centralized ad-
ministrative authority."3 It is recognized that these 
1. Edward Duff, The Social Thought of the World Council of 
Churches (London: LOngmans, Green and COmpany, 1956)> 
p. 228. 
2. Kenneth Grubb, "The Responsibility of the Churches in 
Politics,n The Ecumenical Review, III, 2 (January, 1951), 
117. 
3. W. A. Visser 't Hooft (e~, The First Assembly of the. 
World Council of Churches (New York: Harper and Brothers, 
:Publistiers, 1949), p. 127. · · · 
7 
purposes of the World Council are often misunderstood, and 
that many conceive of the Council's action and authority as 
comparable to that of the Vatican. 1 
Duff, a Roman Catholic writing on the social thought 
of the World Council, indicates that there are fciur. negative 
and eight positive considerations which provide a better 
understanding of the work of the World Council. These form 
a basis for fuller understanding of the Council's intention 
and authority, as conceived by its founders. Negatively, 
the World Council is not (1) a super-Church, (2) an agent 
for negotiations between churches, (3) based on any one 
specific conception of the church, and (4) implying that 
membership in the World Council means a relative apprecia-
tion of onets own ecclesiology. 
Positively, (1) the.re is mutual recognition that 
real conversation rests upon the common affirmation that 
Christ is the Divine Head of the Body; (2) member churches 
believe that Christ is the Lord, basing their belief on 
the New Testament; (3) member churches assert that member-
ship in the Church of Christ is larger than the membership 
of their own denominational affiliation or communion; (4) 
member churches agree that the relationship of other 
1. "Nature and Limits of World Council Action in the 
Political Realm,tt The Ecumenical Review, IV, 4 (July, 
1952), 418. 
8 
denominations to the Church of Christ is a subject for seri-
ous consideration, but do not insist that other churches 
must be considered true and full churches; (5) members of 
the World Council recognize in other churches elements of 
the true Church, on the basis of which serious conversation 
with each other is obligatory; (6) member churches are will• 
ing to consult together about their proper witness of their 
Lord to the world; (7) member churches should realize their 
solidarity with each other, and render assistance in case 
of need and refrain from such actions as hinder brotherly 
relations; and (8) member churches enter into spiritual 
communion with one another in order that they may learn 
from each other, and in order that the Body of Christ may 
be built up. 1 
3. ECUMENICAL MOVEMENT DOCUMENTS 
From each of the four major ecumenical conferences, 
from 1925 to the present, there have been reports issued, 
each of which contains substantive statements relating the 
delegates' interpretation of the churches' message on 
various social issues. Minor conferences have also filed 
reports of their proceedings, often including substantive 
remarks, even though many of these are only in mimeographed 
1. Duff, 2£• ~., 70-82.- These ideas are based on the 
1950 Toronto statement of the Central Committee. 
9 
form. In addition, official 0rgans of the Movement, such as 
the Churchest Commission on International Affairs, and the. 
Central Committee, also have issued statements on various 
occasions. These are the main body of materials used in 
the study of the nEcumenical Movement's" position. These 
documents are official neither in the sense that (a) they 
are unanimous, nor that (b) they are considered as directive 
for, and binding on, the various member churches of the 
Movement. A Bishop of the Methodist Church was once asked 
by a skeptic, "Does the World Peace Commission of the 
Methodist Church speak for the Church?" "I would rather say, n 
he replied, "that it speaks to the Church. ul This is pre-
cisely the answer which one asking about the authority of 
World Council of Churches' documents should receive, for 
they are authoritative in the same sense. 
4. ENCYCLICALS AND IMPRIMATUR 
Papal encyclicals are pastoral letters from the Pope 
to the Church, and are to be distinguished from ex cathedra 
-
pronouncements, which are dogmatic matters. Statements con-
tained in encyclicals are not requisite beliefs for salva-
tion, according to Catholic doctrine. On the other hand, 
1. George Redley, "Boundaries of Conscience," Christendom, 
VII, 2 (September, 1942), 198. 
10 
the precise authority of the encyclicals is not established. 
The Catholic Encyclopedia states that 
from the nature of the case encyclicals addressed 
to the bishops of the world are generally con-
cerned with matters which affect the welfare of 
the Church at-large. They condemn some prevalent 
form of error, point out dangers which threaten 
faith and morals, exhort the faithful to constancy, 
or prescribe remedies for evils foreseen or already 
existent.ul · 
The article later states: 
As for the binding force of these documents it is 
generally admitted that the mere face that the 
Pope should have given to any of his utterances 
the form of an encyclical does not necessarily 
constitute it an ex cathedra pronouncement and 
invest it with inrallih!e authority. The degree 
to which the infallible magisterium of the Holy 
See is committed must be judged from the circum-
stances, and from. the language used in the 
particular case.:l. 
Wilhelm finds it "extremely difficult to determine whether 
these letters are dogmatic or only monitory and adminis-
trative.n3 
Books bearing the Imprimatur of the Church are 
those which are approved for publication by the Church 
inasmuch as they are judged not detrimental to her work, and 
1. "Encyclical,n The Catholic Encyclo$edia, ed. Charles 
Herbermann~ et a!. (New York: ROert Appleton Company, 
1911), v, ~137-- . 
2. Ibid., 414. 
3. Joseph Wilhelm and Thomas Scannell, A Manual of Catholic 
Theology (New York~ The Catholic Publication Society, 
1899)' p. 97. 
may, therefore, be assumed to be consistent with, if not 
wholly representative of, the Roman Catholic position. 
C. PREVIOUS RESEARCH IN THE FIELD 
11 
Many studies of particular denominational ap-
proaches to the understanding of the state have been pur-
sued, yet even among these studies there is most frequently 
the statement of a single representative of that denomina-
tion who would be challenged by another of the same 
religious affiliation. An example of this is George Taylor's 
effort to define the Methodist attitude toward the state. 1 
No work known to this writer compares the evolving concept 
of the state in the Ecumenical Movement with the Roman 
Catholic concept of the state. 
Four books and one dissertation, however, deserve 
mention since they bear generally upon this topic. 
Dr. Nils Ehrenstr8m, delegate to the Oxford Conference of 
''Church, State and CoDD.Ilunity,n and secretary of the Study 
Department in Geneva for twenty-five years, wrote a most 
illuminating short book in conjunction with the Oxford 
meetings. Christian Faith and the Modern State2 provides 
1. Gesrge Brenton Taylor, ttThe Functions of the State in 
Social Reform As Found in Some Official Publications of 
Methodi~' (unpublished Th. D. dissertation, Graduate 
School, Boston University, 1955). 
2. Nils Ehrenstr8m, Christian Faith and the Modern State: 
An Ecumenical Ap~roach, trans. Denzil Patrick and Olive 
Wyon (Chicago an New ¥ork: Willett, Clark and Company, 
1937). 
12 
a succinct statement of the basic Christian groups' concepts 
of the state. It is not, however, based upon the statements 
of the various Ecumenical Conferences. Neither does the 
book deal with (1) materials and developments which came 
after 1938, in which year the book was published, (2) materi-
als other than the basic theological foundations for the 
understanding of the state, or (3) a consideration of materi-
als under typological, rather than denominational categories. 
He includes no systematic discussion of differences and 
agreements between varying perspectives. Its importance 
should not be overlooked, however, since in his presentation 
one discovers the welter of cqnflicting ideas which are 
present in the background of the reports of the conferences. 
Ten Doornkaat, a Dutchman, has written Die 
oekumenischen Arbeiten zur sozialen Frage· .. 1 which contains 
an abbreviated consideration of the concept of the state 
evident in the documents of the Ecumenical Movement. His 
treatment is cursory and, moreover, weak. Though written 
in 1956 it treats __ the Amsterdam an~ Ev~nstan Assembly re-
ports only briefly, putting heavy emphasis on the Oxford 
Conference and the typology stated in the additional report 
l •. Hans ten Doornkaat, Die oekumenischen Arbeiten zur 
soeialen Frage, (Zurich, Switzerland: Gottheif-Verlag, 
1953). 
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on 11Church and Staten from that Conference. Neither does . 
his work pretend to treat the Roman Catholic conception of 
the state. 
Duff has written on The Social Thought of the World 
Council of Churches1 from the Roman Catholic perspective. 
Though he writes from this perspective, however, he does 
not engage in a comparison of Roman viewswith those of the 
World Council of Churches. His statements are objective 
and descriptive, but two additional differences between his 
work and the present one are: (1) his relatively short dis-
cussion of the World Council of Churches thought on the 
state in particular, and (2) his primary attention on the 
Amsterdam and Evanston reports. 
Richard Nesmith has written a recent dissertation on 
nThe Development of the Concept of the Responsible Society,n 
which does not deal exclusively with the state, yet involves 
many implicit assumptions regarding the doctrine of the 
state within the Ecumenical Movement. Nesmith's study, 
however, differs from the present one in several important · 
respects. (1) It does not attempt a systematic presentation 
of an uEcumenical0 doctrine of the state. (2) There is no 
intention of comparing this doctrine of the state with a 
Roman Catholic doctrine. (3) There is primary concern with 
1. Duff, .22.· ~-
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the Amsterdam and Evanston Assemblies, even though Stockholm 
and Oxford are discussed as background, principally because 
it was just prior to the 1948 Assembly that the phrase 
uResponsible Society" was fortuitously conceived. (4) The 
orientation of Nesmith's dissertation turns out to be 
primarily in the utility of the concept of the Responsible 
Society and its function in the World Council of Churches' 
social thought; therefore there is a minimum of substantive 
thought about the state. 
A significant, if somewhat popularized, study has 
just come off the press as this dissertation is submitted 
for its final transcription. John C. Bennett, for many 
years deeply involved in the life of the Ecumenical Movement, 
has authored Christians and the State. 1 In it he describes 
some Protestant attitudes towards various aspects of the 
nature and life of the state, and occasionally, but not 
systematically, treats comparative ideas of the Ecumenical 
Movement and Raman Catholicism. He canvasses some basic 
problems regarding the nature of the state and its action, 
but the dimensions of his study and· the fact that he pre-
sents relatively little discussion of Roman Catholic and 
Ecumenical agreements and differences, make his work quite 
different from the present one. 
1. John Bennett, Christians and the State (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958). 
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D. LIMITATIONS OF 'nilS STUDY 
Several limitations should be in mind for the proper 
reading of this study. 
(l) There is an element of inequality in comparing 
the Roman Catholic system of beliefs about the state which 
has developed over a long history, with the relatively in-
fant discussion of the state within the context of the 
Ecumenical Movement. This inequality becomes more signifi~ 
cant when the authoritative nature of Roman Catholic teach-
ings, and the unofficial character of the Ecumenical 
Movement•s promulgations,are remembered. There exists not 
only an inequality in quantity of material available, but 
also a different authoritative weight assignable to each. 
(2) A second limitation of this study lies in the 
fact that among large numbers of representatives to the 
Ecumenical discussions there is a repudiation of developing 
metaphysical or.philosophical systems regarding the nature 
of the state. This deprecati. on of metaphysics is opposi• 
tion on principle, based primarily upon distrust in human 
reason and upon a fear that Biblical revelation will be 
minimized. On the other hand, within the Roman Catholic 
position there is a highly-systematized metaphysics, 
acceptable on principle because of the postulated affinity 
between faith and reason. 
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(3) A supplementary reason for the unsystematic 
presentation of ideas regarding the state in the Ecumenical 
Movement is that pronouncements by the Ecumenical Movement 
are occasional and polemical rather than complete expositions 
on given subjects. In this respect they are similar to 
Papal Encyclicals, which are also primarily responses to 
particular social or ecclesiastical problems. However, 
the difference between the two kinds of stat~ents is that 
the Roman position is supported by an officially endorsed 
foundation or system, while the statements of the Ecumenical 
Movement find no such support. The polemical and occasional 
nature of the Ecumenical Movement statements makes it diffi-
cult to compare them with the more systematic Roman position. 
It also increases the danger of reading personal biases and 
interpretations into the more general and nebulous state-
ments. 
(4) It might be assumed that the Roman Catholic and 
Ecumenical Movement ideas of the state are coherent patterns, 
unified in basic foundation and secondary implication. This 
unity of perspective is true in neither instance, though 
there is more common ground among Roman Catholic authors than 
among delegates to the Ecumenical Movement. Among Roman 
Catholics, however, men like Dawson, Maritain, Murray and 
Weigel are to be distinguished from writers like-Leo XIII 
and John Ryan. In Ecumenical circles there are Protestants 
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of Lutheran) Reformed, and Dissent background, as well as 
Catholics of varying communions, such as the Old C~ics, 
the Anglo-Catholics, and the Orthodox. It would be wrong 
to identify the Ecumenical Movement with Protestantism, 
though a majority of its delegates would claim affinity 
with the Protestant movement. Strictly speaking, then, 
this study is not a comparison of the Roman Catholic with 
the Protestant concept. of the state, though many evidences 
will point in that direction, and several differences 
between the two will undoubtedly reflect basic antipathies 
between these two Christian groups. However, no direct 
encounter between two clear-cut and well-defined systems 
can be expected. 
A great amount of typological study and classifica-
tion is needed in both Roman Catholic and Ecumenical thought. 
It is particularly imperative that certain cores or islands 
of agreement in Ecumenical thought be developed. This study 
proceeds under the difficulty of having no clear-cut concepts 
of the Ecumenical Movement with which the Roman Catholic 
perspective can be neatly compared. It is hoped that this 
dissertation will contribute to the evolution of some such 
definitive categories of Ecumenical thought. 
(5) A major limitation of this study might be its 
lack of the historical dimension~ Contempory political 
theology has a long history, both in Roman Catholic and 
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:Protestant thought -- a history which plays an obviously 
influential role in the formulation of contemporary doc-
trines of the state. Many studies have been made in these 
fields of development of political thought within the 
churches. Therefore a recapitulation of these doctrines 
in this dissertation would be superfluous. It is true, 
however, that historical backgrounds have been in mind 
during the writing of this study. 
(6) There is no uofficiatt' view of the Ecumenical 
Movement regarding any issue, since all reports, though 
voted by the various conferences, are merely results of 
the critical discussion of representatives from various 
religious perspectives. There is no binding authority of 
Ecumenical documents on any of the member cb.urches; the 
statements are only directives for critical thought and 
action. Though this is also the theoretical nature of 
the papal encyclicals, their authority is never clearly 
interpreted, which ensues in the hierarchical structure 
of the church lending strong authority, at least soci-
ologically, to these promulgations. Furthermore, since 
it is members of the Roman clergy who decide upon the 
authoritativeness and proper interpretations of Encyclicals, 
they have much greater weight and authority than any of the 
Ecumenical documents. What is true of all social teachings 
in general is also true of the doctrine of the state. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
After background reading in political philosophy 
in general, and the classical political thought of Roman 
Catholic, Protestant, and Anglo-Catholic thinkers, a 
classification of subjects related to the doctrine of the 
state will be developed. These will be related not only 
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to the theoretical nature of the state, but also tb·· the 
normative demands upon the state in its historical relation 
to other institutions and practices. 
Having formulated the categories by which the 
doctrine of the state can be discussed, an·'. examination 
of readings on Catholic political philosophy will be pur-
sued, with statements classified according to the accepted 
categories. Similarly, a perusal of Ecumenical Movement 
reports, subsidiary .documents, procedural notes, and other 
documents springing from ecumenical discussions will be 
classified in categories paralleling those of the discus-
sion of the Roman Catholic position. On the basis of these 
two systematic studies of the Roman Catholic and Ecumenical 
doctrines of the state, the dissertation proceeds to a 
description of major similarities and differences between 
the two perspectives. 
These selections will be made on the basis of a 
logical coherence theory, as proposed in such writings as 
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those o£ Edgar s. Brightman,1 and not to be confused with 
a selection of topics which are merely consistent or 
without contradiction. An attempt is made here to view 
specific documents and statements in their historical 
and sociological context, and to interpret them in the 
light of the composite of related documents and state-
ments. On the philosophical level, Brightman defined 
coherence as 11 systematic consistency of judgments with 
each other and with all the facts of experience."2 In 
this study the tlfacts of experience" are used in a some-
what restricted sense, since there is no effort to dis-
cover whether the churches' actions toward the state 
are consistent and coherent with their theories. 
1. Edgar Brightman, A Philosophy of Religion (New York: 
Prentice-Hall, Incorporated, 1940), pp. 128-129. 
2. Ibid., p. 527. 
PART ONE 
ROMAN CATHOLIC CONCEPT OF THE STATE 
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CHAPTER I 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE STATE 
A. DIVERSITY WITHIN THE ROMAN CA'mOLIC POSITION 
It is frequently assumed that the unity of the Roman 
Catholic Church, so prominent in polity and dogma, extends 
to all areas of Catholic thought. Such an assumption is 
mistaken, for both in doctrinal matters and social thought 
there is considerable variety of opinion. This diversity 
of perspective manifests itself in teachings about the 
state. A few evidences of diversity illustrate this fact. 
(1) A debate which has had a long history in Roman 
Catholic circles regards the responsibility of the Church 
and pope in secular and political affairs. There are pro-
ponents of the theory of "direct power'" and advocates of 
a theory of nindirect power, 11 the former of which claims 
that the Pope is always justified in exercising political 
power since that right is his in principle, even though he 
does not always exercise that right. The theory of indirect 
power asserts that though the ~ope does not possess polit-
ical authority in principle, he may, nevertheless, exercise 
such political power as is necessary to give proper· 
- 22 -
23 
guidance on spiritual aspects of secular affairs. 1 Baierl 
complains that the task of discerning the proper responsi-
bility of the Church in state affairs would be l~ghtened 
"had the Church ever directly and explicitly stated dog-
matically her teaching on the relation of Church and State, 
that is, to what extent she claims to be superior to the 
State. • • • But actually there is no definitive and bind-
ing declaration in this matter. n2 
(2) An intriguing debate persists today between 
"static expositors'• and udynatnic expositors." This dis-
tinction rests upon a serious difference of opinion of 
whether new political ideas are to modify Roman Catholic 
thought, or whether such classic statements as those by 
Leo XIII ·adequately define the Roman Catholic doctrine 
of the state. Evidence of this dispute appears in sep-
arate writings by Baier1, 3 Fenton4 and Father Weigel. 5 
1. Joseph Baierl, The Catholic Church and the Modern State (Rochester, New Yorkt Saint Bernard's Seminary, 1955), 
p. 45. 
2. Ibid., 13. 
3. Ibid., 13. 
4. Joseph Fenton, nToleration and the Church-State Contro-
versy," The American Ecclesiastical Review, CXXX, 5 
(May, 1954), 330-343. 
5. Gustave Weigel, A Survey of Prote$tant Theology in Our 
Day (Westminster, Maryland:· The Newman Press, 1954). 
In this debate Father Ryan represents the 11static expos-
itors," while men like Fatlbe.r-:-Weigel are exponents of the 
ndynamic expositor" group. 
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The distinction between these two groups is based 
upon their conception of the legitimate relations between 
Church and state. Of the static expositors Baierl comments: 
nThe theory of the static expositors follows along the lines 
set down more than thirty years ago by.Doctor John A. Ryan. 
Ultimately, however, its source is the Encyclicals of Leo 
XIII. ul The so-called dynamic expositors seek a more 
"modern" understanding of the relations between Church and 
state, partly under the impact of experience in the 
American situation of separation of Church and state, and 
also partially influenced by contemporary discussions of 
human rights. In Weigel's own words, the dynamic group 
uproposes a fresh formulation of the Catholic theory of 
Church and state with a view to showing that there is no 
antagonism between it and the American arrangement, clearly 
defined in the first and tenth articles of the Bill of 
Rights attached to the original Constitution.u2 
Dynamic expositors do not completely reject . 
classic ideas. (a) They have sought to show that Leo spoke 
1. Baierl, .22· cit., 216. 
2. Fenton, ~· _ill., 332. 
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of an ideal state of affairs Which does not exist in the 
world, so that actual governments have to be governed by 
more pragmatic considerations, 1 and (b) they have tried to 
show how Leo's ideas have been modified by popes who suc-
ceeded him, especially those concepts of Pope Pius XII. 2 
Obviously, then, a major legacy of Leo XIII to the dynamic 
expositor-s is the principle that in some instances the 
pursuit of the common go.od, for which states exist, may 
exonerate legislators from following the true theory of 
government. uA distinction must be made between the phil-
osophic theory of government and the pragmatic task of 
governing. Prudence will dictate when the pursuit of the 
common good justifies such a dispensation. "3 
(3) Another debate which is related to this dis-
tinction between static and dynamic expositors, but which 
possesses a different focus, is that between those Who 
accept a separation of Church and state only as a prag-
matic concession, and those, on the other hand, who accept 
the philosophic principle of separation. Baierl remarks 
that nrt is a remarkable fact that often an inclination --
at times even an enthusiasm -- for the policy of separation 
1. Baierl, ~· cit., 10. [Baierl is here quoting from 
Father Weigei:'J 
2. Ibid., 216. 
3. '):bid., 217. 
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has appeared in Catholic circles. nl This enthusiasm was 
manifest, for example, in the statements of Maurice Schumann 
of the Popular Republican Movement of France in 1946. This 
Movement is generally regarded as the spokesman for Roman 
Catholic elements in the French Constituent Assembly. 
Schumann maintained that genuine guarantee of liberty for 
individuals and religions lies in a farmal state policy of 
neutrality towards all religions. "The PRM spokesman ex-
pressed his party's support for including the word 'secular' 
in the first article of the Constitution now being drafted, 
which reads: 'France is an indivisible republic, secular, 
democratic, and social. ttf Further, .. Because the nation is 
composed of people of different faiths, it is the duty of 
the state to observe strict neutrality and impartiality in 
regard to these beliefs. The true guarantee of liberty 
lies in this neutrality.n2 However, the official view of 
the Roman Church is one of close relation between state 
and Church, with the former supporting the Church to the 
exclusion of other religious clatms. 3 
(4) Sociologist Melvin Williams has investigated 
Roman Catholic social thought, including the area of 
1. Ibid., 188. 
2. ttThe World Church: News and Notes," Christianity and 
Crisis, VI, 16 (Sept. 30, 1946), p. 8. 
3. Baierl, ~· cit., 188. 
politics, concluding that there is no uniform Roman 
Catholic position. 
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The so-called "traditional Catholic" theory of 
politics is a vague phrase, but it usually denotes, 
when used by non-Catholic writers, a philosophical 
emphasis similar to the ideas of St. Thomas. Yet 
St. Thomas' works are so suggestive that one may 
find in modern Catholic political thought any 
number of Catholics who say that they are in the 
Thomistic tradi.t!ion. They may, however, be in 
total disagreement with one another at various 
points. A careful study of modern Catholic polit-
ical theorists reveals that there are several 
camps.l 
From this acknowledgment of difference, Williams proceeds 
to classify Catholic political theorists into two main 
groups, each with three sub-divisions.2 The first major 
division is the 11 sociophilosophical,u which is itself sub-
divided into the "apologeticn (typified by St. Thomas, 
Leo XIII, Balbos, and Ryan), the "personalistic,. (exempli-
fied.by Maritain, Berdyaev, Mounier, Furfey, etc.), and 
the "Christian solidarism11 approach (led by Pesch, Pius XI, 
Nell-Bruening, Gathrein). William proposes that the 
second major division in Catholic political thinkers is the 
"Sociohistorical School," with the three sub-divisions as 
follows: the t'political pluralists" (Maitland and Gierke), 
"political objectivists,u (Layaley~, Agar, Hayes), and the 
1. Melvin Williams, Catholic Social Thought (New York: The 
Ronald Press Company, 195o), p. 265. 
2. Ibid., 266-292. 
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"cultural historians" (Dawson, Jansen, Schmidt). 
His discussion of the distinctive attributes of 
each of these classifications leaves one wondering if there 
are significant substantive differences among these groups, 
or whether each simply emphasizes one aspect of approaching 
the study of the state to the relative exclusion of other 
approaches. Behind each approach, one suspects a rather 
uniform theological and philosophical notion of the state, 
its nature and functions. In the short number of pages 
which he devotes to this study, Williams does not provide 
clear typologies of these groups, and leaves the impression 
that there is little significant difference between the 
various approaches, and that all would basically agree, in 
the final analysis, with the philosophical approach to the 
nature of the state as presented in the Encyclicals of the 
popes, and reflecting the political thought of St. Thomas. 
Sociological and historical studies of ~he state 
are blended with the philosophical studies of the state 
in Roman Catholic thought~ because with the Roman Catholic 
emphasis on nat\lral law, and its changing adaptations 
through history, that philosophic approach leaves much room 
for empirical investigation. It is a quite simple matter 
for the empirically-centered political theorists in Roman 
Catholicism to join with the philosophically oriented 
theorists for two reasons: (a) Roman Catholic philosophy 
and theology leave room for empirical studies of the state, 
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and (b) empirical studies have always to be put into some 
conceptual framework for interpretation and usefulness, so 
that it is a simple matter for empiricists to interpret 
their findings in the traditional philosophic and theological 
concepts of the Church, and therefore, of St. Thomas. The 
attempted classification by Williams, points to the existing 
diversity among Roman Catholic political theorists, though 
the preceding comments propose to demonstrate the diversity 
has not necessarily introduced division. 
(5) On the practical level, also, there is disagree-
ment among Roman Catholics relating to restrictions of 
freedoms of non-Catholics. John Courtney Murray, one of 
the most 11liberal" of American Roman Catholics, decries the 
methods of restriction and coercion practiced by the Church 
against non-Romans in some countries, such as in Spain and 
certain Latin American countries. His statements opposing 
the actions of Spanish bishops brought reaction from the 
latter group, but Murray responds, challenging the conten-
tion that these actions are proper for the Church. 1 He 
opposes the frequent statement that error has no rights, 
for he believes (a) that it is foolish to speak of error 
and truth as having rights aside from the persons who 
1. John Courtney Murray, °Contemporary Orientations of 
Catholic Thought on Church and State in the Light of 
History," Cross Currents, II, l (Fall, 1951), pp. 46-7. 
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pursue this truth or error -- it is only people who have 
rights and duties, and (b) even if such a distinction could 
be made, the statement that error has no rights is not a 
functional political principle. 1 
In Holland also a letter of young Dutch Roman 
Catholics demonstrated their dissatisfaction with the rigid 
and unimaginative policies of the Church, particularly in 
regard to social questions. The letter continually spoke 
of a need for "break-through., from the traditional position 
to a more fluid and adaptable witness of spiritual vitality 
incarnated in social affairs. 11We are afraid," they wrote, 
"that Catholicism in the Netherlands is not incarnated but 
rigid. Are we really compelled to look passively at this 
increasing rigidity, because the faith of the Dutbh 
Catholics is so empty that every external change brings 
this emptiness to light?u2 
From the above comments it will be obvious that the 
picture of Roman Catholic unity on the nature and function 
of the state is a chimera, even though one rightfully 
1. Ibid., 47. 
2. World Council of Churches, Department on Church and 
Society, nThe Roman Catholic in the Public Life of Today: 
A Significant Debate in Holland,n "Background Information,n 
No. 10 (November, 1954), pp. 11-12. [Mimeographed papers, 
unpublished. May be found in the William Adams Brown · 
Ectm:J.enical Library at Union Theological Seminary, New York 
City.] 
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expects greater unanimity among Roman Catholics than among 
delegates from various denominational groups to the 
Ecumenical Movement. It is not pretended that these few 
evidences of disagreement exhaust the spheres of dispute 
(e.g. much confusion reigns in the interpretation of ·--· 
Concordats and their efficacy and authority, the nature 
of authority of encyclicals etc.); they are introduced 
here simply as evidence that the Roman Catholic position 
is not so monolithic as some assume, especially in the 
realm of social philosophy. 
B. DEFINITION OF THE STATE 
Roman Catholic definitions of the state correspond 
to the definition used in this dissertation; the state 
bein~ conceived as the political unit which co-ordinates 
various aspects of community life. Dismay at the con-
fusion between state and community is frequently evident, 
and Dawson deplores the tendency which he observes from 
1917 to the present to merge the State in the community. 1 
Wright points to the distinction between state and com-
munity in the following manner, basing his comment on the 
conclusions of men like Monsignor Pasquazi, Dean of the 
1. Cristopher Dawson, Berond Politics (New York: 
and Ward, 1939), p. 6 . 
Sheed 
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Oivil Law Faculty in the Pontifical Roman Athenaeum: 11The 
notion of State is distinguished from the notion of Nation, 
for while the notion of nation is psychological and 
ethnographic, the notion of the State is rather juridical 
and political."1 Father Murray fears European developments 
where the state and community have been confused, leading, 
as in the case of Nazi Germany, to a view that the General 
Will, as defined by those in control of the State, is 
superior to Constitutional law. He states that Americans 
have repudiated the idea of an omnipotent society-state. 
uThe consequence is, n Father Murray reminds us, 
"that the State remains interior to society, 
not outside of it, as it were surrounding it. 
The State is an aspect of the life of society--
a pervasive aspect (as modern law is pervasive), 
but not an all-embracing, or omni-competent 
aspect.u2 
It would be a mistake to suppose that there is a 
specific definition of the state which has been used by 
all Catholic writers. Leo XIII's concept of the state is 
generic. The state, asserts Rerum Novarum, is not to be 
understood as particular states in. this or that nation, 
but generically as ttany government conformable in its 
institution to right reason and natural law, and to those 
1. John Wright, National Patriotism in Papal Teachi~ (Westminster, Maryland: The Newman BoOkshop, 194 ) , 
p. 47. 
2. Baierl, ~· £!!., 163. 
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dictates of divine wisdom wh;ch we have expounded on The 
Christian Constitution of States."2 One of the interest-
ing omissions in the important Immortali !!!!, of Pope Leo 
XIII, alluded to in the footnote above, is a definition of 
the state, even though the topic under consideration is the 
Christian constitution of states. In general usage, however, 
the Roman Catholic definition of the state roughly corres-
ponds with the definition proposed for this dissertation, 
so there need be no confusion in use of the term. 
C. GENERAL THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
1. Sources for Understanding the State 
a) General sources 
In Roman Catholic thought man, though fallen, re-
tains rational capacities which direct him toward an under-
standing of God's world. Since Thomas Aquinas is influen-
tial in the formulation of Roman Catholic thinking on this 
point (reflecting the teleological principles to be found 
in A~stotle), his notion of the relation between reason 
and faith is relevant in the current discussion. 
1. Pope Leo XIII, ttRerum Novarum," Social Wellsprings, ed. 
Joseph Husslein (Milwaukee: The Bruce PubliShing 
Company, 1940), I, 185. 
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AqUinas contends that there can be no ultimate dis-
parity between reason and faith, for both speak of the 
reality which is God's creation. When reason's conclusions 
differ from those of faith, it is not because faith is 
unreasonable, but because reason bas been improperly or 
insufficiently employed. Faith is like a telescope Which 
permits a further range of understanding and a clearer 
perception, but faith does not abrogate the conclusions of 
reason. A~uinas accepts as a postulate that there is in man 
an ontological nature which includes "reason," making it 
possible to understand the natural law of God's universe, 
the essence of Which universe is intelligible law. 
Maritain contends that human reason should even be permitted 
freedom in its search for religious truth, ueven at the risk 
of error. nl Man's fall has not so distorted man's capacity 
for reason that that faculty is no longer reliable. It is 
true that through the fall man' s passions and whims con-
stantly cloud reason, but the Roman Catholic postulates no 
inherent defect of reason. 2 Consequently, supernatural 
1. Jacques Maritain, Man and the State (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 162. 
2. "By original sin the ma~elous harmony of man's faculties 
has been so deranged that now be is easily led astray by 
low desires, and strongly tempted to prefer the transient 
goods of this world to the lastinft goods of heaven." 
Pope Pius XI, ttQuadragesimo Anno, ' Social Well strings, 
ed. Joseph Husslein (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publ shlng 
Company, 1942), II, p. 226. 
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understanding of life and its purposes are transmitted to 
man through God 1 s special agent, the Church. Through the 
Church revelation supplements and fulfills the tentative 
and partial comprehensions of reason, but adds nothing con-
trary to right reason. 
This Thomistic conception of the relation between 
reason and faith in Roman Catholic thought is reiterated 
today. 
Faith and reason combine for mutual aid and sup-
port, yet in such a way that each retains its own 
proper character and comparative independence. 
Reason assists Faith by demonstrating the credi-
bility of Faith, by contributing to the understand-
ing of its subject-matter, and by developing it 
into theological science. On the other hand, 
Faith is of service to Reason, by rescuing it from 
many errors, even in the domain of human science, 
and by guiding it to profounder and ~re compre-
hensive knowledge of natural truths .J. 
Faith and reason.are so conjointly allied that what impairs 
one is detrimental to the other.2 The Vatican Council states 
that it is impossible for reason and faith to be at vari-
ance, for they are, on the contrary, of mutual help. 11For 
while right reason establishes the foundations of faith, 
and, by the help of its light, develops a knowledge of the 
things of God, faith, on the other hand, frees and preserves 
l. Wilhelm, ~· cit., 148. 
2. Pope Leo XIII, 11Aeterni Patris,n Social Wel-l.s{irings, ed. 
Joseph Husslein {Milwaukee: The Bruce. Publis~ing Company, 
1940), I, p. 252. 
36 
reason from error and enriches it with varied knowledge. ul 
On the basis of the Vatican Council's statements; three 
fundamental postulates regarding the Roman Catholic idea of 
the relation between faith and reason are summarized by 
Wilhelm: 
1. Reason is a principle or source of knowledge, 
and possesses a domain of its own. Faith, 
too, is a principle of knowledge, higher in 
dignity than reason, and likewise having its 
own proper domain. 
2. As both Faith and Reason come from God, they 
cannot be opposed to each other, or arrive at 
contradictory conclusions. 
3. From these two principles the Council infers 
that any conclusion opposed to illuminated (supernatural) Faith is altogether false, and 
only apparently reasonable. Hence a Catholic 
has the right and duty to reject any such as-
sertion or conclusion as soon as he is in-
formed by the infallible teaching of the Church 
that his Faith is really illuminated.2 
Private interpretation must submit to authoritative inter-
pretation3 since that authoritative interpretation from the 
Church has been guaranteed purity of transmission (through 
assistance of the Holy Spirit) to men's understanding, 
uncorrupted by the finitude and sin of those receiving 
1. Pope Pius XI, "Rappresentanti in Terra, n Social 
Wellsprings, ed. Joseph Husslein (Milwaukee: The Bruce 
Publishirig Company, 1940), I, p. 106. 
2. Wilhelm, .2E.· cit., 147-148. 
3. Ibid., 62. 
-
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the revelation. 1 
Thus natural law discerned by reason and complemented 
by supernatural law known through the Church are the primary 
sources for Roman Catholic thought about the state. The mean-
ing of natural law is not unanimously accepted by all 
Catholics. Maritain's interpretation of St. Thomas' writings 
on natural law raises many questions, not· the least of which 
is Maritain's fidelity to Thomistic doctrine. 
A~cording to Maritain natural law is not something 
that has been simply deposited in man which can be deduced 
logically like arithmetical or geometrical propositions. 
Interpreting his statements as the proper understanding of 
Thomas Aquinas, Maritain speaks of natural law as based upon 
the ontologically given nature of man, and developing through 
man's intuitive response to problems which confront him in 
the experiences of life. 2 One of the most liberal of Roman 
Catholic thinkers, he conceives of the natural law almost 
empirically. Appealing to the teaching of Thomas Aquinas, 
he says: 
1. Ibid., 68. 
2. This notion is reflected time and again in Maritain's 
book cited above, Man and the State, and is a central 
idea in the selection from Maritain in the compilation 
of Utley and Maclure. [T.E. Utley and J. Stuart Maclure, 
Documents of Modern Political Thought (London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1957).] 
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When he [Aquinas] says that human reason discovers 
the regulations of natural law through the guid-
ance of the inclinations of human nature, he means 
that t~e very mode or manner in which human reason 
knows natural law is not rational knowledge, but 
knowledge through inclination. That kind of 
knowledge is not clear knowledge through concepts 
and conceptual judgments .. "! 
This comprehension of the natural law results from moral 
experience and self-reflection and could not be developed 
through pure conceptualization. 2 Utley contends that this 
view of Maritain is the prevailing view in Roman Catholic 
political thought of today. 
The main idea Which the concept of natural law 
carries is that it is possible, by considering 
the different instincts and emotions which make 
up human nature, to discover a latent harmony 
between them; each instinct and each general 
human inclination has, it is asserted, a purpose 
which can be fulfilled in harmony with the rest; 
conflict and disorder is the consequence of sin; 
and the business of the state, in the sphere 
which is entrusted to it, is to create the condi-
tions in which this harmony -- a harmony of man 
with himself and of men with each other -- can 
be most easily achieved.~ 
Despite the fact that Maritain and others provide a basis 
for an empirical understanding of natural law, Utley is 
convinced that their system is still basically ~ priori. 
Utley's comment on natural law further illuminates 
this discussion: 
1. Mari tain, .QE.. ill· , 91. 
2. Utley and Maclure, .QE.• cit., 178. 
3. Ibid., 178. 
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In the past, it has been the tendency of Catholic 
political thinkers to state the doctrine of 
natural l~w in rigid, a priori terms, to assume 
that the provisions of-natural law are immediately 
accessible to reason and that the act of express-
ing them in positive law is, to a very large 
extent, simply one of deductive logic. The present 
tendency, as represented by Maritain is to a much 
more empirical view. By contemporary Catholic 
scholars, natural law is seen as something Which 
reveals itself in history and the task of applying 
it to human affai~s is seen as one of infinite 
complexity, involving continual adaptations of 
settled principles to changing c~rcumstances. 
Nevertheless, the theory of natural law is still 
concerned with what is common to human nature; 
its aim with however much modesty it may be 
pursued, is to affirm absolutes. In form, there-
fore, Catholic polil:ital thought i·s a priori 
rather than empirical.l -
b) Specific sources 
The general understanding of the state is gained 
through the natural law, and through revelation, from God 
through the Church. There are, however, specific sources 
for the understanding of the state, upon which not all 
Roman Catholics ~gree. 
Some Roman Catholics emphasize the philosophic ap-
proach, as transmitted through the tradition of the Church. 
This understanding of the state is not known solely through 
the classic writings of men like St. Thomas; it is also 
reflected in p~pal encyclicals, whose authority is variously 
interpreted. The Catholic Encyclopedia itself leaves the 
1. Ibid., 178. 
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issue of Encyclical authority neb~lous~ 1 This philosophic 
approach appears most authoritative and is accepted as the 
Catholic position for this dissertation. The reasons for 
this acceptance will be clear at the end of this discussion; 
Williams suggests that there are other Roman 
Catholics in the philosophical tradition, such as Maritain, 
who ~igh~ be classified as personalists. This group would 
develop its philosophy of the state on the basic assumption 
of the ultimate dignity and w~rth of the person -- not 
necessarily· the individual, since this connotes, in the 
modern day, individualism. Wber~as this group is not so 
dependent upon the traditional theories of the state in 
Roman Catholic history, most of the writings which are 
produced in this strain follow the basic metaphysical 
propositions of Roman Catholic philosophy and theology. 
Although specific principles of interpreting the nature 
and role of the state have a different center or focus, 
conclusions about the state are markedly similar to those 
of the first group. 
A third philosophical position defined by Williams 
is that of nChristian solidarism.tt It is the thesis of 
this group that society is a nwholen of individuals and 
groups, even when individuals and groups do not recognize 
l. See page 10, footnote 2. 
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themselves as an entity through a contract. Society does 
not exist apart from individuals, but solidaris.m does 
insist that the unity of society roots not only in the 
natural and instinctive characteristics of man, but also 
in a rational and moral unitye It is man's duty to exist 
in society and recognize, rationally and morally, his in-
volvement with others. The aim of the state is, obviously, 
the social welfare, which is known properly through an 
appeal to Christian principles. It would best achieve 
healthy economic, social, political, and cultural life 
through the establishment of "obligatory vocational groups" 
which would have an autonomy from, but obligations toward, 
the greater society, just as individuals possess both 
autonomy and responsibility.! 
Williams also suggests that there are three groups 
in Roman Catholicism which take a more sociological and 
historical approach (rather than philosophical and the-
ological) in attempting to understand the nature and func-
tion of the state. The first of these are the political 
pluralists, who rebel against the centralization of govern-
ment, affirming that society is a composite of associations 
which have a soul and direction of their own and which 
should not be constricted by the state. Such constriction 
would involve not only inexpedience, but immorality. "And 
1. Williams, 2£• cit., 271-274. 
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since the State does not endow these groups with this 
consciousness and will, it cannot retain a sovereign rela-
tion over them.ul This group, then, eschews the philo-
sophical approach to the understanding of the state, but 
it does presuppose Roman Catholic theological and philo-
sophical purposes in its understanding of the role of the 
state in providing for the common good, and in the 
Church's relation to the state. Therefore, it is not 
radically different from other Roman Catholic political 
theories, though its methodology is to be distinguished 
from others. 
A second group under Williams's classification is 
that of historical objectivism, Which consists in an effort 
to determine, (through a concentrated study of states in 
history) the nature of the state as well as its best forms 
and functions. Here the problem of all ~mpirical studies 
arises again: What are the criteria by Which the state in 
history will be measured? and what are the norms for 
evaluation to be? The presupposed, though frequently 
unacknowledged, answer to these questions is the Roman 
Catholic idea of the universe, and its concept of the 
Church. Though the focus of its study Ls, historical, it 
is quite similar' to other Roman Catholic political theories. 
1. Ibid., 281.. 
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Finally, there is a third group in William's 
Sociohistorical School, which is termed the cultural 
(synthetic) school. It is the primary intent of this 
school to evaluate the interrelations between the various 
major aspects of culture (economics, politics, religion, 
etc.) in order to perceive their optimum organization and 
interaction. It_is assumed that these spheres have their 
own distinctive principles and spirit, none of which should 
be violated since they channel into the common good. The 
state is on~~ one of several organs of society; its duty 
is to promote the welfare of the citizenry through co-
ordinating a hierarchy of corporate groups. Society is a 
spiritual organism "in which each individual and every 
class and profession has its own function to fulfill and 
its own rights and duties in relation.to the whole. 111 
All of these approaches are seen by various mem-
bers of the Roman Catholic Church as sources for the under-
standing of the state. The diversity of their methodology 
does not preclude, however, a rather common idea of the 
state and its functions. This unity of understanding is 
much greater on the pragmatic and operational level than 
on the theoretical, but even on the latter level, agreement 
between various thinkers from different schools should not 
1. Ibid., 289. 
be minimized. This is partially true because (1) theo-
logical and philosophical notions neither. contradict, nor 
minimize the importance of, empirical studi~s,_ and (2) 
empirical studies need structuring, which is often 
achieved through traditional Roman Catholic concepts. 
· 2. Philosophical and Theological Foundations 
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Because defense of one's classification ~d sub-
division would be required in making a distinction between 
theological and philosophical items, and because particu-
larly in Roman Catholic thought, the line between phil-
osophy and theology is difficult to draw, this discussion 
joins the uphilosophicalu and utheological" foundations. 
It is not pretended that the following discussion is 
either complete in any one field, nor that it covers all 
areas which might be relevant to an understanding of the 
Roman Catholic doctrine of the state. However, it is pro-
posed that the following topics give directional and 
substantive understanding of the theoretical context of 
Roman Catholic thought about the state. The discussion 
will be organized under the following headings: (a) general 
structural considerations, (b) system of nlaws 11 .which give 
background for understanding Roman Catholic social thought, 
(c) creation, (d) man, and (e) social order and the state. 
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a) General structural considerations 
In recognition that there are several diverse ele-
ments within Roman Catholicism, it should be clarified at 
the outset that this dissertation assumes that the 
Thomistic system of laws is the_widespread basis for Roman 
Catholic social thought. This broad popularity is evidend:.-
in many papal Encyclicals and in the works of many prominent 
Catholic social scientists. It has been conjectured above 
that one cause for the continuing, and perhaps increasing, 
popularity of the Thomistic system is :that in its espousal 
. of natural law theories there is wide latitude for empirical 
studies of society, and, obversely, empiricists assume, 
whether announced or not, some basic structure, system and 
purpose in their analyses of historic and sociological 
data. Roman Catholics naturally accept much of the tradi-
tional theological and philosophic teaching of the Church, 
which is primarily Thomistic. 
Secondly, a primary postulate of Roman Catholic 
thought is a distinction between nature and supernature, 
the former operating under definite rules which have been 
established by God, and which are operative in man's life 
as he now knows it. The realm of supernature is the 
special sphere of God's grace, which gives life a more than 
natural dimension, and through which man attains his true 
purpose. Though distinguishable, however, these two realms 
are not to be conceived as separated from one another. 
Dawson comments that: 
From the Catholic point of view it is just as 
false to treat nature and grace as mutually ex-
clusive things as it is to oppose body and soul, 
or matter and spirit, to one another; for the 
union of body and soul make up the natural man. 
The supernatural is not the contradiction of 
nature, but its restoration and crown, and every 
faculty of man, whether high or low, is destined 
to have its share in his new ·supernatural life.l 
A third structural consideration is that the 
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Church mediates the supernatural within the natural; through 
the Church men may experience God's grace fully. The Church, 
unlike any other institution on earth, is a supernatural 
institution, through which comes not only grace, but also 
revelation. It is this pregminent position which provides 
the Church with its authority in social affairs as well as 
religious, since all affairs possess their religious and 
moral ramifications. In the Roman Church it is not the 
< 
body of believers who possess final authority (as in the 
Orthodox conception of the Church). Pope Pius XII clarifies 
the Roman Catholic idea of tbe authority ~f the Church: 
In the Church -- unlike the State -- the primordial 
subject of power, the supreme judge, the highest 
court of appeal, is never the community of the 
faithful. Therefore, in the Church, as founded by 
1. Christopher Dawson, Enquiries into Reli!ion and Culture (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1933), p. ~1. 
Christ, there does not exist and cannot exist any 
popular tri~unal or judicial power deriving from 
the people. 
It is the Church, deriving its teachings from a source 
above the common reasonings of its constituents, which is 
the final teacher about the proper concepts of the state 
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and about all of man's corporate existence. This is asserted 
because, though theoretically man could know the moral law 
through reason and the natural law, "taking into considera-
tion the power of passion, prejudice, and other influences 
which cloud the understanding or pervert the will, one can 
safely say that man, unaided by supernatural revelation, 
would not acquire full and correct knowledge of the natural 
law. nZ 
Finally, so much has been written about natural law 
from a variety of perspectives that its precise meaning is 
not clear. Neither is its implication within Roman 
Catholic circles always clear. That element which natural 
law theories seem to have in common is their repudiation of 
a completely empirical or "exi.stential" approach to 
1. Pope Pius XII, "View on the Spiritlhal Power of the Church 
and Modem Concepts of State Power- October 2, l945,rr 
Church and State throu~ the Centuries, trans. and ed. 
Sidney Ehler and John . rail (LOndOn: Burns and Oates, 
19Q6.)' p. 606. 
2. 0 Law, tt The Catholic Encyclopedia, ed. Charles Herbermann, 
et al. (New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1911), IX, 
pp./7-78. 
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philosophy like that of Jean Paul Sartre. Such an inclusive 
field does not yield clear meaning to the phrase, so that 
when used in this study of Roman Catholic thought about the 
state, "natural law" means that which is understood by 
Maritain (which he feels to be the most accurate interpre-
tation of St. Thomas) as the proper understanding of the 
term. No contemporary Roman Catholic philosopher is more 
capable of suggesting the term's meaning, although he does 
not speak for the Church. Its definition will be discussed 
under the following consideration of rtlawsn. 
b) System of rrlaws 11 which give background ~or understanding 
Roman Catholic social thought 
According to the Thomistic doctrine there are four 
major kinds of law: (1) Eternal Law, (2) Natural Law, 
(3) Divine Law, and (4) Human Law. 
(1) Eternal Law. 
Eternal Law is law as it exists in the mind of God .. 
From eternity there was present to the Spirit of 
God the plan of the government of the world which 
He had resolved to create. This plan of govern-
ment is the eternal law according to which God 
guides all things toward their final goal: the 
glorifying of God and the eternal happiness of 
mankind.l 
Man never totally comprehends this law, through either 
reason or revelation or a combination of both. Eternal Law 
1. "Law," The Catholic Encyclopedia, IX, p. 55. 
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corresponds roughly to A~istotle's final cause, except that 
it has a personal source through which all things tend 
toward their teleological destiny. 
(2) Natural Law. 
Natural Law is a law •twritten and engraved in the 
mind of every man. This is nothing but our reason, command-
ing us to do right and forbidding evil.ul Maritain stresses 
that this natural law is not some code of laws that man can 
discover through the operations of pure reason; rather is 
it something that man discovers through confronting situa-
tions and life. Man's knowledge of natural law, therefore 
uhas increased little by little as man's moral conscience has 
developed. 112 Implicit in this dynamic understanding of 
natural law is the recognition that men's notions of the 
natural law are never to be construed as a final formula-
tion of that law .• 3 The natural law which man can perceive 
is based upon an ontologically given nature of man -- an 
intuitive power that helps him to know the right in particu-
lar situations. Dawson's comments on this problem are 
pertinent: 
1. Pope Leo XIII, nLibertas Humana," Social Wellslrinfs, 
ed. Joseph Husslein (Milwaukee: The Bruce Pub ish ng 
Company, 1940), I, p. 119. 
2. Maritain, .s?.• cit., 90. 
3. Ibid. , 81. 
It [the Natural Law] has never been regarded as 
a complete all-embracing basis of Christian 
social theory. It is essentially partial and 
limited. When the Church comes to consider the 
problems of Christian social life and the ideal 
of Christian culture,·she considers civilization 
not as a static order based upon the unchanging 
percepts of Natural Law, but as a concrete 
historical reality which derives its moral 
values and even its spiritual unity from its 
religious tradition.! 
There is in men a certain natural law, which is 
a participation of the eternal law by Which men 
discern good and evil. Without this power of 
moral discernment man would not be a reasonable 
being. But this does not mean that it provides 
a ready-made gode of rules which everyone everyf. 
Where admits • .2 
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The relationship between Eternal and Natural Law 
is close. nit follows, therefore, that the law of nature 
is the same thing as eternal law, implanted in rational 
creatures, and inclining them to their right action and 
end.n3 Therefore, the Natural Law is, in this sense, 
universal and immutable. 4 Man would know his true posi-
tion in the world were it not for the uFall," through 
L Christopher Dawson, The Jut!tfent of the Nations (New York: 
Sheed and Ward, l942),pp. -141. 
2. Ibid., 136. 
3. Pope Leo XIII~ nLibertas Humana, n p. 119. 
4. 11Law, u The Catholic Encyclopedia, 77-78. 
which man's reason has not been totally perverted, but 
clouded. 
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A direct relation of the Natural Law to the state 
is seen in the connnent that unatural law is the foundation 
of all human law inasmuch as it ordains that all men shall 
live in society, and society for its existence requires an 
authority Which shall possess the moral power necessary to 
control the members and direct them to the con:unon good.nl 
(3) Divine Law. 
Divine Law is revealed Law Which is known through 
the Church, and which guides man to an understanding of 
Eternal Law, or God's will, which he could not attain 
through natural reason after the Fall. nDivine Law is 
that which is enacted by God and made known to man through 
revelation. We distinguish between the Old Law, contained 
in the Pentateuch, and the New Law, which is revealed by 
Jesus Christ, and -contained iU: the New Testament. rr2 It is 
through compassion that·God reveals his will to man through 
instruments such as the Biblical revelation. The New 
Testament and other;:revelations through Divine Law do not 
abrogate the Natural Law nor further limit the sovereignty 
of the State: nThe fact is merely that the natural law is, 
1. Ibid., 79 • 
. -
2. Ibid., 71. 
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in same points, defined and restated with greater certainty 
and detail in the New Testament."1 The Church, as the 
agent of the Divine Law, has not grown out of natural law, 
but has been specially initiated by God. Therefore, its 
promulgations have a higher authority than those of 
"natural" institutions like the state. Speaking of the 
origin and nature of the Churc~, Pius XII states: 
The origin of the Church, unlik~ the origin of 
the State, is not to be found in Natural Law. 
The most complete and accurate analysis of the 
human person offers no ground for the conclusion 
that the Church, like civil society, was natur-
ally bound to come into existence and develop. 
Its existence is derived from a positive act of 
God beyond and above the social n~ture of man, 
though in perfect accord with it. 
(4) Human Law. 
Human Law is the enactment of law by human institu-
tions or civil law. This human law is formulated on the 
basis of experiences of men in different cultural situa-
tions, but it does not derive its authority from society. 
The authority for human law is rightly understood as stem-
ming from its relation to the natural law and moral law. 
The Pope has made this clear in Libertas Humana. 3 Human 
law is based on prudence and reason, promulgated and 
1. Baierl, ~· ~., 60. 
2. Pope Pius XII, uview on the Spiritual Power of the 
Church," p. 605. 
3. Pope Leo XIII, nLibertas Humana,rr .QE.• cit., 121-122. 
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enforced by competent authorities, but it always must be 
judged by natural law, and therefore must never be con-
sidered autonomous. It will be evident that theoretically 
no inconsistencies can develop between the Eternal, 
Natural and Divine Laws, since all are rooted in the 
will of God, and reasonable. When properly conceived Human 
Law will also be ~ligned with these other three types of 
laws, and can be judged in their light. 
In the following discussions of the nature and 
origin of the state, the crucial importance of this system 
of laws in-the !{oman Catholic concept of the state will be 
readily manifest. 
c) Creation 
That all creation is from God and an expression of 
His will is a self-evident proposition for the:Boman 
Catholic. That God sustains his creation is equally well-
recognized. Despite the "Fallrr creation remains under 
God' s aegis. 
Perhaps the most significant belief about creation 
in Roman Catholic thought, in addition to the above-
mentioned ideas, is that creation is an integrated struc-
ture, with all its elements oriented toward both a par-
ticular and a generalized fulfillment. The whole universe 
is conceived as a hierarchically organized system, possess-
ing a definite teleological purpose. Not only does the 
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total creation have a specific inherent end toward which it 
tends naturally, but all parts of that creation have their 
own end. The whole system is coherent, integrated and 
purposeful. 
d) Man 
Basic to Roman Catholic thought· about the nature o£ 
man is that he has been endowed with a given ontological 
nature, in contradistinction to the thought of contemporary 
existentialists whose dictum is rtexistence precedes essence." 
Maritain, surely a Thomist in this respect, says: "I am 
taking it for granted that we admit that there is a human 
nature, and that this human nature is the same in all men.n1 
He proceeds to demonstrate that this "human naturen is not 
static, but a constellation of inclinations and intuitions, 
tending him toward his.destiny in creation. "Possessed of 
a nature, or an ontologie structure which is a locus of 
intelligible necessities, man possesses ends which necess-
arily correspond to his essential constitution and which 
are the same for all. 112 
An aspect of this given nature of man is a partial 
comprehension of the natural law, through which he is obli-
gated to seek salvation. "God has written the natural moral 
1. Maritain, ~- cit., 85. 
2. Ibid., 86. 
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law, at least in its most general outlines, in the hearts 
of all men, and it is obligatory without any external token.'~ 
Man, created in the image of God, possesses reason 
as his highest quality. Since reason permit~ knowledge of 
God • s law and will, man is morally obligated to seek the 
fulfillment of that law, as animals are not. Regarding man 1 s 
reasoning capacity, the official Roman Catholic view may be 
described as follows: 
Just as our whole being is an image of God, so also 
is our reason with its powers and inborn tendencies 
an image of the Divine Reason, and our cognitions 
which we involuntarily form as a consequence in 
consequence of natural tendency are a participation 
in the Divine wisdom. • • • ~is is, indeed, not to 
be understood as though we had innate ideas, but 
rather that the ability and inclination are inborn 
in us by virtue of Which we spontaneously form 
universal concepts and principles, both in the 
theoretical and practical order, and easily discern 
that in these practical principles the will of the 
Supreme Director of all things manifests itself.Z 
In Roman Catholic thought the uFall".has not incapa• 
citated man's reason to the extent that it is now untrust-
worthy. His reason is clouded by passion and lust, but not 
inherently defective. The 
Reign of evil over the hearts and institutions of 
men has not led to a radical and general perversion 
of human nature, s·till less to the destruction of 
God's good creation. The natural world has lost 
its vital and essential relation to the supernatural 
1. "Law, 11 The Catholic Encyclopedia, IX, p. 54. 
2. Ibid., 55. 
realities. Its life has been wounded and 
impaired and thrown into disorder. 11 J. 
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Original sin consists in a "loss of grace, and therefore of 
eternal life, together with a propensity to evil, which 
everybody must with the assistance of grace, penance, 
resistance and moral effort, repress and conquer."2 Man 
must find escape from this nfalltt in order that he may again 
have grace and fulfillment. It is the Church which, as the 
channel of this special grace through a dispensation from 
God, provides escape from the natural consequences of the 
Fall. 
In summary, man possesses not simply a natural life, 
but also a supernatural destiny. Man's nature is twofold; 
he is neither solely flesh nor spirit, but a compound of 
both. It is his function to be a bridge between two worlds, 
the world of sense and the world of spirit, each real, each 
good, but each essentially different. 3 Though powerless to 
achieve proper understanding of the moral life and to act 
in accordance with that end by himself, and without the 
1. w. A. Visser 't Hooft and J. H. Oldham, The Church and 
Its Function in Societ' (Chicago and New York: Willett, 
Clark and Company, 193 ), pp. 115-116. 
2. Pope Pius XI, uMi t brennender Sorge, u Social Wellslrings, 
ed. Joseph Husslein (M1lwaukee: The Bruce Publish ng 
Company, 1942), II, 329. 
3. Dawson, Enquiries into Religion and Culture, p. 311. 
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services of the Church, Cath9lic doctrine has never condoned, 
on the other hand, that uerror" which negates or minimizes 
man's role in the renewal of life, a "heresy" that was con-
demned in Jansenism. 1 Man's purpose is explained thus~ 
Man has one ultimate purpose of existence, c·e:ternal 
happiness in a future life, but a twofold proximate 
purpose, one to earn his title to eternal happiness, 
the other to at£ain a measure of temporal happiness 
consistent with the prior proximate purpose.2 
e) Social Order and the State 
Within Roman Catholic thought the social order is a 
natural ~ression of man's nature and growing out of man's 
temporal needs. It is not conceived as an ttartificialu 
outgrowth of man's sin. The state develops out of man's 
nature as "zoon politikon". Social institutions are par-
tial responses to man's corporate nature. 
In the social order there are three necessary soci-
eties. One of these, the Church, originates in the super-
natural sphere and does not develop through the natural 
understandings of man. "The other two, which are necessary 
in the natural order, are the State and the family. Beyond 
these three there are many groups which are more or less 
l. Ibid., 341. 
2. "State and Church,u The Catholic Encyclopedia, ed. 
Charles Herberm~nn !! al. (New York: Robert Appleton 
Company, 1911), XIV, 23rr-251. 
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useful. Some of them indeed are morally necessary but none 
of them is absolutelY: necessary."1 
D. SPECIFIC THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
1. Origin of the State 
In Roman Catholic social thought the state is a 
product of the natural inclinations of men endowed with a 
social nature. 2 nEven if man had not fallen into sin a 
state would have been required to direct the common life of 
human beings. The state, like the other ordinances of the 
community, belongs to the order of creation. n 3 Pope Pius XI 
states that God has destined man for life in civil society 
by implanting certain qualities in his very nature. 
In the plan of the Creator, society is a natural 
means which man can and must use to reach his 
destined end. Society is for man and not vice 
versa. This must not be understood in the sense 
of liberalistic individualism, which subordinates 
society to the selfish use of the individual; 
but only in the sense that by means of an organic 
union with society and by mutual collaboration 
1. John Ryan, The Citizen, the Church and the State (New 
York: The Paulist Press, 1939), p. 6. 
2. Francis Haas, Man and Societg (New York: D. Appleton-
Century Company, 1930), p. 3 4. 
3. Ehrenstr8m, ~· ~., 28. 
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the attainment of earthly happiness is placed 
within the reach of all.~ · 
According to Cahill, the state rests upon the fol-
lowing: (a) the natural fitness of men for association with 
one another, (b) the innate tendency of men for mutual asso-
ciation, (c) men's mutual needs which can be satisfied only 
with the help that civil society affords, and (d) "his 
powers and faculties which can find means for exercise and 
development only in.large civil association."2 
All these influences show that nature intends man 
to live as a member of an organized society much 
more extensive and wide -- embracing more than 
mere family life. They prove, in other words, 
that the State like the family is a creation of 
nature, intended and ordained by God. n::s · · 
The state exists as part of the hierarchical and 
. systematic structure which God has planned for th~ universe. 
Not alienated from the whole purpose of God in· his creation, 
the state participates in the teleological design of the 
universe, in co8peration with other agents. According to 
Raman Catholic doctrine, the three great institutions estab-
lished by God are the Church, the family and the state. The 
latter two derive their origin from natural creation, whlle 
1. Pope Pius XI; "Divini Redemptoris, n Social Wellsprings, 
ed. Joseph Husslein (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Com.-
fim~rl942), II, 352. 
2. Edward Cahill, The Framework of a Christian State (Dublin: 
M. H. Gill and Son, Ltd., 1932), p. 458. 
3 • Ibid. , 458 • 
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the Church results from God's special dispensation. But 
"all three have their origin in God, and whi.le each has its 
special, proximate end, their ultimate ends are one and the 
same -- the eternal salvation of man. 111 In 1945 Pope Pius 
XII indicated that the difference in origin between the 
state and the Church was that the former originates from 
below upwards, while 11the Church as a society was accom-
plished from above downwards. 112 But the collaboration of 
Church and state leads naturally towards the fulfillment of 
creation and the salvation of man. 
Regarding the origin of specific states, within 
Roman Catholic thought there is general repudiation of the 
"contractu theories of men like Rousseau, because man is 
inherently interdependent and is in relation with other men 
whether or not he recognizes that dependence. Rather it is 
conceived that the state grows naturally out of the original 
social groups of the family, tribal and village li£e. 3 This 
is implicit in the whole concept that the state originates 
from below upwards and is part of the natural expression of 
l. William Adams Brown, Church and State in Con temp ora~ 
America (New York: charles Scribners and Sons, 193 , 
p. 185. 
2. Maritain, ~· cit., 184-185. 
3. Cyril Richardson, us tate and Church: A Roman Catholic 
Interpretation, .. Christendom, VI, 1 (Winter, 1941), 
p. 136. 
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man. Tqis should not be construed as negating the need for 
people to come together to define a compact, or as implying 
that the state is not responsible to its constituents. Ac-
cording to Gavin, St. Thomas asserted that even monarchies 
must subserve the will of the people. 1 
While accepting this origin of the state, Maritain 
infuses that idea with a more rational and volitional 
element. He avers that the state results from both 
natural and reasonable causes. Man's dependence upon the 
physical laws of the world around him and the tendencies of 
his own instincts lead him to communal life. But man is 
also driven to political life by reason, lfconcerned with the 
ends of human existence and the realm of freedom and moral-
ity, and on freely establishing, in consonance with Natural 
Law, an order of human relations.u2 
No specific form of state is sacrosanct, and no 
sovereign justifiably claims authority directly from God. 
The element of reason in the establishment of government 
makes it impossible to identify existing states with a 
mandate from God, even though each state exists under the 
will of God. 
1. Frank Gavin, Seven Centuries of the Problem of Church 
and State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1938), p. 92. 
2. Maritain, f!P.· cit., 190. 
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In conclusion, Roman Catholic thought conceives the 
state as a natural product of man's nature and needs~ grow-
ing out of small units and extending to larger areas when 
the need arises. Flexibility regarding specific state forms 
stems from the proper use of reason and intuition in man, 1 
so that though every state stamds under the will of God, no 
state may properly claim exclusive favor as the sole ex-
pression of God's will. Generically, the state is an ex-
pression of the inevitable character of natural law, and 
thus ordained by God; specific states, however, are merely 
transitory expressions of the need for a state, and are not 
sacrosanct. 
2. Purpose of the State 
The purpose of the state is to seek the "summum 
bon~' which is variously interpreted and articulated. 
"The connnon good is the directive goal, the creative prin-
ciJ>le, the sustaining force of the political community."2 
The encyclicals of Leo XIII and the explicit 
statements of Catholic political philosophers 
have emphasized time and again the dominant 
significance of this definition of its aim 
for the interpretation and adoption of an at-
titude toward political life as a whole.3 
1. In combining these two elements Thomas followed the Greek 
philosophers, for whom reason was a mixture of intuition 
and rational elements. 
2. Ehrenstr8m, ~· ~., 31-33. 
3. Ibid., 31-32. 
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This common good is the highest atm of the state, and 
therefore takes precedence over mediate aims of the state, 
such as the maintenance of public order, which should but-
tress, in the long run, the common good. 1 When asked in 
what the purpose of the state consists, Ryan responds: 
The end of the state is the common temporal good 
of all its members. This means their welfare as 
a community, as members of families, as members 
of social classes, and, so far as feasible, as 
individuals. • • In fact the ultimate end of the 
State can only be described in terms of indi-
vidual welfare. 2 · 
What are some of the considerations in the defini-
tion of the ucommon goodtt? Firstly, the common good is 
neither the good of the individual alone, nor the sum of 
individual goods. Maritain sees the common good as the 
welfare of human beings in community, for the former views 
would 
Dissolve society as such to the advantage of its 
parts, and would amount to either a frankly 
anarchistic conception, or the old disguised · 
anarchistic conception of individualistic materi-
alism in Which the Whole function of the city is 
to safeguard the liberty of each; thus giving the 
strong freedom to oppress the weak.3 · 
To conceive of the common good as the sum of individual 
1. Maritain, 9[· cit., 24. 
2. Ryan, £'2.· cit., 15. 
3. Jacques Maritain, The Ferson and The Common Good, trans. 
John Fitzgerald (New York: Charles Scribners' Sons, 1947), 
P· 40. 
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"goo.ds~' remains individualistic, taking inadequate account 
of the real corporate nature of man. Private good is seen 
as indivisible from the common good. 
Sec~ndly, the common good is neither purely spirit-
ual nor temporal. According to Maritain, the common good is 
not something which is "ethically good."1 Other Catholic 
authors assert more specifically that the state must be con-
cerned with the spiritual welfare of its constituents. 
In 1885 Leo XIII wrote: 
So, too is it a sin for the state not to have any 
care for religion, as if it were something beyond 
its scope, or of no practical benefit; or else out 
of many practical forms of religion to adopt that 
one which chimes in with its fancy. For we are 
bound absolutely to worship God in that way which 
He has shown to be His will.2 
In 1888 he commented: 
For the public authority exists for the welfare 
of those whom it governs; and although its proxi-
mate end is to lead men to the prosperity found 
in this life, yet, in so doing, it ought not to 
diminish, but rather to increase man's capability 
of attaining the supreme good in which his ever-
lasting happiness consistsr.- which never can be 
attained if religion be disregarded.3 
1. Ibid., 44. 
-
2. Pope Leo XIII, "Libertas. Humana," p. 129. 
3. Pope Leo XIII, "Immortal! Dei," Social Wellsprings, ed. 
Joseph Husslein (Milwaukee: The Bruce PubliShing Company, 
1940), I, 68. 
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The state's legitimate concern for the spiritual 
life of its members is reflected time and again in writings 
by Catholic philosophers. Ryan, a political philosopher of 
the Thomistic tradition, comments that "it is quite as much 
the duty of the State to safeguard the spiritual welfare of 
its members as their moral and physical nature."1 Temporal 
good means not only material things, but also spiritual ones 
as well. 2 Cahill also denounces the idea that temporal 
welfare has solely to do with material goods and conditions. 
The state•s obligations to promote the moral and spiritual 
life of its people is conceived as a higher function than 
the provision of temporal good and material products. 3 
Furthermore, uactivities which are not merely personal or 
private, but Which of their own nature tend to influence the 
religion and morals of the people, are within the province 
of the civil power to prevent or to promote.n4 These com-
ments make it abundantly clear that the conception of the 
common good necessarily includes a conception of spiritual 
1. John Ryan, °Comme~ts on 'The Christian Constitutio1;1. of 
States,•n The State and the Church, ed. John Ryan and 
Moorhouse F. X. Millar (New York: The Macmillan Company, 
1937), p. 56. 
2. Ryan, The Citizen, the Church and the State, p. 15. 
3. Cahill, £e• ~., 468. 
4. Ibid., 467. 
as well as temporal fulfillment, which, it hardly need be 
said, possesses quite concrete connotations for all Roman 
Catholics. 1 
Haas divides the responsibilities of the state 
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into two categories -~ (2) a protective function, and (b) a 
promotive function. 2 These are suggestive of the way 
responsibilities of the state for the common good may be 
spelled out in fuller detail. The state'~ protective func-
tion is primarily in the sphere of rights, which it guar-
antees in three ways: (1) it defines the rights of each 
individual as against the righ~s of other individuals, and 
the rights of each individual as against groups; (2) it 
guarantees individuals and associations the freedom to 
exercise their lawful rights; and (3) it puts an end to 
personal disputes. 3 Haas has also included some suggestive 
1. This introduces a point of contention between Catholics 
and non~Catholics, for in theory the Church is defined 
as responsible for spiritual affairs. Yet Catholic 
thought insists that many affairs which appear temporal, 
and would thereby come within the province of the state, 
are interpreted as spiritual, and thereby matters for 
the Church's concern. On the other hand, spiritual 
matters which are often considered outside of the concern 
and jurisdiction of the state are interpreted to be 
within the proper definition of the common good, and 
therefore constitute legitimate spheres of state action. 
In the last analysis, somebody must determine what con-
cerns are temporal and which spiritual. In Roman 
Catholic thought one of the parties being judged is the judge in every situation. 
2. Haas,~· cit., 397-41~. 
3. ~·' 400-401. 
notions of the promotive functions of the state, both in 
physical and non-physical types of welfare. 1 
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Implicit in Haas's discussion of the purpose of the 
state is the notion that the state is responsible for the 
common good through the frequently negative application of 
justice, and the usually positive development of co8rdination 
and harmony. The juridic:a:L function of the state is given 
high priority in Catholic circles. Maritain_comments that 
"the primary duty of the modern state is the enforcement 
of social justice. rt2 Leo XIn speaks of the judicial function 
in the following words: 
The first duty, therefore, of the State should be 
to make sure that the laws and institutions, the 
general character and administration of the common-
wealth, shall be such as to produce of themselves 
public well-being and private prosperity.3 
Others conclude that the highest aim of the state --
provision for the common good -- can be achieved not only 
through the maintenance of justice, but also through the co-
ordinating activities of the state. This co-ordinating 
function is seen as the primary purpose of the state for 
nsolidarists, 11 who see society as a complex of interrelated, 
but partially autonomous, associations. Pius XI sees the 
1. Ibid., 409-410. 
2. Ibid., 20. 
3. Pope Leo XIII, "Rerum Novarum," P• 185. 
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chief role of the civil authority to be "the efficacious 
furthering of the harmony and co-ordination of all social 
forces.n1 
We have indicated how a sound prosperity is to be 
restored according to the true principle of a 
sane corporative system which respects the 
proper hierarchic structure of society; and how 
all the occupational "Orders" should be fused 
into an harmonious unity, inspired by the prin-
ciple of the common good.2 
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One of the elements implied in this latter function 
of the state (that of co-ordinating many social units or 
associations) is recognition of the value of diversity in 
the public life. The stat.e' s purpose in achieving the 
common good will be best accomplished, it is implied, 
through a decentralized political control that seeks to 
co-ordinate diverse elements within culture. 3 
In conclusion, the conception of the ttcommon good" 
is the focal notion in the Roman Catholic teaching an the 
function of the state. Father Delos's definition of that 
common good provides succinct summary of its basic prin-
ciples: tt(the common good} is a complexum of those goods 
in the material and moral order which society puts at the 
disposition of its members in order that they may achieve 
their personal destinies. r.4 
1. Wright, .2.E.. £!E.. , 48 • 
2. Pope Pius XI, "Divini Redemptoris,tt p. 353. 
3. See Pope Pius XII's comment in Ehler and Morall, ~· ~., 
p. 601. 
4. Wright, .2£· cit., 20~. 
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The idea of the common good is a particularly fruit-
ful notion for it (1) permits broad diversity in technical 
means for its attainment, (2) provides wide latitude of 
interpretation, and (3) maintains the centrality of the 
Church's religious and moral teachings. It is a concept 
which has interesting affinity with the idea of the 
"Responsible Societyn in Ecumenical literature. 
3. Nature of the State 
Four characteristics are most prominent in the 
Roman Catholic conception of the nature of the state: (a) it 
is a natural institution, (b) it is a perfect society, (c) it 
is an enterprise of sinners, and (d) it is an expression of 
a community and not an autonomous authority. 
a) A natural institution 
Firstly, the state is conceived in Catholic thought 
as a "naturaln institution. The state grows naturally out 
of God's creation and man's nature; it stems from the unatural 
law". Some form of state is inevitable, but no specific form 
is thereby sacrosanct. States have grown from man's propen• 
sity toward social life; they are the natural extension of 
family and tribal life. nit is a union of families and 
individuals held together by reciprocal rights and duties.n1 
l. Cahill, op. cit., 455. 
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b) A perfect society 
Secondly, the state is considered a "perfectn soci-
ety. The connotation of the word 11perfect" is that the state 
has within itself all the necessary capacities to fulfill 
its assigned functions. It has ufull powers within its own 
sphere to safeguard and promote the temporal good of its 
members. nl The state and the Church are the only two 
"perfectu societies which exist. 2 However, the state cannot 
operate independently of other social agencies or institutions, 
because its function has never been defined in such a way. 
Least of all is the state independent of the Church and the 
family. Yet it does possess those attributes necessary for 
the fulfillment of its assigned purpose, and is thereby 
considered perfect. That the state, either generically con-
ceived or as actual governing bodies_, is not considered per-
fect in the moral sense will be clear in the discussion of 
the third characteristic of the state. 
c) An enterprise of sinners 
Thirdly, the state is composed of human beings who 
have evil and sinful passions; thus a ch,.racteristic of the 
state is its tendency toward evil. The state, as an institu-
tion, must ever be corrected by the Church lest it lose 
its way. 
1 .. Ibid., 506. 
2. Ryan, The Citizen 1 the Church and the State, p. 6. 
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The State left to itself loses the sense of its 
natural vocation as a guardian of law, peace and justice. It becomes, like a man without grace, 
simply the plaything of its own sinful tendencies: 
instincts of violence, of despotism, or tyrannical 
domination •. l 
As a result of this tendency toward evil, force and law 
are necessary in society. "Original sin and its conse-
quences have had the effect of radically corrupting the 
normal relations of masters and servants, of political 
authority and its subjects."2 Force has become necessary. 
Intended as a corrective, however, the use of force is fre-
quently the source of evil, since it tempts its users to 
abuse their power for personal gain. 3 
One of the expressions of the evil tendencies of 
the state is, consequently, the extension of personal power. 
Maritain plays a. refrain that sounds like the Frotestant 
social ethicist Reinhold Niebuhr: 
Fower tends· to increase power, the power machine 
ceaselessly tends to extend itself; the supreme 
le~al and administrative machine tends toward 
bu~eaucratic self-sufficiency; it wo~ld like to 
consider itself an end, not a means.4 
And, again sounding very much like Niebuhr, Maritain asserts, 
"Let us realize this fact that"the part of instinct and 
1. Joseph Lecler, The Two Sovereignties, trans. Hugh 
Montgomery (LondOn: Burns, Oates and Washbourne, 1952), 
P• 40. 
2. Ibid., 20-21. 
a. Ibid., 20-21. 
4. Maritain, Man and the State, ·p. 14. 
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irrational forces is even greater in communal existence than 
in individual existence.ul An endemic characteristic of the 
state i~in Roman Catholic thought, its tendency towards 
corruption. 
d) An expression of a community 
Fourthly, the state is rightly conceived as an ex-
pression of a certain community rather than as an autonomous 
agent. It derives its life and authority from historical 
communities. Maritain attacks the 1~egelian or pseudo-
Hegelian" doctrine of the state, which conceives of the 
state as a person, a supra-human person. 1 He claims that 
the state is not even sovereign,. since sovereignty rests 
upon natural right, ttwhich does not belong to the state 
but to the body politic as perfect society, u which in it-
self is an expression of the greater community. 3 The state, 
asserts Maritain, is a part.of the body politic, inferior 
·to the total body politic, ttand at the service of the com-
mon good. rr4 Any ~tate is, therefore, ·always servant of the 
commun~ty and the total human enterprise, i.e. the search of 
man after his true destiny. This characteristic of the 
1. Jacques Maritain, Christianity and Democracy, trans. 
Doris Anson (New York: Charles Scribners' ons, 1944), 
p. 61. 
2 •. Maritain, Man and the State, p. 195. 
3. Ibid., 195. 
4. Ibid., 23-24. 
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state will be more clearly elucidated in the discussion of 
the relationship between state and individual. 
To sum up, the state is a natural and perfect insti-
tution, which possesses dangerous tendencies towards evil, 
particularly through an abuse of its power, and which is 
always properly seen as an expression of the total commun-
ity and not as its master. 
4. Authority of the State 
The ensuing discussiQn of the authority of the 
state will be presented under three divisions: (a) need 
for, and definition of, state authority, (b) source of the 
state's authority, and (c) limitations upon the authority 
of the state. 
a) Need for, and definition of, state authority 
Cahill asserts that nthe element of authority of 
governing power is essential to the very nature of human 
society.ul Asked in what the first principle of political 
philosophy consists, Treacy replies, uAuthority is necessary. 
The State cannot exist without it. Obedience to this author-
ity is the duty of citizens." "What is this authority called'l·n 
'Government. n2 
1. Cahill,~· cit., 460. 
2. Gerald Treacy, A Handbook of Catholic Social Philosophy (New York: The Paulist Press, 1947), p. 9. 
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Roman Catholic definitions of authority reflect the 
moral implication of that word. Haas writes that ttauthority 
may be defined as the moral power to direct others, or more 
simply, to tell them what to do an~ what not to do. nl This 
authority must be a legitimate or moral power, and is appli-
cable to the extent that the acts which it requires "are 
necessary to secure the ends for which the members are 
organized."2 Three aspects of state authority are involved 
in Haas' comments: (1) authority must be moral, (2) it must 
fit a human need, and (3} it must be understood as deriving 
from God. 3 Maritain's definition distinguishes between 
power and authority: 
Authority and power are two different thiugs: 
Power is the force by means of which you can 
oblige others to obey you. Authoritl is the 
right to direct and command, to be 1 stened to 
or obeyed by others. Authority req~ests Power. 
Power without authority is tyranny. 
When the urightu to direct or command is to be clarified, 
questions of the source of authority inevitably arise. 
b) Source of the state's authority 
Two principles govern Roman Catholic understanding 
of the source of state authority: (1} it derives ultimately 
1. Haas,~·£!!., 388. 
2. Ibid., 388. 
3. Ibid., 388-390. 
4. Maritain, Man and the State, p. 126. 
from God, through the natural law, and (2) it stems from, 
and is subordinate to, the will of the people. 
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(1) Catholics affirm that the right to rule is 
from God. 1 The will of God for the state is known through 
natural law, written in the ontological nature of man. 
"He [God} has. endowed men with such qualities and needs that 
they cannot live reasonable lives without the State. There-
fore, He wishes the State to exist and to function in such a 
way as to attain this end, to promote man 1 s temporal welfare. u2 
Had not God willed civil government, there could be no legit-
imate government because justified exercise of authority and 
power would be precluded in the equality of men's natures. 
uNo particular group of men has in itself the right to rule 
others."3 It is a "vicious theoryu to conceive of God as 
directly ordaining certain rulers with authority. 4 "The 
divine source of authority must not be interpreted as mean-
ing that God gives authority directly and immediately to 
the ruler himself; in other words that God designates the 
1. Pope Leo XIII, ttDiuturnum, 11 Social Wellsprings, ed. 
Joseph Husslein (Milwaukee: The Bruce PUblishing 
Company, 1940), I, 50. 
2. John Ryan, "The Moral Obligations of Civil Law,u The 
State and the Church, ed. John Ryan and Moorhouse!fillar 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1924), p. 224. 
3. Maritain, Christianit~ and Democracy, pp. 50-51. See 
also Haas,~· cit., 90. 
4. Haas, ~· cit., 392. 
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holder of the authority by a divine immediate act. Such a 
theory was held ~once) • ul God 1 s will for the authority of 
the state is a general one. Therefore the natural corollary 
of this position is that state rulers also derive their 
authority from a secondary source, the people's will. 
(2) Gavin claims that St. Thomas's view of state 
authority derived from God and through the people. uBack 
of what St. Thomas writes stands his conviction that 
sovereignty inheres in the whole of the people fundamentally. 
Whoever rules over the people rules by divine authority 
given by God directly to the whilile societyl'2 Whether this 
is accurate interpretation of St. Thomas is not here under 
debate; what such a comment does reflect is an effort to 
make the Thomistic system compatible with modern thought 
which asserts the subordination of the state to the will of 
/ 
the total counnunity. Roman Catholics attack the "liberalu 
notion of the social contract origin of the state because 
of its alleged irreligious attitude. On the other hand, 
there is general acceptance of the idea that people do, and 
must, contract together in some manner for the formation of 
same civil government. This idea is caught in the words of 
Maritain. 
1. Heinrich Rommen, The State in Catholic Thou~ht (London 
and St. Louis: B. Herder Book Company, 19~), p. 428. 
2. Gavin, ~· .ill• , 90. 
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The leaders of the people receive this right from 
the creative and conservative principle of nature 
through the channels of nature itself, that is, 
through the consent or will of the people or of 
the body of the community, through which authority 
alw~s lasses before being Invested in the leaders.l [Un rl nirig mine} 
c) Limitations upon the authority of the state. 
The state's authority is limited by four elements, 
basically: (1) the Church, (2) the people.as a community, 
(3) its aim, and the natural law, and (4) various associa-
tions within it. There is obvious overlapping in these 
areas, for example, the claims of associations rest upon 
technical considerations of how the natural law and common 
good will be best served. 
(1) Limitations which the Church imposes upon the 
state will be discussed in greater detail in the section 
on Church-State relations. In general outline, Church and 
state interests ought not to conflict because each exists 
under the will of God and possesses its own hierarchically 
defined responsibilities. The Church, as a supernatural 
institution which derives its existence from a direct 
mandate from God rather than indirectly through the natural 
order, is responsible for the supernatural destiny of man, 
and is, therefore, authoritative in all matters of faith 
and morals. 
1. Maritain, Christianity and Democracy, pp. 50-51. 
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On the other hand, the state, as a natural institu-
tion receiving its command from God indirectly through the 
natural law, is responsible for the temporal welfare of man. 
Since the supernatural end of man is more important than his 
temporal well-being, the function of the Church is higher 
than that of the state. Since its function is higher, and 
since it receives direct authority from God, the Church 
properly limits the sphere of the state's activities when 
the latter acts in a manner detrimental to the common good. 
In case of direct contradiction, making it im-
possible for the jurisdiction of both to be 
exercised, the jurisdiction of the Church pre-
vails, and that of the State is excluded. The 
reason of this is obvious: both authorities 
come from God in fulfillment of His purposes in 
the life of man; He cannot contradict Himself; 
He cannot authorize contradictory powers. His 
real will and concessi9n of power is determined 
by the higher purpose of His Providence and 
man • s need, which is the eternal hap'iiness of 
man, the ultimate end of the Church. 
(2) The state is also limited by the people as a 
community. When the people's will alters, the form of 
government should find changed expression. The state is 
always subordinate to the will of the people, because in 
the investing of certain rulers with power -"the people 
lose in no way possession of their basic right of self-
government. n2 The state holds its authority through the 
1. "State and Church," The Catholic Encyclopedia, ed. 
Charles Herbermann and others (New York: Robert 
Appleton Company, 1907), XIV, 251. 
2 .. Maritain, Man and the State, p. 134. 
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people. 1 The state is not sovereign, asserts Maritain, 
because it possesses neither sole and supreme independence 
with regard to the power over its people, nor may it exer-
cise its aut~ority in an unrestricted manner. 2 
(3) The state is also limited by the moral law. 
It can properly act only in accordance with the ·natural law 
and in the interest of the common good. Since the.nwhole 
purpose of the State is to assist individuals and families 
in the pursuit of temporal happiness. • • • it cannot 
justly, or even validly, exercise its activities except for 
the good of the people. "3 Whether a state acts in conform-
ity with the moral law is something which must be judged 
by an agent other than the state, which is the Church. 4 
Part of the state's fidelity to the moral law is measured 
by the subordination of its own activities to the law of 
the land and the will of the people expressed through 
plebiscite. Pius XII claims that the individual state is 
also subject to international law, which is also human law, 
insofar as that international law seeks the common good of 
the total human community. 5 
1. lbid., 131. 
2. Ibid., 42-43. 
3. Cahill,~· ~., 462. 
4. Ryan, "Comments on the 1 Christian Constitution of States, 111 
p. 43. See also Gavin,~· £!!., 93. 
5. Pope Pius XII, nAnalecta,u The American Ecclesiastical 
Review, trans. Vatican Press Office, CXXX, 2 (February, 
1954), p. 131. 
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. 
(4) Finally the state is ltmited by the various 
natural associations within its. bounds. It has already 
been shown that the state is limited by the supernatural 
institution, the Church. It is also limited by the other 
natural institution, the family.. Various voluntary 
natural associations arise within states, and the state 
should respect the inner life of these associations. While 
not autonomous from the state, these associations are con-
' ' 
ceived as possessing a character and life of their own 
with which the state should not interfere. The state 1 s 
relation to such associations is co-ordination of. their 
activities in the interest of the common good. It should, 
however, encourage their spontaneity and independence. 
Further consideration of the statets relation to such units 
follows under the section with that title. 
In ·conclusion, then, the state possesses a moral 
authority to rule bec~e it derives its authority from 
God, through the natural law ~d as an expression of the 
will of the people. The authority is neither arbitrary nor 
unlimited, since its work is rightly understood as delimited 
by the claims of the Church, the family, the will of the 
people, the moral law· (as seen _through the natural law and 
the common good}, and inner associations within the state 
which possess their own natural life. 
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5. Organization of the State 
The following discussion of the organization of 
the state as conceived in Roman Catholic political thought 
will b~ presented in three sections: (a) the general 
attitude of the ChurCh toward types of state organization, 
(b) the Church's attitude toward existing forms of state, 
and (c) the general lines of state organization which ap-
pear most acceptable to current Catholic political theorists. 
a) General attitude of the Church towards types of state 
organization 
Though some Roman Catholics seem to long for a re-
turn to the Church-state relations of the 13th century,1 
one finds little of that spirit in general Catholic writings. 
Several theorists despair of ever achieving a "Christianu 
form of state organization. It is debatable whether this 
despair roots in a conviction that no state can be 
Christian, in principle, or whether it rests upon the be-
lief that sinful men would distort even the best organiza-
tion and, by vitiating it with sin, make it less than 
1. "There was a time when States were governed by; the prin-
ciples of Gospel teaching. Then it was that the power 
and divine virtue of Christian wisdom had diffused it-
self throughout the laws, institutions, and morals of 
the people, permeating all ranks and relations of civil 
society." Pope Leo XIII, "Immortal! Dei,u p. 75. 
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Christian. It is clear, however, that among contemporary 
Catholics the conviction is widespread that "there has never 
been a time when society was completely Christian; 
Christianity has never been more than a leaven working in 
the world, and its wo.rk is never finished. ul Connnenting 
on the values of democratic organization in America, Murray 
is careful to remind his readers that ui am not of course 
suggesting that the American state e~hibits the pure 
embodiment of all the principles stated in the treatise ~ 
ethica sociali; no political realization is ever pure.n2 
The Church does not· claim, today, that supernatural 
faith informs man of the ideal kind of political organiza-
tion, though the principles it leads man to affirm, and the 
inspiration it provides, are relevant to the formation of 
states which "work for human dignity, against any kind of 
totalitarian oppression.n3 Leo XIl:I grants that there may 
be difference·-of opinion among Christians regarding the 
best form.of civil administration~ 4 The determining prin-
ciple in judging the character of a state is whet~er it 
provides for human welfare within the bounds of natural law. 5 
1. Christopher Dawson, Religion and the Modern State (London: 
Shead and Ward, 1935), p. 146. . · · 
2. Murray, .2E.• cit., 22. 
3. Jacques Maritain, The Range of Reason (New York: Charles 
Scribner•s Sons, l952),tp. 170-171. 
4. Pope Leo XIII, "Immortali Dei, 11 p. 89. 
5. Ibid., 66 .. 
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Variety in forms of the state may vary not only in 
accordance with difference of opinion among Christians, but 
concrete circumstances ~y dictate different kinds of govern-
ment in two societies, both of which best achieve the common 
good and justice in their particular area. . It may even suit 
the disposition of the people better. 1 Rommen•s classic 
work on the Roman Catholic idea of the state asserts: 
The discussion about the best form of government 
is somewhat abstract if it does not refer to the 
relatively best form of government for the 
individual nation. Such discussion must concern 
itself with the realization of the common good of 
a particular nation with full appreciation of its 
geographic location, its economic basis of life, 
its national tradition, its particular cultural 
development, and all other such elements that 
establish the nation's individuality •••• What 
matters is that each nation should find the 
constitutional form of government that fits its 
individuality and lets it thus realize hie et nunc 
the order of the common good, the objective-aha---
supreme standard of legitimacy.2 
Ryan comments that "none of the three classical 
forms of government (monarchy, aristocracy, democracy) nor 
any of their modifications or combinations, is morally 
unlawful or unfavorably regarded by the Catholic Church." 3 
Finally, both Leo XIII and Pius XI concur that the Church 
is not to be identified with any specific form of government. 
1. Pope Leo XIII, "Diuturnum," p. 51. See also Cahill, .2E.• 
cit., 476, and Rommen, .2£• cit., 437. 
2. Ronnnen, .2£• cit., 501. 
3. Ryan, "Comments on the 'Christian Constitution of States,'" 
P• 28. 
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Leo XIII states: uthe Church has no care what form of 
government exists in a state. • • • of the various kinds 
of government there is none of which she disapproves, so 
long as religion and moral discipline liv::e:. untouched. ul 
And'Pius XI, four decades later, voices the same sentiment. 
Universally known is the fact that the Catholic 
Church is never bound to one form of government 
more than to another, provided the divine rights 
of God and of Christian consciences are safe. 
She does not find any difficulty in adapting 
herself to various civil institutions, be they 
monarchic or republican, aristocratic or 
dem.ocratic.Z 
b) Church's attitude toward existing state forms 
Against Communism, Catholic popes and political 
theorists condemn the following: (1) its materialist 
metaphysic, (2) its concentration of power in centralized 
government, (3) its totalitarian claims, (4) its resistance 
to the Church, (5) its means used to attain its ends, (6) its 
violation of natural law in denying property rights, (7) its 
false notion of the equality of all people which does not 
recognize the hierarchical structure inherent in society 
and the universe as a whole, (8) its attack upon the 
1. Pope Leo XIII, "Sepientae Christianae,u Social 
Wellsprings, ed. Joseph Husslein (Milwaukee: The Bruce 
PUbliShing Company, 1940), I, 155. 
2. Pope Pius XI, nDilectissima,tt Social Wellslrinf[i, ed. 
Joseph Husslein (Milwaukee: The Bruce Pub ish g 
Company, 1940), I, 294. 
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family, (~) its denial of the dignity of human personality, 
and (10) its economic interpretation of history. Even 
before the contemporary battle between Communism and 
Catholicism Pius XI . wrote that "Communism is intrinsically 
wrong, and no one who would save Christian civilization 
may collaborate with it in any undertaking whatever.u1 The 
doctrine of Communism was judged uabsolutely contrary to 
the natural law itself."2 
The Church's opposition to Socialism rests upon 
some similar grounds. It deplores socialism's alleged 
(1) irreligious orientation (as was the case with some, 
but not all, socialists), (2) undermining of the structure 
of the state through ·ideas of equality, (3) deprecation of 
the home and family rights, and (4) assailment of the 
natural law principle of private .property. 3 It is inter• 
esting to note that Pius XI's attack against socialism 
was not as contentious as had been Leo XIII's 40 years 
earlier. Many Roman Catholics have come to accept man.y of 
the principles espoused by socialists, particularly in the 
realm of economic organization. Indeed, the principle of 
the corporative state, and the concept of solidarism are 
1. Pope Pius XI, "Divini Redemptoris, n p. 339. 
2. Ibid., 342. 
3. Pope Leo XIII, "Quod Apostolici Muneris,u Social 
Wellsprings, ed. Joseph Husslein (Milwaukee: The Bruce 
Publishing Company, 1940) I, 14-15. 
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in close proximity with some socialist notions. It is like-
wise interesting, in this regard, to note that Pius XI's 
support for the rights of private property is far less 
heated and univocal than had been Leo XIII's. 1 
Roman Catholic political theorists have also attacked 
the alleged individualism and irreligiosity of·liberals, · 
particularly of the 18th and 19th century variety. They have 
polemicized against capitalism, (sometimes as if it were to 
be identified with the American political system -- and per-
haps with some justification) for its alleged materialistic 
emphasis and its practical dehumanizing methods. Dawson 
suggests that Communism and Capitalism are similar in that 
they both put econ~c considerations first, nand conse-
quently they bo~ are far more opposed to Catholicism 
than .they are to one another.u2 
Fascism is deplored because of its alleged (1) total-
itarianism, (2) centralization of control and power away 
from the people, (3) irrationality, (4) deification of the 
people or the state to the detriment of the individual, and 
(5) opposition to religion, Wherever the totalitarian state 
limits Church worship because it rivals the state•s claim 
for total allegiance of its constituents. Pius XI showed 
1. Compare Pius XI's "Quadragesimo Anno" with Leo XIII' s 
"Rerum Novarum.u 
2. Dawson, Religion and the Modern State, p. 147. 
that the Fascist corporative state dif~ered from that 
solidaristic state proposed by the Church in two ways: 
(a) the voluntary associations under the Fascist system 
were charged with being mouthpieces of the state rather 
than possessing real autonomy, and (b) membership in 
Fascist associations was obligatory. 1 
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One final condemnation of existing state forms and 
ideologies cannot be omitted, though it does not fit into 
any of the preceding classifications. Christopher Dawson 
has made the following judgment: 
Protestantism, Liberalism, and Communism are the 
three successive states by Which our civilization 
has passed from Catholicism to complete secular-
ism. 
The first eliminated the Church, the second elim-
inated Christianity, and the third eliminated the 
human soul. We cannot have a Christian society 
or a Christian economic life until our civiliza-
tion has recovered its moral conscience, its 2 faith in God and its membership in the Church. 
This comment leads to the third consideration. 
c) General lines of state organization which appear most 
acceptable to current Catholic political theorists. 
Though it may be known by different names, current 
Catholic political thought favors an organization of 
1. Pope Pius XI, nQua:dragesimo Anno, n p. 212. 
2. Dawson, Religion and the Modern State, p. 148. 
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society which provides for diversity and unity through a 
network of associational units, each related to the Whole, 
but each performing distinctive functions for its own 
membership. The general conception is democratic in its 
insistence that government comes from the people. Various 
names have been applied to such a social system, which has 
implications for ~e form of state.or government: 
·. 
nsolidarism, 11 ttthe corporative state, u "pluralism, tt or 
even ndemocracy.'' Behind. each name, however, the unity 
of the concept appears, for it consists in an effort to 
decentralize authority and to increase individual partici-
pation and responsibility in social issues and decisions. 
society. 
Pope Pius XI appeals for the development of such a 
That condition [centralization of power] is 
essentially wrong. It throws upon the state 
innumerable burdens humanly impossible for it 
to carry with efficiency. What, therefore, is 
needed is the re-establishment of the normal, 
natural, human organic society in which minor 
functional associations are organically devel-
oped and linked with similar associations into 
an organized life, where burdens are wisely 
distributed and the state attempts to perfo:ml 
no more than its due governmental activities. 
On this basis the Pope endorses the principle of 
ttsubsidiarity," whereoy it is asserted that no higher order 
in society should assume responsibility for doing that Which 
1. Pope Pius XI, "Quadragesimo Anno," p. 206. 
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a lesser order could perform as effectively. Dawson ac-
cepts this teaching that the ttstate is a functional organ-
ism or a graduated hierarchy of corporate groups."1 On 
the practical level, this principle was written into the 
Portuguese Constitution of 1922. 
The State shall promote the formation and develop-
ment of the national corporative economic system. 
Care shall be taken to prevent any tendency among 
its constituent parts to indulge in unrestrained 
competition with each other, contrary to their own just aims and those of society; they shall be en-
couraged rather2to collaborate as members of the same community. 
One of the most recent appeals to the 11corporativeu 
or usolidaristic" state comes from the pen of Azpiazu, who 
advocates a society and state based upon associations 
organized by vocational or professional interest. While 
avoiding degeneration into a rigid class structure, it 
would enable various interests to participate in and con-
tribute to the total life of society. The state's function 
is to assure that these associations will have a common. 
focus of interest and work, and to assure high degrees of 
co-ordination among units. uThe aggregate of these natural 
societies is what·makes up civil society which, according 
to the idea of solidarism, is not a society composed of 
individuals, but of the orderly, systematic grouping of 
1. Dawson, Religion and the Modern State, p. 135. 
2. Ehler and Morall, .21!.· cit., 513. 
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other smaller societies. !'1 The two basic principles of 
solidarism as Azpiazu conceives it are (l) the development 
of a social cohesion which does not rest upon the central 
control of the state, but which is yet a harmonious whole 
rather than proliferated individualism, and (2) the ad-
vancement of an economic system based upon co-operation and 
mutual interest rather than competition. 2 
In $1mroary, though Roman Catholic political 
theorists express no ultimate preference for one or another 
form of government, asking only that each acknowledge the 
freedom of the Church and strive after harmony with the 
natural law, there is condemnation of several existing 
forms of states on various bases. There is general con-
sensus that the centralized state of the present needs to 
be modified to provide for more small associational groups, 
through which individuals may find greater responsibility 
and fulfillment. The state's function is to co-ordinate 
these various smaller units. 
6. General Principles of State Action 
Since the overarching concern of the state is to 
provide for the common good, Roman Catholic social action 
l. Joaquin Azpiazu, The CoB';orative State, trans. William 
Bresnahan (St. Louis: • Herder Book Company, 1951), 
p. 58. 
2. Ibid., 65. 
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becomes basically pragmatic when it seeks to discern what 
will prove most advantageous in particular circumstances. 
Its philosophy of natural law provides a theoretical 
rationale for this pragmatic procedure. However, justice 
is the basic principle guiding the state's actions, or, in 
the light of human destiny, assuring to each man his due 
while at the same time preserving social harmony and the 
common good. In Roman Catholic thought justice is not 
conceived as a secondary principle, on a lower level than 
love. Justice and love exist in mutual harmony, with 
justice expressing love and the natural law. This is 
implied in the statement that "charity will never be true 
charity unless .it takes justice into constant account. ul 
Ryan deplores that "there has been a tendency among too 
many to dissociate the virtue of justice from the virtue 
of charity, with the result that life has been made even 
more selfish and heartless."2 Cahill insists that the 
state is subject to the same moral law as individuals, 
rrand the government of the State in dealing with its own 
members as well as with other corporate bodies or 
individuals is bound by the laws of justice, charity,,and 
religion.n3 
1. Pope Pius XI, "Divini Redemptoris, rt p. 361. 
2. John Ryan and Francis Boland, Catholic Princ~le·s of 
Politics (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1 43), 
p. 160. 
3. Cahill, ££· cit., 465. 
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There is no distinction between justice as the norm 
of social morality, and love as the principle of private 
morality, though such a distinction does find expression in 
some Protestant circles. Justice, according to Catholic 
thought, is not a concession which God makes for a sinful 
world; it is written into the natural law itself. Dawson 
reiterates Augustine when he comments that ttwithout justice 
the state is nothing but organized robbery and the iaw of 
the nations nothing but the destruction of the weak.ul 
The relation between justice and love is implicit 
in the following comment by Pope Pius XI. 
All the institutions of public and social life 
must be imbued with the spirit of justice, and 
this justice must above all be truly operative. 
• • • Social charitf should be, as it were, the 
soul of this order economic] and the duty of 
the state will be with promptness to protect 
and defend it effectively.2 
Three prominent principles of state action in 
Catholic thought merit special consideration. They are 
proximate principles which are neither ultimate nor 
specific applications. (a) The principle of subsidiarity 
has received considerable attention, particularly from 
Pope Pius XI. This principle states that no institution 
should assume the responsibilities or do the work of an 
1. Dawson, The Judgment of the Nations, p. 146. 
2. Pope Pius XI, "Quadragesimo Anno,'' p. 212. 
institution of a lower level (in the social hierarchy) 
which that lower institution could perform without detri-
ment to the common good. Pius XI asserts: 
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Just as it is wrong to take awat from individuals 
what bt their own ability and e fort they can 
accomp ish and commit it to the community, so it 
is an injury and at the same time both a serious 
evil and a perturbation of right order to assign 
to a larger and higher society whit can be per-
formed successfullt by smaller and lower commun-
ities. This is atxed and unchangeable principle 
most basic to social philosophy, immovable and · 
unalterable • .!. 
All those in power should be convinced, therefore;, that the 
more faithfully· this p·rinciple of subsidiarity is implemented 
in social affairs, the more effective and harmonious will be 
that society. 2 On this basis current Roman Catholic prefer-
ence for some sort of "corporative" or Ttpluralisticu state 
rests. In every instance some institution will have to 
judge, on pragmatic grounds, what would best suit the com-
mon good. Once again the judgment of the Church would 
play a large role in determining secular affairs. 
(b) A second principle for state action is that 
which governs social situations which are not ideal. In 
view of the weakness of men and sin in the world, the 
Church recognizes that states and other institutions cannot 
always perform their ideal function. This principle asserts 
1. Ibid., 206-207. 
2. Ibid., 207. 
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that the state may accommodate its principles in situations 
which prohibit it ideal functioning. It phrases the prob-
lem of compromise in positive terms. Compromise of the 
ideal is permitted within the context of another, but 
greater, principle. 
While not conceding any rights to anything save 
what is true and honest, she [the Church] does 
not forbid public authority to tolerate what 
is at variance with truth and justice, for the 
sake of avoiding some greater evil, or of ob-
taining or preserving some greater good.l 
Pius XII has concurred that, 
The duty of repressing moral and religious error 
cannot therefore be an ultimate norm of action. 
It must be subordinate to higher and more general 
norms, which in some circumstances permit, and 
even perhaps seem to indicate as the better 
policy, tolerat~on of error in order to promote 
a greater good. 
It appears on the surface that this principle is two-pronged. 
It could be interpreted by the Church to support religious 
toleration, or toleration of social practices which di4 not 
coincide with the teachings of the Church (e.g. regarding 
the state and education, or the support of the Church by 
the state). On the other hand t:his principle, as stated 
above, could logically lead to a conviction that the end 
justifies the means, and, on that basis, permit widespread 
exercise of intolerance. Though Pope Pius XI states that 
1. Pope Leo XIII, ttLibertas Humana," p. 134. 
2. Pope Pius XII, nAnalecta," p. 134. 
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"the tolerance of evil which is dictated by political 
prudence should be strictly confined to the limits which its 
justifying cause, the public welfare, requires,"1 it is by 
no means clear that this principle assu~es more tolerance 
than if the principle were never stated. 
(c) A third basic principle in Raman Catholic thought 
is political only in its ramifications. This principle 
states that in the natural lawmen are inclined towards as-
sociation with others, and therefore need that association 
for their full realization. On this basis, it is postulated 
by the Church that human beings have the right of voluntary 
association, insofar as such association does not impair the 
common good. Implicit in this principle lies the idea that 
the state must recognize the existence and value of such 
associations. It also intimates that the.state's primary 
function is the co-ordination of the efforts of these 
groups. It is through the creativity of these associations 
that society as a whole retains its health~ For the govern-
ment to assume responsibilities which individuals or small 
groups could as adequately perform is an act of irresponsi-
bility which shows that government to be indifferent to 
injustice and oppression. 2 
1. Pope Leo XIII, nLibertas Humana, u p. 135 •. 
2. Haas, 2£· cit., 387. 
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In conclusion, Roman Catholics conceive of the 
state's principle of action as controlled ultimately by the 
ideas of the common good achieved through justice. But 
neither this common good, nor the avenues toward it, can 
be blueprinted once and for all circumstances. The move-
ment towards that common good must be pragmatically analyzed 
in each new situation, seeking in the necessary compromises 
of each situation to incorporate as much of the common good 
as possible. Many antitheses will continue to exist within 
society, for society: is dynamic and growing. These 
antitheses will not be eliminated, nor should they be 
understood as mutually exclusive. Society is always a 
complex balance between freedom and order, freedom and 
authority, individual rights and state rights. One point 
in history may require the aceentuation of one; another 
juncture might demand its opposite. Through this dynamic 
equilibrium of opposing forces, caught up in the stability 
of la~ and government, society may move toward fuller 
realization of the common good. 
CHAPTER II 
STATE AND CULTURAL UNITS AND ACTIVITIES 
A. STATE AND OTHER CULTURAL UNITS 
1. State and the Individual 
The following discussion of the relation between the 
individual and the state will be divided into three- sections: 
(a) relation between individual and state in creation, 
(b) obligations of the state toward the individual, and 
(c) duties of the individual toward the state. In the dis-
cussions of each section it should be kept in mind constantly 
that within Roman Catholic political thought there is wide-
spread opposition to "individualism" which conceives of men 
as if they were isolated from the rest of mankind. 
a) Relation between individual and state in creation 
Both individuals and the state originate in the 
natural creation, and both are subject to the natural law. 
It is theoretically impossible to determine whether the 
individual or the state is of earlier origin, since the 
state is already implied in the ontological nature of man. 
Nevertheless 11man is older than the State and he holds the 
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right of providing for the life of his body prior to the 
formation of any State. 111 For two reasons, the individual 
is superior to the state: (1) the logical priority of 
the individual in the natural order, and (2) the super-
natural dimension of man's destiny. In addition to the 
individual's primacy over the state, the people as a 
whole are superior to the body politic. ttThe people are 
the very substance, the living and free substance, of the 
bo~y politic. ~e people are above the State, the people 
are not for the State, the State is for the people.rr2 
The relationship between state and individual re-
quires that there be mutual recognition of the other's 
dignity and value. "The community as well as the citizen 
is of divine origin, and each is adapted to the other; 
therefore neither citizen nor society can repudiate each 
other's obligations nor deny or reduce each other's 
rights."3 
b) Obligations of the state toward the individual 
Since the state's primary task is to provide for 
the common good, and since the common good includes concern 
1. Pope Leo XIII, nRerum Novarum," p. 171. 
2. Maritain~ Man and the State, p. 26. 
I 
3. Ehler and Morall, op. cit., 558~ [From Pope Pius XI's 
"Divini Redemptoris. 11 1 
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for an individual's development towards his God-willed 
destiny 7 the state is responsible for serving those needs. 
"The State's reason for existing is to help him in the 
acquisition of these possessions and of a truly human 
life.n1 Here Maritain speaks of man's acquisition of 
supra-worldly possessions. In the state's attempts to 
provide for the common good, moreover, the individual good 
is not to be dissociated from the common good; individual-
ism does not supercede the corporate communal needs. "The 
true conception of political life is neither exclusively 
personalist nor exclusively communal. 112 
The state can serve best the common good when, 
under the moral and natural law, it respects human rights, 
which may be either natural or positive. 3 In either case 
the state is obliged to sustain those rights through legal 
means and distributive justice. 4 The basis of man's 
natural right lies in the fact that he was constituted a 
person by God, and made for life. eternal. uThis is the 
origin of those primordial rights which political society 
must respect and which it may not injure when it requires 
l. Maritain, Christianiti and Democraci, p. 47. 
2. Maritain, Person and the Common Good, p. 55. 
3. Haas, .2:2.• ~., 101. 
4. Cahill, .2:2.• cit., 492. 
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services of its members.ul Man, therefore, possesses cer-
tain inalienable rights because he exists in a certain 
relationship with God; neither the society nor the state 
create these natural rights. 2 This does not mean, sug-
gests Pope Pius XI, that all men have equal political 
rights. One of the charges against Communism is that it 
does not recognize different levels ~f rights in society. 
nit is utterly untrue, and mere empty talk, to say that 
all citizens have equal rights and that there are no ruling 
ranks in society.u3 In any case, political and positive 
rights are moral only When they are determined by consider-
ation of man•s natural rights, and the common good. 
One area in which considerable discussion has been 
pursued both within Catholic circles, and between Catholic 
and other theorists, is that of the state's role in assur-
ing religious liberty for the individual. Traditionally, 
the Roman Church has maintained that since the state's 
obligation is provision for the common good, and since the 
common good requires concern for man•s supernatural destiny, 
the state must be concerned about true religion. Therefore 
1. Maritain, Person and the Common Good, p. 65. 
2. ttNatural rights are inherent in human beings, and they 
proceed from the moral law as their ultimate source." 
Haas, .QE.• ~·, 109. 
3. Ehler and Morall, ~· £!!., 558. 
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the traditional Roman Catholic view is that the state 
should support the Roman Church. Furthermore, there are 
some who justify religious intolerance with the dictum 
that "only truth has rights; error has no rights ... Ryan, 
a prominent American Catholic, makes the following state-
ment about religious liberty: 
.Rights are merely memls to ra-tional ends. Since 
·no. rational end is promoted by the dissemination 
of false doctrine, there exists no right to in-
dulge in this practice.· The fact that an in-
dividual may in good faith think that his false 
religion is true gives no more right to pro-
pagate it than the sincerity of tha alien 
anarchist entitles him to advocite his abomi-
nable political theories. .. • c. - .. 
Rommen states that ttthe right to religious freedom means 
ultimately the freedom of the Church, not the freedom of 
the individual against the Church." 2 
Other Roman Catholic political theorists repudiate 
this alleged intolerance of the Catholic Church toward non-
Catholics. Baierl contends that the Popes do not propose 
physical compulsion and coercion.of religious doctrine, but 
1. Ryan, ncomments on the 'Christian Constitution of States,'" 
p. 36. 
2. Rommen, 2.£• cit •. , 380. It is frequently charged that 
this intolerance of non-Catholics is not merely a fiction, 
but a prominent social factor in lands with a prepon-
derance of Roman Catholics. Religious persecution in 
Spain and Colombia is cited as an example of the 11unfor-
tunate" implementation of this theory. See, for example, 
the Ecumenical Press Service (June 10, 1953), p. 3. 
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the more subtle means of moral suasion. 1 He suggests that 
such "moral compulsion" is the legitimate respon~ibility of 
the Church. "The intolerance of the Syllabus is theoretical 
dogmatic intolerance, something entirely different from 
c~vil and political."2 Without entering into a discussion 
of whether this actually ensures religious liberty, Baierl 
goes on to contend that Pope Pius IX does not reify repres-
sion of wrong religious doctrine to the exclusion of other 
interests of the Church and other principles. This principle 
of repressing moral and religious misdirection "must be 
subordinated to higher and more general norms, which in 
certain circumstances permit, and even make it appear the 
better part, not to impede error in order to promote the 
greater good. 113 This.is based upon the recognition that 
even God tolerates sin and error. 
Other Catholics attack the proposition, reiterated 
by Ryan, that error has no rights. Rather Rouquette 
answers this position with the statement that 
Neither error nor truth can have rights as such. 
Only people can have ri~hts. • •• Is it not 
possible, while denounc~ng error~ error, to 
allow the broad rights of individuals to seek 
truth at their own risk, even given the danger 
1. Baierl, 2£· cit., 111-112. 
2. Ibid., 113. 
3. Ibid., 121. 
of embracing error • • • collectively and 
sociologically?l 
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Father Rouquette suggests that even a predominantly Catholic 
state would not be justified in~reventing its citizens from 
falling into religious error."2 Other Catholics such as 
John Courtney Murray, 3 Jacques Maritain, 4 and Father 
Pribilla take similar positions Which would provide for 
genuine religious liberty for non-Catholics in the state. 
Such ideas find constitutional expression in the 1937 
Constitution of Eire, which states: "The State shall not 
impose any disabilities or make any discrimination on the 
ground of religious profession, belief or status."5 
The role of the state in providing religious liberty 
for the individual is still clouded in Catholic thought, 
but it is a confusion based upon attempts to think more 
clearly about the issue. 
c) Duties of the individual toward the state 
Because it is impossible to divorce personal good 
from the common good, 6 uall during his life he [the 
1. (Robert Rouquette], uFrench Jesuit on Religious Liberty," 
Christianity and Crisis, IX, 17 (October 17, 1949), p. 133. 
2. Ibid., 133. 
3. Murray, .2E.. ill· , 46. 
4. Maritain, Man and the State, p. 175. 
5. Ehler and Morall, .2E.· .ill· , 599. 
6. Azpiazu, £e• cit., 35. 
individual] has continually to associa·te the two ends and 
subordinate them or co~ordinate them in accordance with 
the importance of each."l Since both the state and the 
individual seek the highest common good, their ·tasks are 
parallel, ·and mutual co-operation ought to be the rule. 
Pope Pius XI asserts that nit is of the very essence of 
social justice to demand from each individual all that 
is necessary for the common good.u2 
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This participation of the individual in the state's 
work of seeking the common good ~equires that an individual 
respect the authority of the state, submit to its just laws, 
and in many cases devote one's services to its causes. 3 
nMan cannot be exempted from his divinely imposed obliga-
tions toward civil society, and the representatives of 
authority have the right to coerce him when he refuses 
without.reason to do his duty .. "4 The sole occasion for 
man's disobedience to the state is when the latter demands 
something which ttis openly repugnant to the natural or the 
divine law."5 
l. Ibid. , 54. 
2. Pope Pius XI, univini Redemptoris," p. 362. 
3. Pope Leo XIII, nLibertas Humana, tt p. 123. See also 
Cahill, ~· cit., 493. 
4. Pope Pius XI, nnivini Redemptoris," p. 352. 
5. Pope Leo XIII, "Diuturnum,u p. 55. 
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In conclusion, relations between the individual and 
the state revolve around the interpretation of the common 
good. The individual exists in the natural and super-
natural realm through participation in the common good. 
Mutual rights and duties of the individual and the state 
can be defined only on the basis of their respective as-
signments in the realization of the common good. The state 
owes the individual that whiCh facilitates his development 
towards his supernatural destiny; the individual owes the 
state that which contributes to the development of all 
men': towards their true destiny, which, concomitantly, 
contributes to his own fulfillment. 
2. State and Family 
According to Roman Catholic social philosophy of 
the Thomist tradition there are three necessary institutions 
in man 1 s life: the Family, the State, and the Church. Of 
these the Family and the State are natural institutions, 
growing out of the natural ontological nature of man. 
This discussion centers around the relation between these 
two necessary natural institutions. 
In what sense is the family superior to the state, 
and upon what bases does it make claims from the state'? 
The first reason for t~e priority of the family over the 
state is that it is "instituted directly by God for its 
-· '··' ·.--
peculiar purpose, the generation and formation of off-
spring.nl The family is a true society whose principal 
purpose is to provide souls for God's creation; therefore 
it is "anterior to every kind of State or nation, with 
rights and duties of its own, totally independent of the 
comm.onwealth."2 A second reason for the priority of the 
family over the state stems fram the historical existence 
of the family prior to the state. "The first natural 
society formed in the world • • • is the family •••• 
The family is the fundamental social cell of the Whole 
Christian order.n3 
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Thirdly, the family is interpreted by some to meet 
more fundamental needs of the human being than the state: 
The family, like the individual, is prior to 
the state. It comes into being in response 
to human needs and tendencies that are more 
urgent and more deeply rooted in human nature, 
and more necessary to all the best interests 
of the individual and the race than the needs 
for which the State has immediately to provide.4 
Fourthly, some Catholics conceive of the family as a moral 
unit, possessing certain rights independent of the state. 
1. Pope Pius XI, uRappresentanti, u p. 92. 
2. Leo XIII, ttRerum Novarum," p. 173. 
3. Azpiazu, ~· cit., 72. 
4. Cahill, £e· £!!., 321. 
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These rights are claimed to be inherent i~ the family, and 
must be respected for the proper functioning of that 
family. 1 Upon these considerations, the family can claim 
the respect and protection of the state. 
On the other hand, the family is limited. These 
limits of the family are stressed by the same author who 
contends that families have inherent rights and personality. 2 
The state's claim over the family rests upon the belief that 
while the state is a "perfect" society, possessing all the 
powers and characteristics requisite to its task, the 
family is an nimperfectu society, needing the aid and 
supplementation of other social units, including the state. 
nThe State is a necessary and natural institution, because 
the family alone is incapable of providing everything for 
the full development of life, and because the State is 
needed for the co-ordination of social activities unto the 
common good."3 
The family is an imperfect society, since it has 
not in itself all the means for its own complete 
development; Whereas eivil society is a perfect 
society, having in itself all the means for its 
peculiar end, which is the temporal well-being of 
the community; and so, in·this respect, that is 
in view of the common good, it has pre-eminence 
1. Haas, 22.• cit., 174. 
2. Ibid., 174. 
3. Augustine Osgniach, The Christian State (Milwaukee: 
Bruce Publishing Company, 1943), pp. 19-20. The 
over the family, which finds its own suitable 
perfection precisely in civil society.l 
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This right of the state over the family is limited, 
contingent upon the inability of the family to function 
properly for the common good. But the legislator ought to 
start with the premise that the family can manage its own 
affairs adequately. 2 It is the responsibility of the state 
to judge whether, in specific instances, the family is 
functioning normally or not. 3 Society can justifiably ex-
pect that the family will act as an economic unit, and as 
a social school, for these are the principal contributions 
of the family to the common good. 4 In the interest of 
social growth and the common good the state will be vigilant 
for the preservation of the legitimate functions of the 
family, since they nourish the total life of community. 
ttFamily, economic, cultural, educational, religious life 
matter as much as does political life to the very existence 
and prosperity of the body politio.u5 
If the state attempts to do for members of families 
things which they should do for themselves, it 
1. Pope Pius XI, 11Rappresentanti,n p. 92. 
2. Haas, ~· ill.·, 180. 
3. Ibid., 180. 
4. Ibid., . 164. 
5. Maritain, Man and the State, p. 11. 
stifles personality, and reduces its citizens 
to a condition of depemdenGe and indifference. 
The private initiative of family life, therefore, 
is always to be preferred to governmental inter-
ference, and the latter is to be resorted to 
only when private initiative within the family, 
for either personal ~r social reasons, fails to 
func.tion adequately. 
In conclusion, both families and states possess 
inherent rights from natural law, and though autonomous, 
each is obliged to complement and assist the other in the 
performance of its assigned functions in straining toward 
the common good. 
3. State and Ch~rch 
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The following discussion of the relations between 
the state and the Church will be presented under two head-
ings: (a) comparison of the theoretical status of the 
state and the Church, and (b) relations between the state 
and Church on the operational level. The uchurch" does 
not refer, of course, to religious institutions in general, 
but to the Roman Catholic Church in particular. 
a) Comparison of the theoretical status of the state and 
the Church 
According to Roman Catholic thought of the Thomist 
tradition, the ~tate and Church are both ttperfecttt 
1. Haas, ~· cit., 181. 
institutions, possessing all the necessary attributes to 
the complete performance of their respective tasks. The 
major difference between the state and the Church stems 
from the claim that the state is a "naturaln institution, 
concerned primarily with the temporal conditions of men 
and the common·good, while the Church is a "supernatural" 
institution, whose special responsibility is to guide man 
towards his ultimate supernatural destiny. The state 
develops naturally out of human nature, while the Church 
is founded by a special dispensation from God. 1 · Both 
state and Church are concerned with the fulfillment of 
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man, but the state does not possess all the characteristics 
requisite for this achievement. 
The Almighty has appointed the charge of the 
human race between two powers, the ecclesias-
tical and the civil, the one being set over 
d~vine, the other over human,things. Each in 
its kind is supreme, each has fixed limits 
within which it is contained, which are defined 
by the na.ture and special object of the province 
of each.~ 
...... _,. 
One is committed directly and specifically with 
the charge of what is helpful in worldly matters; 
while the other is to concern itself with the 
things that pertain to heaven and eternity. 
Everything in human affairs that is in any way 
1. Rommen~ ~· cit., 572. 
2. Pope Leo XIII~ nlnmortali Dei,u p. 71. 
sacred, or has reference to the salvation of 
souls and the worship of God, Whether by its 
nature or by its end, is subject to the jurisdiction and discipline of the Church.l 
Since both the state and Church originate in the 
will of God, theoretically there should be no conflict 
between them. But the spheres of their interest tend to 
merge or fuse together. Conflicts do occur, and in such 
instances the authority of the Church is judged to take 
precedence, because its function is higher than that of 
the state. 2 Furthermore, the Church.has been assigned 
responsibility for interpreting the moral law, even When 
that seems to infringe upon the authority of the state. 3 
Christ could have instituted the state with spiritual 
authority, but 11rather He has created a specific admin-
istrative organization for the sphere of religious life 
and has endowed this organization with sovereignty; that 
is, He bas made it entirely self-sufficient, and in its 
sphere of activity, wholly independent of every other 
power on earth."4 
b) Relations between state and Church on the operational 
level 
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The presentation of this subject will be pursued 
under six prominent topics in Roman Catholic thought about 
1. Pope Pius XI, "Rappresentanti," p. 104. 
2. Rommen, .2£· cit., 546. 
3. Cahill,~· cit., 602. 
4. Baierl, ~· £!!., 62. 
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Church-state relations: (1) lines of defining the proper 
relations·, (2) religious freedom, (3) separation of Church 
and state, (4) concordats, (5) 11Catholic Action, 11 and 
(6) method of Catholic persuasion. 
(1) Lines of defining the proper relations. 
While it is broadly asserted that the state is 
responsible for temporal welfare, and the Church for the 
spiritual destiny of man, this proves inadequate in actual 
practice, for institutions tend to extend their authority, 
the line between spiritual and temporal affairs is not 
easily defined, the Church is responsible for some temporal 
affairs since these cannot be divorced from spiritual wel-
fare, and the temporal welfare has spiritual facets. 
Rommen conceives these spheres as two intersecting circles, 
with the size of the intersecting area varying considerably 
in different cultures. 1 
Further comments by Roman Catholic theorists illus-
trate the impossibility of defining accurately and univer-
sally what the proper lines of Church and state authority 
shall be. Ryan comments that "no formal, dogmatic pronounce-
ment has ever been made by the Church regarding her precise 
authority in civil affairs."2 Baierl contends that relations 
1. Rommen, 2£· cit., 580. 
2. Ryan, "Comments on the 'Christian Constitution of States,'" 
p. 44. 
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between Church and state practiced in the Middle Ages cannot 
be considered normative for today's relations. 1 Finally, 
Lecler approvingly quotes Cardinal Baudrillart that "the 
relatians of the Church and State are not regulated in ac-
cordance with absolute and, so to speak, geometrical prin-
ciples; they result from the social and political situa-
tion."2 
The Church did not come into the world with a 
ready-made doctrine to govern her relations 
with the secular powers. She has defined her 
attitude step by step, in order to cope with 
situations which grew progressively more compleK. 3 
One distinction about Which Roman Catholic theo-
logians disagree is that between udirectu and uindirect" 
power of the Church in temporal affairs. Others reject 
the major thesis of each of these groups and contend that 
the role of the popes and Church in this area (of secular 
affairs) is merely directive and to give counsel. 4 The 
debate cannot be engaged here; to mention its influence 
illustrates the diversity of the Catholic position. In 
general the theory of ttdirect" power over the state finds 
few exponents in the modern day, with men like Dawson and 
1. Baierl, ~· ~·, 21. 
2. Lecler, ~· cit., 41. 
3. ~-' 51. 
4. Ryan, ncomments on the • Christian Constitution of 
States, tn p. 44. 
Maritain propounding the ttcounsel" theory. 
(2) Religious freedom 
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Though the logic of the Catholic position dictates 
state support for the Roman Church, there are numbers of 
Catholics who advocate religious freedom, despite the 
certainty that errors will be propagated. Even when 
Catholics are in a majority it is the position of same men 
like Maritain that minority religiio.us units should still 
experience real ·and practical religious freedom.· The 
state should support only "the common secular faith in the 
conmon secular charter. ul However, many Catholics accept 
the logic of their position that only Catholics should 
experience true religious freedom. Ryan is one who sug• 
gests that only Catholicism should be tolerated and en-
couraged in a dominantly Catholic state. 2 
Many Catholics confine their interests primarily to 
defining the freedoms which the Catholic Church should 
enjoy in social relations, without involvement in a discus-
~ion of the rights of others. The freedom of the Church 
should consist in at least the following: administration 
of the sacraments by those constituted by the Church with 
authority, preaching of the Gospel and the Church's 
1. Maritain, Man and the State, p. 114. 
2. George Coe, unemocracy Also Confronts the ·Church,u 
Christendom, IV, 4 (Autumn, 1939), p. 563. 
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teachings, missionary activity, worship in accordance with 
the teachings of the Church, direction of clergymen in 
maintaining ecclesiastical discipline. 1 
(3) Separation of Church and state. 
The general Catholic position is a repudiation of 
the doctrine of Church-state separation, since genuine con-
cern for the common good obligates the state to support the 
one Church and religion Which can assure that common good. 
Ryan affirms the state's responsibility for supporting the 
Catholic religion. 2 Pius IX officially condemned the 
separation of Church and state in his Syllabus of Errors, 
but Baierl claims that this was a condemnation in principle 
Which recognized that in some historical situations 
separation is acceptable in the interest of avoiding a 
greater evil. 3 Collaboration between Church and state 
is explicitly endorsed by Leo XIII in his principle of 
.. concordia," which suggests a close and dynamic relation-
ship between both spheres, but avoiding the absorption of 
one into the other. This emphasis on dynamic relationship, 
rather than either "separation" or "union" is espoused by 
1. Rommen, op. cit., 572. 
--
2. Ryan, "Comments on the 'Christian Constitution of 
States, tn p. 34. 
3. Baierl, .2E.• cit., 191. See also Pope Leo XIII, nLibertas 
Humana," p. 'm. 
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John Courtney Murray. 1 
Among Catholics a general d stinction is sometimes 
made between the American forms of dhurch-state separation 
and those in Europe during its rebeilion against the Church. 
This distinction is suggested by MaJitain, Rommen, and 
Murray. Maritain advocates the kind of separation exer-
cised in America because it is not nti-clerical in 
spirit. 2 John Courtney Murray cond nes separation, sug-
gesting that too close identificati n of the Church with 
the state would prove detrimental t 
the Church because of the changing 
institutions and the transcendent c 
life and work of 
of all political . 
.. 
of the Church. 3 
1. 
I think that an affirmative swer to the question 
[Whether a state has to pro ct and control the 
right religion] would imply denial or nefllect 
of that nvital law of conti al adaptation which 
is the law of the Church 1 s ought and action •• 
• .. Actually it was alo_ng th t path, and in obedi-
ence to that law, that the C urch came to the 
idea that ltifreedam of the Ch rch' meant being 1 the 
religion of the state•. But this idea is cer-
tainly not the end of the ro d, beyond which lies 
only aberration. Surely I d not have to believe 
2. Maritain, Man and the State, p. 
~· ~., 605. 
See also Rommen, 
3. Murray, "On the Structure of the hurch ... state Problem, n 
p. 31. 
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that the Church has suddenly become 'petrified 
in a given moment of hi story, '1 • • • and has 
'closed herself to all further progress'.! 
Finally, Weigel proffers three principles which 
should determine Church-state relations: (a) because the 
Church is a supernatural institution it is free from the 
jurisdiction of the state, (b) arrangements between Church 
and state must be adapted to meet the needs of varying situ-
ations, with as little accommodation to error as possible, 
and (c) Church and state must collaborate since they are 
both serving the same human person. 2 
(4) Concordats 
Where relations between Church and state have been 
tenuous, the Church has often sought to negotiate Concordats 
with existing rulers to ensure the maximum amount of freedom 
possible< for its work. Concordats have been made in 
countries like Austria, Nazi Germany, and Italy, When 
governments have been unwilling to support the Church. 
Concordats are compacts between Church and state, but their 
legal nature is under dispute. 3 
Three general theories of the nature of Concordats 
find expression in Catholic circles: (a) the nlegalist 
1. Murray, "Contemporary Orientations, 11 p. 47. 
2. Baierl, ~~ cit., 220. 
3. Ibid., 106. 
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theoryn holds that, in reality, the state is supreme over 
the Church, and has merely concede some privileges to the 
Church which may be abrogated if th need arises; (b) the 
"compact theorytt conceives that a C ncordat is equally 
binding upon both partners, who equal before the law; 
and (c) the nprivilege theory" asse t:s that the Church and 
pope grant privileges to the state ut of concern for the 
work of the state. 1 The ory is widely held 
today. 2 In matters of dispute, Ca olics believe that the 
Church, through the Sovereign Ponti f, "always remains the 
authoritative interpreter.n3 
Various interpretations of he value of Concordats 
may be found in Catholic thought. ~eoretically there 
should never be a need for concorda~s, for they arise 
only when dissention arises between Church and state.4 
Yet the positive value of Concordat is asserted by Lecler: 
••The concordatory system is in itse f an excellent arrange-
ment • • • • These solemn agreement between the Holy See 
1. nconcordat," The Catholic Enc cl edia, IV, 198. 
2. Lecler, ~· cit., 45. Other dis ussions of the legal 
nature or-Concordats may be foun in Baierl, .2E.· cit., 
106, and in Rommen, ~· cit., 58 -590. 
3. "Concordat," The Catholic Enc edia, IV, 202. 
4. 
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and national governments enable que tions on the border-line 
between the spiritual and the tempo~al to be perfectly 
solved. ul 
(5) Catholic Action 
Catholics are enc:.oJuraged t participate in the 
temporal affairs of the state, both as individuals and as 
groups united in "Catholic Action." Catholic Action nseeks 
to apply Catholic principles to all departments of life; 
for instance to industrial, politic 1, racial and inter-
national relations. 112 Even when th state works in these 
areas, the Church is responsible fo continuing its activ-
ities through Catholic Acti0n. 3 
Widespread fear that Cathol c Action will result 
in the formation of political parti s is evident in 
Roman Catholic circles, for it is f ared that such parties 
might lead to harmful disputes en varying elements of 
the Church. 4 These parties are not onceived as contrary 
to Catholic principles of action, b t they are inimical 
to Catholic unity. 5 
l. Lecler, ~· cit., 42-43. 
2. Ryan, The Citizen the Church and the State, p. 20. 
3. Pope Pius XI, nnivini Redemptoris, 11 p. 370. 
4. Pope Pius XI, "Firmissimam Consta tiam,u Social 
Wellsprings, ed. Joseph Husslein (Milwaukee: The Bruce 
PUblishing Company, 1942); II, 38 -387. 
5. Ibid., 387. 
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(6) Method of Catholic persuasion 
Many Catholic theorists ace pt the principle of 
Church-state separation, and freque tly hail it as an ad-
vance for the Church, since the Chu ch must rely upon 
moral suasion rather than various f rms of compulsion. 
Eckhardt interpreted the Pope's con ordat with Mussolini, 
whereby the Church was forced to re ort to spiritual power, 
as beneficial to the Church: urn 1 sing control of the 
papal states, the Holy See had got ~id of its character-
istics of •caesaropapism', under Wh~ch its spiritual . 
power was too often subordinated to the secular."1 Speak-
ing in a debate with Paul Blanshard a sharp critic of the 
Roman Church, Father Duttne interpre s the moral teachings 
of the Church as prohibiting effort to "implement moral 
teachings through political power. u Maritain and Dawson 
both appeal to the moral persuasion Churc.h, with 
Dawson remarking, perhaps unrealist "there is no 
longer any danger of Christians att ting to force their 
beliefs on others at the point of sword or of their 
1. Reinhold Niebuhr, "Papal Politic , u Christendom, II, 2 (Spring, 1937), p. 343. 
2. Harvard Law School Fowm, The Ca ,holic Church and 
Politics (Cambridge, Massachuset s: Samuel Marcus Press, 
1950) , p. 35. [Held at the Camb idge High and Latin 
School. Speakers participating ere Father George Dunne 
and Paul Blanshard. 1 
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trying to make men religious by act f Parliament."! 
In conclusion, the formula t at the state is respon-
sible in the temporal arena, and the Church exercises author-
ity in the spiritual realm, provides theoretical direction 
to determining proper Church-state r In practice, 
however, the principles are inapplic ble in neat, concise 
equations. The lines between state 
shifting; they need constant refo 
to meet the challenges of new and c 
4. State and Othe 
d Church are forever 
and redefinition 
ing situations. 
The Catholic doctrine of re tions between states 
will be presented under the followi! categories: (a) phil-
osophical basis for relations betwe states, (b) inter-
national law and international org ization, and (c) war. 
a) Philoso hical basis for relation between states 
Because in Roman Catholic tJought states develop 
out of the needs implanted in man t 
no particular kind of soci~l organi 
the natural law, 
is considered 
sacrosanct. Social organization mu t_ adjust perennially 
to new situations and problems in o der to provide for the 
maximum common good in each instant • In the light of the 
natural law and the common good rel between states 
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must be established and judged. olio theorists stress 
the need for international co-operat on in the interests 
of the common good, in both its temp ral and supernatural 
dimensions. "The common good in our day is certainly not 
just the common good of the nation d has not yet suc-
ceeded in becoming the common good o the civilized world 
community. It tends, however, unmis akably toward the 
latter. ul Wright comments that 
No national communities can, in their political 
vindications, seek the sett ement of their mutual 
differences without bringin the particular good 
of their own nations into h rm.ony with that 
greater good identified wit the general welfare 
of the great community of nkind. 2 
Morally, then, states not only may eek mutual co-operation, 
but, particularly in the modern word where man's inter-
dependence is increasingly manifest in economic and cul-
tural, as well as political spheres they are obligated 
to link their efforts toward the to al common good. 
The interchange, ever more intensive, of ideas, 
services and goods of every kind has daily 
strengthened the national s lidarity of States 
and tightened ever closer t eir bonds of mutual 
interdependence from which n the future there 
is no possibility of escape. 
Today the order and prosper ty of each nation 
is indissolubly bound to t order and prosper-
ity of the rest. No State an not hope fully 
1. Maritain, The Person and on Good, p. 45. 
2. Wright, 2E.· cit., 207. 
to discharge its duty toward those dependent 
upon it unless it can count n the more or 
less generous collaboration f other States, 
or be assured that the mutua ly planned efforts 
of the collectivity of State$ will result in 
general conditions favorablelto order and 
universal peace, Which constitute the inter-
national common good. 
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This universal common good w ich complies with 
the requirements of the soci 1 nature of man 
can only be the outcome of t e ordered rational 
collaboration of all States. 
Maritain asserts that stateslhave no reason for 
acting independently from other stat s when such action 
would jeopardize the common good, fot no state is sovereign 
since it does not possess absolute aithority, even over 
its own constituency. 2 
b) International law and internation 
The development of an intern of co-
operation, and the codification of i ternational regulations, 
are logical applications of Roman Ca holic political thought. 
It is as natural and necessary for t ese organs to be 
'' developed as it was for the evolution of the state in the 
past. Ryan and Boland state that nations must agree to 
seek a nebulous common good, and that practical steps must 
be taken for concrete realization of that good. "If the 
social life of the nations is to be in complete harmony 
1. Ryan and Boland, .2£.· cit., 235. 
2. Maritain, Man and the State, pp. 194-195 •. 
--
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with the designs of the Creator it must be organized 
juridically •••• The social nature of man calls for this 
organization.n1 
While the development of international organization 
and law need detailed definition, it is stressed that the 
roots for these institutions must be nourished by a common 
ethos and morality. Haas had this in mind when he com-
mented that, "in a certain sense true internationalism may 
be regarded as an attitude of mind."2 It is also what 
Malines believed when he wrote of machinery for international 
co-operation: 0 It will be a lifeless body so long as there 
is no agreement of minds on the certain and indestructible 
principles which must govern international life, or union 
of wills in the fulfillment of the same ideal of ju~tice 
and charity.u3 
Despite the fact that internationalism is inherent 
in the Roman Catholic doctrine of society, even Catholics 
themselves sometimes deplore the fact that relatively few 
prominent internationalists have been Catholic. 
, :The existence of an international societ~1 
is in accord with God's designs as a result 
of man 1 s natural sociability. It is for 
1. Ibid., 236. 
2. Haas, ~· .£.!:;., 481. 
3. Ryan and Boland, ~· .ill·, 237. 
4. He does not say "state,u but implies it in his other 
sentences. 
c) War 
-
human wisdom to organi~e that society. Immense 
efforts have been directed to this end and 
Catholic public opinion has not taken its 
proper share.l 
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While Catholics deplore war as an abuse of God's 
creation, a violation qf the natural law, and as detrimental 
to the common good, the Church avows that there are "just" 
wars. Wars are justified on the principle alluded to above, 
which permits actions which are usually evil if they are 
engaged for the avoidance of a greater evil. "Catholic 
theologians and mo·ralists, whilst refusing to condemn war 
absolutely, are careful to lay down the precise conditions 
with which a war must comply in order to remain within the 
limits of justice!i2 The following conditions are unani-
mously accepted as necessary for a just war: (1) It must 
have been declared by a legitimate authority (those Who 
have respensibility for defending and promoting .,the 
legitimate interests of the social body.") 3 (2) It must 
have a "just and grave cause, proportioned to the evils it 
brings about." (3) It can be engaged only nafter all means 
1. Ibid., 242. 
2. Ibid., 254. 
3. I~id., 254-255. 
4. tbid., 254 .. ttThe defence of an essential right which is 
unjustly attacked is the sole justifying cause of a de-
fensive war; the asserting of an essentially right 
unjustly denied, that of an offensive war; and the 
126 
of peaceful solution of the conflict have been exhausted 
without success."1 (4) It must tthave a serious chance of 
success.u2 (5) It must ube carried out with a right 
intention. "3 "This right intention, demanded by the 
moralists as an essential condition of a legitimate war, 
may easily agree with other motives which are more inter-
ested, but still in conformity with right and reason."4 
Within the Roman Church there are some pacifists 
who contend that whereas war might have been justified in 
the past [and presumably some would deny the justifiabil-
ity of even these wars 1, it cannot be allowed .-today because 
of the destructive capacity of modern warfare. Men like 
Ryan and Boland challenge this contention on the g~unds 
that "a refusal to allow Right the assistance of force in 
any circumstance simply allows force to take precedence 
over right with impunity and delivers up humanity to the 
far more serious disorder of moral violence.n5 Whether 
helping of a belligerent who has a just cause for war, 
that of a war of intervention." Ibid. , 254-255. Each 
of these causes should aim at the re-establishment of 
proper order. 
l. Ibid., 254. 
3. Ibid., 254. 
5. Ibid., 254. 
2. ~·' 254. 
4. Ibid., 261. 
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this is true is not at issue here (though pacifists would 
have questions about the value of these arguments, e.g. 
does uRightu have rights, or do people, etc.); the concern 
here is to demonstrate that there is diversity among 
Catholics, though the majority accept war as a lesser of 
two evils when it can be adjudged just. 
Practical situations are variously interpreted, 
however, as is indicated in the distress of some Catholics 
at Pope Pius XI's attitude toward the rise and exploits of 
Mussolini. 1 Even though the principles appear. clear, 
application introduces a legion of problems which may 
divide Catholic opinion, both within and across national 
boundaries. 
5. State and Associational Units 
From the preceding discussion of the organization 
of the state, it will be clear that Catholic social 
thought encourages the establishment and protectio~ of 
various associational units in society, whose life and 
rights it is the responsibility of the state·to protect 
so long as they remain harmonious with the total common 
good. These associations do not exist in abstraction, 
1. Gaetano S~lvelnini, uThe Vatican and the Ethiopian War," 
Christend&m, II, 1 (Winter, 1937), pp. 31-32. 
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but are identical with their membership, "considered col-
lectively."l As long as they are "in harmony with the 
moral law, they have the right necessary to effect that 
[their] purpose."2 
Leo XIII bases the rights of such associations 
upon the natural inclination of man to associate; The 
state must respect the rights of these association$~ for 
if it challenges the rights of associations, it thereby 
contradicts its own authority, since the state itself 
rests upon the same principle, viz. uthe natural propen-
sity of men to live in society. 113 Both Leo XIII and 
Pius XI condone the principle of subsidiarity, whereby 
associations' rights are guaranteed protection against 
interference by the state in their inner life. This prin-
ciple of subsidiarity outlaws interference by a higher 
social unit in the life of a smaller unit, where the lat-
ter could perform the same function with equal efficiency, 
which is measured, in turn, by considerations of the com-
mon good. 4 The principle of subsidiarity protects the 
1. Lewisc·Watt, The State (3rd edition, Oxford: Catholic 
Social Guild, 1953), p. 39. 
2. Ibid., 39. 
3. Pope Leo XIII, nRerum Novarum, tr p. 197. 
4~ Pope Pius XI, "Quadragesimo Anno, u pp. 206-207. 
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innate right of individuals to organize. 1 
A variety of associations in society provides a 
functional answer to the dangers of both totalitarian, 
centralized government, and extreme individualism. Further-
more, it provides man•s social life with a diversity of 
interest and expression which enriches the total common 
good. Maritain is one who stresses the value of pluralism 
because of his faith in the potential contribution of a 
variety of interest centers to the corporate social life. 2 
These associations may be professional~ ec9nomic, familial, 
cultural, religious, political, etc. The total community 
nincludes a whole series of associations, existing by 
nauural right, which freely supplement and complete one 
another!~ These associations contribute to the health of 
society not only through the stimulation which diversity 
provides, but through the fact that individual citizens 
are able to participate responsibly in some social unit; 
therefore, the gulf between the large state and the indi-
vidual is narrowed. 
Whereas associations in general are invited as a 
means for social organization, two kinds o:e associational 
1. Ibid., 190. 
2• Maritain, Man and the State, pp. 169-172. 
3. Ehrenstr8m, op. cit., 26. 
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unit have been stressed in recent Roman Catholic thought. 
Azpiazu, Rommen, and others stress the importance of find-
ing an adequate associational structure for governing a 
society's economy, stemming from a reaction against both 
total state planning and laissez-faire capitalism. They 
feel that professionally organized economic groups could 
provide stability, flexibility, and personal involvement 
in the economic structure. Azpiazu calls this concept of 
social organization nsolidarism.," the principles of which 
follow pluralism and the idea of subsidiarity, but needing 
pragmatic definition~. in varying situations. His The 
-
Corporative State is a stimulating application of the 
logic of Roman Catholic thinking about associational units 
in social organization. 
A second type of association which is increasingly 
stressed among Catholic social theorists is the religious 
unit. "Catholic Action" units are proliferated in the 
hope of permeating society with moral and religious direc-
tion. Pope Pius XI even claimed that the bishops should 
have authority to judge which labor unions individual 
Catholics could join. 1 He also states that one of the 
first precautions against perversion of the authority of 
associational units is that 
1. Pope Pius XI, rrQUadragesimo Anno," p. 189. 
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Side by side with these trade unions, there must 
always be associations which aim at giving their 
members a thorough religious and moral training, 
that these in turn may impart to the labor unions 
to which they belong the upright spirit which 
should direct their entire conduct.l 
In conclusion, the state is obliged to encourage 
and respect a large variety and number of associational 
units within its jurisdiction, as long as these units 
harmonize with the common good. Its authority over these 
associations rests upon its obligation to protect the com-
mon good, and the state therefore legitimately is co-
ordinator of these associations. For the state to inter-
fere in the inner life of these associations is to step 
beyond its proper limits. In turn, associational units 
owe respect to the state insofar as that latter unit 
seeks the achievement of the common good, and, while re-
maining autonomous, are responsible for contributing to 
that good. 
B. STATE AND CULTURAL ACTIVITIES 
1. State and Education 
The following discussion of the state and education 
treats only the general ideas of the state's responsibility, 
and does not enter into a discussion of religious education, 
1. ~·' 189. 
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the aims of education in general, or the content of educa-
tion. It will be pursued under four main topical headings: 
(a) general framework of the Catholic thought about educa-
tion, (b) claims of the state for educational authority, 
(c) limits of state's authority in education, and (d) 
optimum functional ~~;angements for state and education 
today. 
a) General framework of Catholic thought about education 
Simply stated, the purpose of education in Roman 
Catholic thought is the salvation of souls. Less concisely, 
but more authoritatively, it is the development of trthe 
supernatural man who thinks, judges, and acts in accordance 
with right reason illuminated by the supernatural light of 
the example and teaching of Christ.n1 Or, ueducation con-
sists essentially in preparing man for what he must be and 
for what he must do here below, that he may attain the sub-
lime end for which he was created. n 2 Thus, education has 
both temporal and supernatural dimensions. In a fallen 
world grace must be channeled through both natural and 
supernatural means of communication. Implications of this 
condition for education will become evident below. 
In general, Catholics believe that three agencies 
share responsibility for education -- the Family, the 
1. !'ope !'ius XI, ttRappresentanti," p. 119. 
2. Ibid., 91. 
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Church and the State. How these agencies are interrelated, 
and the legitimate claims and limits of each, comprise the 
next centers of interest. 
b) Claims of the state for educational authority 
In Catholic thought the family's claim to educa~ 
tional authority derives from the natural law -- the family 
being the primary social unit. The family is prior to the 
state both historically and sociologically; it is respon-
sible not only for the bearing of children (which could be 
accomplished in promisouity), 1 ~ut also for rearing them. 2 
The Church receives its authority for education from its 
supernatural character and its assigned function of com-
municating supernatural truth and grace (both) • As the 
sole supernatural institution among men, it is responsible 
for their salvation. 
In the light of the responsibility of the family 
and Church for education, what is the claim of the state 
to education? The state's claim derives from two basic 
considerations: (1) from its function, which charges it 
with responsibility for seeking the common good, 3 and 
1. Maritain, Man and the State, pp. 119-120. 
2. Ibid., 119-120. 
3. "· •• the state can exact, and take measures to secure 
that all its citizens have the necessary knowledge of 
their civic and political duties, and a certain degree 
of physical, intellectual, and moral culture, which, 
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(2) from the fact that as a natural institution, ordained by 
God, it possesses similar rights to those of the family, 
except that in some instances its authority may supercede 
that of the family since the state is a uperfect society," 
while the family is an "imperfectn society. On these two 
foundations the state erects its claim to educational 
authority. 
c) Limits of state's authority in education 
In general the state's limits in education are de-
fined by its positive function the achievement of the 
common good. When, in education, the state violates the 
common good in the field of education, it thereby exceeds 
its proper boundaries. Institutionally, both the family 
and the Church delimit the sphere of the state's educa-
tional jurisdiction. 
The family's right precedes that of the state, be-
cause children come from the parents, and under the natural 
law there would be no subjects for the state without the 
family. 1 "Now it is certain that both by the law of nature 
and of God this right and duty of educating their offspring 
belongs in the first place to those who began the work of 
considerin~ the conditions of our times, is really 
necessary or the common good." Pope :Pius XI, 
11Rappresentanti," p. 102. 
1. Ibid., 98. 
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nature by giving them birth, • • • • .,l Pope Pius XI grants 
educational responsibility qualifiedly -- to parents who 
are "earnest and conscious of their educative duties.n2 
Maritain sees the state as performing only an auxiliary 
but necessary function in education, supplying things Which 
the family could not provide. 3 
The second institution which limits the authority 
of the state in education is the Church, because her 
supernaturally derived assignment requires her to 
Watch over the entire education of her children, 
in all institutions, public or private, not 
merely in regard to the religious instruction 
there given, but in regard to every other branch 
of learning and every regulation in $0 far as 
religion and morality are concerned.4 
This is an ''inalienable and indispensable" right and duty 
of the Church. 5 
And first of all education belongs pre~nently 
to the Church, by reason of a double title in 
the supernatural order, conferred exclusively 
on her by God Himself; absolutely superior 
l. Pope Pius XI, ncasti Connubii," Social Wellsprings, ed. 
Joseph Husslein (Milwaukee: The Bruce PubliShing 
Company, 1942), II, 131. 
2. Pope Pius XI, nMit brennender Sorge," p. 333. 
3. Maritain, Man and the State, P• 120. 
4. Pope Pius XI, "Rappresentanti," p. 95. 
5. Ibid. , 9 5 • 
therefore to any other title in the natural 
order.l 
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The state's educational exercise is also right-
fully limited by the consensus of the community, a feeling 
which is especially strong among men like Maritain. 2 The 
theoretical authority of the Church over the community 
should be kept in mind, however, so that ultimately it 
is interpreted that the Church has final authority in 
education. 
By virtue of Christ's command, 'Go ye, there-
fore, and make disciples of all nations, baptiz-
ing them in the name of the Father, Son, and 
Holy Spirit, teaching them to observe all I have 
commanded you• ••• the Church possesses the 
first title to education, the supreme authority 
to teach 'the divine faith' to man, to keep 
Whole and inviolate the deposit confided in her; 
to direct and fashion men, in all their actions, 
individually and socially, to purity of morals 
and integrity of l~fe, in accordance with 
revealed doctrine. 
Brubacher suggests that, 
The Church • • • goes on to make the extremely 
broad claim that there is no form of instruc-
tion at all Which, in the last analysis, is 
1. Ibid., 92. 
2. Maritain, Man and the State; pp. 120, 124-125. 
3. John Redden and Francis Ryan, A Catholic Philosophy of 
Education (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 
1942), p. 104. 
unconnected with man's last or ultimate destiny 
and which, therefore, can be withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the divine law, of which1the Catholic Church is the infallible judge. 
d) Qptimum functional arrangement for state and education 
today. 
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Catholic educators cannot condone secular education, 
or that which omits the moral and relig~ous teachings of 
the Church. Ideally, therefore, the state should asSttme 
responsibility for the total education of its constituents 
in the interest of the common good, which includes 
religious interests. In some states, it is ag~eed, avoid-
ance of a greater evil may demand separation of secular 
education from true Church education, necessitating the 
establishment of parochial education. In the United States 
parochial education is acceptable in the interests of the 
ultimate common good, a temporary concession to a pragmatic 
problem. But theoretically the Church's authority extends 
even to those who do not acknowledge her authority, for the 
Church is ordained by God for his whole natural creation. 2 
The development of parochial schools rests upon 
four principles: (1} the spiritual interests of the child 
1. John Brubacher, Modern Philosophies of Education (New 
York, Toronto and LondOn: McGraw-Hili Book Company, 
Incorporated, 1950), p. 158. 
2. Pope Pius XI, "Rappresentanti,u p. 96. 
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are not exclusive of other interests, but they are primary; 
(Z) morality stands next to religion in order of importance, 
and proper morality is based on religion; (3) religion with 
its appeal to both the head and the heart, is the best 
principle of union for the mental and spiritual aspects of 
education; and (4) the quality of Catholic schools is 
second to none. 1 At the Baltimore Council of 1884 pro-
visions were made for parochial school education in the 
following proposals: 
1. Near each Church, a parochial school, if it 
does not yet exist, is to be erected within 
two years from the promulgation of this 
Council, and is to be maintained in pe~ertuum, 
unless the bishop, on account of grave~£­
ficulties, judge that a postponement be 
allowed. · . 
2. A priest who, by his grave negligence, pre-
vents the· erection of a school within this 
time or who, after repeated admonitions of 
the bishop, does not attend the matter, 
deserves removal from the Church. 
3. A mission or 4 parish which so neglects to 
assist a priest ·in erecting or maintaining a 
school, that ~y reason of this supreme neg-
ligence the s~hool is rendered impossible, 
should be reprehended by the bishop and, by 
the most efficacious and prudent means pos-
sible, induce~ to contribute the necessary 
support. 1 
1. nschools,u The Catholic Encyclopedia, ed. Charles 
Herbermann and others[ (New York: Robert Appleton 
Company, 1907), XIII,,56l. 
I 
i 
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4. All Catholic p~rents are bound to send their 
children to pa~ochial schools, unless either 
at h~e or in pther Catholic schools they may 
sufficiently ~d evidently provide for the 
Christian education of their children, or 
unless it be unlawful for them to send them to 
other schools ion account of a sufficient cause, 
approved by t~e bishop, and with opportune 
remedies and pirecautions. As to what is a 
Catholic scho~l, it is to be left to the judg ... 
ment of the orrdinary to define.l 
Answers to the q~estions of educative responsibility 
I 
of states in pluralist religious societies are particularly 
I 
elusive. Some modern th$nkers accept the separation of 
Church and state in pri,iple. Men like Maritain and 
Murray accept the "right'r of individuals other than 
I 
Catholic to a non-Catholic education. They conceive the 
I 
state's function as prov~ding the common morality which sup-
, 
ports citizenship, but no more. The principle by which the 
I 
Church judges the state's educational role in the modern 
I 
! 
situation can be summari~ed, basically, in the following 
i 
I 
I quotation: 
And let no one s~y that in a nation where there 
are different religious beliefs, it is impossible 
to provide for p~blic instruction otherwise than 
by neutral or ~ed schools. In such a case it 
becomes the dutylof the state, indeed it is the 
easier and mare teasonable method of procedure, 
to leave free scppe to the initiative of the 
Church and the f~ly, while giving them such 
assistance as ju$tice demands. 
l. Ibid., 581. 
I 
I 
I 
2. Pope Pius XI, 11Rappre/sentanti, u p. 114. 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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Catholic theory of state !responsibility in education will 
I 
continue to be defined by pragmatic responses (and 
compromises) to concrete ~istorical challenges to the 
I 
central aut~ority of the \Church, permissible under the 
positive principle of 0a~oidance of a greater evil." 
2. I S~ate and Economics 
Because the econqmy of a society is integrally con-
i 
nected with the "common good" the state cannot abdicate 
its responsibility for ~iding and directing it. The fol-
I 
lowing comments pertain ~o (l!) the state 1 s responsibility 
i 
for, and control over, t~e economic order, and (b) the 
I 
limitations of the state •
1
s control of that order. 
I 
a) The state's responsib~lity for> and control over, the 
I 
economic order. . 
The state' s claJ to guidance of 
I 
rests upon its responsib~lity to provide 
I 
the economic order 
for the common good. 1 
The Church opposes the "rliberalism" of the 18th and 19th 
! 
centuries which committe1 itself to laissez-faire principles, 
because though this theo~ was promulgated in the interests 
of liberty, it encourage4 a new kind of tyranny -- an 
I 
! 
1. nThe first duty, therJ£ore, of the rulers of the State 
should be to make sur~ that the laws and institutions, 
the general character!and administration of the "common-
wealth shall be such Js to produce of themselves public · 
well-being and private prosperity. n Azpiazu, E.E.· cit., 
220. I 
I 
i 
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economic one. The C~o~/ good, ..,...,... it is alleged, was con-
i 
sequently hindered. 
The role of goverbment in economic affairs cannot 
i be blueprinted in advance\ or for all countries; it must be 
I 
pragmatically adapted to ~he demands of the common good in 
each situation. This resronsibility can be determined 
best by competent technical examination, for 
I . 
The competence of! the Church in matters of 
morality does no~ imply any competence of the 
Church to teach o!r judge about what is econom-
ically sound or ~seful in economic policy, about 
what has to be done concretely by social legis-
lation to fulfil] the demands of social justice. 
• • • All this isl left to the free decision of 
political author~ty.l 
I 
On the other hand, I 
! 
Thus even in the /sphere of social economics, 
although the Chu~ch has never proposed a 
definite technical stfitem, since this is not her 
field, she has n~ver eless clearly outlined the 
guiding principl~s which, while susceptible of 
varied concrete ~pplications according to the 
diversified cond~tions of times and places and 
peoples, indicat~ the safe !ay of securing the 
happy progress o£ society.n 
And further, [ 
i 
For the deposit qf truth entrusted to Us by God, 
and our weighty office of declaring, interpreting, 
and urging in s~ason and out of season the entire 
moral law, deman4 that both social and economic 
questions be brought within Our supreme jurisdic-
tion, in so far as they refer to moral issues.3 
I 
I . 
1. Romm.en, ~· ~·, 5821 
2. Pope Pius XI, "Divini ,Redemptoris, u p. 355 .. 
I 3. Pope Pius XI, "Quadragesimo Anno, n p. 192. 
! 
I 
I 
I 
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This directing o~ the economic order by the state 
I in a pragmatic manner is /permissible since economic laws 
are not fixed and inviolJble; they are simply descriptions I , 
of human responses to ce~tain felt needs. For example, the 
ttlaw of supply and demand ••• is by no means fixed and 
I 
unchangeable. ui. AlthougH economic laws grow from the 
. I 
people's needs and can b~ ttchangedn or reformulated, 
economics mciy not be div~rced from the natural and moral 
law. Just because they Jre responsible to the. common good, 
I • 
they are also subordinat, to the moral will of God. 2 There-
fore, governments may no¢ create arbitrary economic 
! policies. I 
If ngovernment h4s.no small role to play in helping 
I 
to keep the economy of a ination oti an even keel ••. • • 
[a role] of guidance andidirection, but in no sense one of 
I 
dictationu3 (extending n~t only to the production of goods, 
I 
but also to an assuranceiof "equitable distribution of 
goods, among all people'Aj , what are the mechanics or general 
I 
I 
1. Haas, .QP_. cit., 367. i "Actually, these laws are merely 
human aeductl.ons usually made by individual men, based 
on human conduct ••• I. Economic laws do not originate 
in some ethereal sphete independent of God and man. In 
reality, these laws ate human laws, based upon human 
acts. They can be, and frequently are interfered with 
and even •made over' by man.,. 
2. Pope Pius XI, "Divini/Redemptoris," p. 350. 
3. Haas, £e· cit., 372. 
4. Ibid., 372. 
I 
I 
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I 
! 
lines of a good relation ~etween the state and the economic 
sphere? Once again, the Foman Catholic principle of sub-
sidiarity plays a promin,~t role. In Quadragesimo ~ 
i Pope Pius XI comments th~t a proliferation of small 
! 
economic units, responsi~le to the total society, can 
effect best the decentra~ization of government, maintain 
an efficient level of pr~duction, and avoid economic indi-
vidualism. Although the /state alone is responsible for 
final supervisory author~ty, nsubordinate associations are 
I 
to take much of the burd~n of regulating economic condi-
tions from the State.ul I 
I 
Azpiazu.conceives of an economy centered in compar-
1 I . 
atively small vocationallunits, composed of both management 
and labor, co-operating in planning for the total economy. 2 
I Haas supports him in suggesting that what is needed today 
l 
I 
is not simply an organization of workers, but a more 
I 
comprehensive body of "a:Ll factors of production -- employers 
__,...... 
and workers -- to functibn together under government guidance, 
I . 
but not domination, for fhe common good of all.u3 Azpiazu 
is even more extreme in his claims for the authority of 
economic vocational unit~, comparatively independent of 
the state. [ 
1. Ehler and Morall, .2E.. ./ cit. , 40 9 • 
2. See Azpiazu, The Corpbrative State, .2E..• cit., passim. 
I 
a. Haas, .2E..· ~·' 114. I 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
i 
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I 
I 
The value of an 1,associational economy If is 
implicit in the followinJ warning by Powers: 
r 
It is absoiutelyinecessary, today especially 
when the former trend of laissez-faire is 
weakened seriously -- to beware of plunging 
to the opposite extreme. In the organization 
of production fuil weight must be accorded this 
principle. • • that the activities and services 
of society ought/to possess a merely subsidiary 
character, aiding or supplementing the activity 1 of the individua+, the family and the professions. 
I 
' b) Limitations of state bontrol over the economic order 
I 
The norm for the/limitation of the state in economic 
affairs is the ucomm.on gbod." Beyond this comprehensive 
I 
limitation, however, there are several lesser ones. {l) The 
I 
~:1~::: ::8£~::::t::::~~c::::::i::~i:: ::::i:::::s 
with the highest interesfs of the world economy. States 
must recognize and act ih accordance with, the economic 
! 
interdependence of all n!ations. {2) The common good must 
I 
be sought in conjunction; with the natural law, which, 
I 
assert Roman Catholic tqinkers, demands private property. 
I 
ttFor every man has by nature the right to possess property 
I 
of his own, n says Leo X~II. 1 
I 
I 
1. Francis Powers {ed.)J Papal Pronouncements on Politics (Washington: Department of Politics, Catholic University 
of America, 1950), pt 113. [Letter from Po~e Pius XII-
Semaines Sociales de France, July 18, l947.J 
I 
2. Pope Leo lCIII, "Rei Novarum, 11 p. 170. 
I 
i 
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The right to posses~ private property is from 
nature, not from map.; and the State has only 
the right to regula~e its use in the interest 
of the public 2ood,1 but by no means to abolish 
it altogether .:r I 
I 
i 
Such an assertion ~oes not imply that man has 
I 
unlimited right to private /property, oblivious to the counnon 
i 
good. In fact, asserts Pius XI, private property, while 
I 
being a natural right of i1dividuals, must be regulated by 
the state according to theispecific conditions. "Provided 
I 
I 
that the natural and divin~ law be observed, the public 
! 
authority, in view of the ~rue necessity of the common 
I 
go~d, may specify more acc~rately what is licit and what 
I 
I 
is illicit for the propertr owners in their use of their 
2 i possessions." When the g:Overnment regulates the use of 
! 
property in accordance wi~h its responsibility, those 
I 
regulated ought to unders~and that their own interests are 
I 
being served. 3 The right/to hold property is not only an 
i 
individual's right; it extends also to associations in 
I 
society, including the Ch~rch. 4 It will be evident, then, 
I 
I 
i 1. Ibid. , 35. See also Pope Pius XI • s "Quadragesimo Anno, u 
p:-1:'95, where Leo XIIII is quoted. 
I 
I 
2. Pope Pius XI, "Quadragesim.o Anno," pp. 194-195. 
I 
i 
3. Ehler and Morall, ~· pit., 427. [This is taken from 
"Quadragesim.o Anno. } / 
4. nProperty,u The Catho]Jic Encyclopedia, ed. Charles 
Herbermann and others /i(New York: Robert Appleton Company, 
1911), XII, 469. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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that though private proper~ is a natural right of individ-
1 
uals and associations in sqciety, which the state cannot 
I 
i 
totally deny, the kinds of /property held and the ways of 
using it may be determined/partially by the state, in the 
I 
interest of the common good. ttThe actual ownership of 
I particular property does n~t come directly from nature, 
I 
but from some contingent f~ct, such as occupation, labour, 
I 
or inheritance.ul Here the authority of the state is 
introduced~ 
(3) Furt!Jermore, e common good will be se~ed if 
the state limits its sphe e of activity by encouraging the 
development of subsidiary and voluntary groups in society 
which will assume responsibility for helping direct national 
economic plamrl.ng. These I groups not only have a natural 
right of association stmiiar to that of the s~ate, they are 
I 
pragmatically valuable in/realizing the common good, for I . 
they encourage individual initiative and responsibility 
in a social context, guar against the dangers of govern-
mental centralization, d defend against extreme individu-
alism. 
and 
In summary, the state is responsible for guiding 
directing the economf insofar as such guidance 
1. Cahill, 2£· ~., 301 
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contributes to the common ~ood, but the very principle which 
I 
dictates its responsibility also limits its range or exten· 
I 
sion of authority.. Becausb social situations differ, and 
I I . 
because the common good i1 each instance needs both differ-
' ent formulation and tools !for its achievement, governmental 
responsibility in economid affairs must be interpreted anew 
I 
in each instance -- no bl~eprint can be pre-established. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I. 3. State and Legal System 
I 
of the Whr:~: ::~~s::t~of~s~:d::t::d:: ::eap::::::::on 
section. on "Theological td Philosophical Foundation"; 
rather is its fecus on 't:hje relation of the state to the 
legal systems of society,/ or to human law. 
I 
I 
a) Positive law of the sttate harmonized with moral law 
I 
The positive law/of the state must be harmonized 
with the moral law, perc~ivable through natural and divine 
I 
law. The responsibility/of states to seek the common good 
I 
I 
includes the duty of making positive law as consistent as 
I 
possible with the naturatl. law and moral law. · This neces-
1 
sary correspondence beoJJeen th~ natural law and positive 
law is suggested by Pop Pius XII: 
The positive la: 
indispensable i 
of different peoples, also 
the community of states, has 
the office of defining more exactly the rights 
derived from nature and of adapting them to 
concrete circumstances, also of making other 
provisions, directed, of course, toward the 
common good, on the basis of a positive agree-
ment, which, once freely entered into, has 
binding force.l 
148 
Law in general serves the common good by structur-
ing human relations, but all specific laws must also "in 
some way serve the connnon welfare."2 Treacy insists that 
true liberty consists in the rule of law rather than in 
the freedom of everyone to pursue his personal whims. 3 
Maritain reiterates that positive law should be conceived 
as an application and extension of natural law in specific 
circumstances. 4 And Ryan adds that "all civil law may 
properly be regarded as either an affirmation of the 
natural law, or an application of its precepts, principles 
or derived conclusions. 115 
These comments support the Catholic claim that 
although states must formulate positive law, they are 
limited in what they may promulgate, for the positive 
1. Pope Pius XII, "Analecta, 11 p ~ 130. 
2. "Law, 11 The Catholic Encyclopedia, p. 54. 
3. Treacy, 2£· cit., 21. 
4. Jacques Maritain, The Meaning of Human Rights (Philadelphia: 
Publication of the Brandeis Lawyers Society, 1949), p. 10. 
[From a speech given before the Brandeis Lawyers Society 
on February 21, 1949.] · 
5. John Ryan and Moorhouse Mil{ar, The State and the Church 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937), p. 245. 
I 
I 
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law always remains under t~e natural and moral law. Indeed, 
I only laws which are reasonable are truly laws, for "an 
I 
unreasonable law is a contfadition."1 That is, if a law 
I is antithetical to the natfral law, or to God's will, 
it is not really a law an~ has no binding force -- it would 
be founded upon power ra~er than authority. In addition, 
when there is a question 9f priority in laws, or of rights, 
The general princtple which controls the problem 
of conflicting ri~hts is that the possessor of a 
right proceeding ;rom a higher source is justified 
in exercising hisjright as against the ¥ossessor 
of a right proceeding from a lower one. 1 
I Furthermore, though some rights usuch as life and that of 
integrity of the body, ar~ permanent and constant, many 
others are contingent an~ changeable.•~ 
b) Positive law of the sJate subject to the international 
dimension of the common Jood. 
I 
The positive law/of the state is also subject to 
I 
I 
the international character of the common good. Implica-
1 
tions of international cbmmunity should be determinative 
not only in external relktions between nations, such as in I . 
tariffs, wars, etc., but/ they also have ramifications for 
. I . 
the internal laws of a /ation. Though perhaps confusing 
1. ttLa.w,u The Catholic ~ncyclopedia, p. 53. 
I 
2. Haas, ~· _ill., 109. 
3. Ibid., 112. 
I 
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I 
ttstate" and "Nation,u the following comment points to this 
aspect of the state's legal responsibility: 
A State would be disturbing this order [the 
natural order} if it claimed the right to use 
its national heritage for its sole convenience, 
without any regard/ for the higher interests of 
humanity, by leavi g its natural resources un-
developed or refus ng to place them at the 
disposal of o:ther ations who were in great 
need of them. l. 
- --- - I 
By its unequal distribution of capacities and 
resources among t~e nations, Providence has 
clearly shown itsLdesire to bring about between 
States an active rystem of exchanges, which are 
equally profitable to all who take part in them.2 
The state's responsibilit~ to international law is implicit 
I 
in the whole of Roman Ca~holic political thought, since all 
I 
nations are subject to t~e natural law, and since the 
I 
international community ts as logical and necessary a 
I 
I development as that of ijdividual states in the first 
place. 
c) Makin and maintainin law 
Regarding the s1ate 1 s relation to laws within its 
own jurisdiction, the ~ing and maintaining of law "is an 
essential part and necessary function of the two perfect 
I 
1. Ryan and Boland, 
pp. 64-65. 
2. ~., 65. 
Cat~olic Principles of Politics, 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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I 
societies.n1 The four nec~ssary ingredients of law are the 
I 
following: (1) it mus.t be/ in accordance with reason, 
(2) it must promote the ge~eral welfare, (3) it must came 
I 
from those vested with aut~ority, and (4) it must be promul-
2 i 
gated. All of these resd upon the need for the preserva-
1 
tion of the community and /the provision for the common good. 
In the interest o~ maintaining ordered relations 
within society, the statelmust also subject itself to the 
limitations which the pos tive formulations of law impose 
upon its own function. T~ough it is promulgator and 
I . 
protector, the state is nbt superior to its own law in the 
I 
sense that it can arbitrafily violate its own product. In 
I 
its relations to the legaf structure, the state is, then, 
the agent of the common g,ood; it is obligated in every 
I 
I instance to be a means t9 that good and never an end in 
. I 
itself. The state is bo~h guardian of the .law, and 
I 
' 
servant to that law insofar as it expresses the common 
good. 
4. State and Community 
In Raman Catholic thought the state is essentially 
a product and function of the community which, though 
1. Ehler and Morall, ~· ~., 602. 
2. Haas, ~· cit., 393. 
ordained by God through the natural law implanted in the 
existence of man, is subject to the general will of the 
total community. The state is that institution in soci-
ety responsible for the ordering of public life through 
relatively fixed patterns of human rela~ions, but this 
assignment does not condone a reification of the state's 
power over the will of the community. 
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In order to avoid a centralization of authority in 
the political branch, the state, Catholic thought encour-
ages a broad network of other institutions in society. An 
example of these other institutions are the professional 
groups advocated by Azpiazu for the economic realm, the 
Church, and families. Dawson seems to endorse the old 
English principle of political thought uthat the national 
society and national culture transcend politics.n1 
Maritain's comments illustrate the attitude that the com-
munity is superior to the political unit. 
Let me emphasize once again that the basic 
political reality is not the State, but the 
body politic with its multifarious institutions, 
the multiple communities which it involves, and 
the moral community which grows out of it. The 
body politic is the people organized under just 
laws. The State is the particular agency which 
specializes in matters dealing with the common 
good of the body politic; it is therefore the 
topmost political agency, but the State is a part, 
not a whole, and its functions are merely 
1. Dawson, Beyond Politics, p. 25. 
Ui3 
instrumental; it is for the body politic and for 
thepeople that it sees to the public order, en-
forces laws, possesses power; and being a part 
in the service of the people, it must be controlled 
by the people.l 
Earlier he had stated: "Finally the body politic must con-
trol the State, which however, contains the functions of 
government within its own fabric."2 
Dawson also strongly advocates the development and 
preservation of centers for cultural growth independent of 
the state, in order that true creativity may ensue. "It is 
• • • dangerous to bring politics into the order of culture, 
for this means the invasion of the human soul by the hand 
of power. This is the original sin of every totalitarian 
system. "3 And further, 
At the present time in democratic countries the 
realm of culture has become a no~man's-land which 
is given up to anarchic individualism and at the 
same time invaded from different directions by 
the organize~ powers of the state, and financial 
capitalism. u 
These need to be given a cohesive orientation, however, which 
is the task of the state. 
1. Maritain, Man and the State, p. 202. 
2. Ibid., 24. 
3. Dawson, Beyond Politics, p. 18. 
4. Ibid. , 28. 
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Again, the various pursuits of art, science, 
philosophy, and culture require means which are 
ordinarily beyond private initiative and necessi-
tate the existence of a large civil society called 
the State. This larger association of individuals 
[individuals or families?] is required in order 
to effect a harmonious whole wherein all social 
activities become coordinated for the common good.l 
Catholic thought is pervaded with a fear of mono-
lithic social power in the hands of the state. In some 
circles it expresses itself as fear of such power in the 
hands of any single organization, including the Church. In 
such instances the Church is conceived as working solely 
through moral suasion, but permitting genuine liberty for 
dissenters. Men like Maritain believe that this is the 
surest way to ensure creativity and the common good. 
In general, however, the state is seen as part of 
the political needs of the community, and while it possesses 
the necessary authority for seeking an ordering of society 
toward the common good through law and justice, it must be 
the servant or tool of the community in its effort to 
achieve the true destiny of man. 
5~ State and Social Change 
The state, however, cannot be relegated to the 
position of a mere policeman or umpire. It has 
the responsibility for providing for the common 
1. Osgniach, ~· cit., 23. 
good. On the other hand it may not and should 
not become totalitarian in attempting to ful-
fill all social functions in the way of economic 
planning and direc:tion.nl 
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This statement points in the direction af Catholic thought 
of state responsibility in social planning and social 
change. The state has not a solely negative ral!.e.,··o£ hold-
ing society together; it ·is also bound to give positive 
guidance on the avenues toward the commo~ good. In seeking 
this common good, to be sure, many voluntary centers of 
activity will be encouraged and endorsed by the state, but 
there need not be a separation of state planning from the 
contributions of associational initiative. 
Maritain fears the dangers of both too much and too 
little state planning, contending for some kind of via media 
or dynamic balance between these two poles. 
One of the errors of individualist optimism was 
to believe that in a free society "'truth, •t as to 
the foundations of civil life, as well as the 
decisions and modes of behavior befitting human 
dignity and freedom, would automatically emerge 
from the conflicts of individual forces and 
opinions supposedly immune from any irrational 
trends and disintegrating pressures; the error 
lay in conceiving of free society as a perfectly 
neutralllioxing ring in which all possible ideas 
about society and the bases of social life meet 
and battle it out, without the Body Politic 1 s 
being concerned with the maintenance of any com-
mon conditions and inspiration.2 
.... - - .. 
1. Ryan and Boland, Catholic Principles of Politics, p. 158. 
2. Maritain, The Range of Reason, p. 166. 
As for social planning, even supposedly intelli-
gent, it is hard to imagine a culture organized 
and unified by social planning alone. Planned 
and plain as it might be, such a cultural para-
dise would offer, I am afraid, little chance for 
the creative powers of human personality as well 
as for fhe enthusiasm and happiness of the 
people. 
In another book he hints that the answer to this dilemma 
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is the decentralization of social life, "tending toward the 
advent of some new personalist and pluralist regime."2 
State planning is necessary not only to hold in check 
the various pressures and forces which would otherwise invade 
the social sphere and disrupt it, but also because people 
need stimulation toward initiative and creativity. Maritain 
sees this aspect of the state's responsibility as vital 
because upeople as a rule prefer to sleep. • •• People 
would like to ignore that they are E!!!. people.n3 
In summary, while the state is responsible for 
positive guidance of the social life of a nation, through 
state planning and initiative, Catholic thought welcomes 
the establishment and strengthening of a pluralistic 
society, through which many associational units will in-
corporate individuals into the life of the nation responsibly, 
1. Ibid., 169. 
2. Maritain, Man and the State, p. 22~ 
3 .. Ibid., 42. 
and through which the dangers of centralized authority, 
with its almost inevitable stultification of private 
centers of creativity, will be partially avoided. Here 
the usolidaristic 0 view of the total society, and the 
principle of 11subsidiarity,u finding fullest expression 
in Quadragesimo ~' are the directive lines for Roman 
Catholic political thought. In the final analysis, how-
ever, specific blueprints of state planning cannot be 
established. 
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PART TWO 
ECUMENICAL CONCEPTS OF THE STATE 
- 158 -
CHAPTER III 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE STATE 
A. DIVERSITY WITHIN THE ECUMENICAL POSITION 
1. Evidence of Diversity 
Viewing the proliferation of Protestant denomina-
tions and the variety of confessions represented in the 
Ecumenical Movement, one would anticipate wide diversity 
in its concepts of the state. This assumption is vali-
dated by even a cursory examination of Ecumenical Movement 
materials. Differences among representative groups root 
not only in theology, per ~' but are manifestly caused by 
varying philosophical and cultural perspectives and condi-
tions. The impact of the cultural milieu on theological 
conclusions becomes evident in the recognition that it is 
easier to predict accurately theological homogeneity within 
geographic than denominational dimensions. For example, 
in the question regarding the nature of the sta£e, periph-
eral to strict theological discussion, more similarities 
can be discerned between Lutherans and Calvinists in 
Germany and Switzerland, than between Calvinists in 
Switzerland and Calvinists in America. Duff suggests the 
- 159 -
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importance of geography in theological differences in his 
generalization that religious groups in England and the 
United States "almost universally conceive of the state as 
a natural and necessary political instrument,n while 
ncontinental theology • • • with its more pessimistic 
view of human nature generally conceives of the state in 
negative terms as a dyke against anarchy."1 Therefore, one 
should not anticipate a direct proportion between the number 
of Ecumenical groups and the number of theories of the 
state within that Movement. For three reasons this may be 
true: (a) divisions within the Protestant church did not 
originate, for the most part, with disagreements about the 
nature of the state and its function; (b) considerations 
of the state have been treated as fringe interests, not 
vital to the living and indispensable core of theology and 
faith; and (c) differences which might have existed -- such 
as those between Luther, Calvin, and Zwingli -- become 
modified and changed through history (as seen in the limi-
tations of Troeltsch's monumental typological study of the 
Church's social teachings), 2 so that the cohesive and 
1. Duff,~· cit., 121. 
2. 
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integrating influence of a common cultural experience blunts 
the sharpness of differences to the extent that they may 
gradually disappear. 
In this respect it is particularly interesting, 
but not surprising, to observe that despite several radically 
divergent theological and philosophical positions, theoreti-
cally directing and limiting various conceptions of the 
state, there is evidence of widespread unanimity on many 
practical considerations of the nature, role and organiza-
tion of the state in contemporary society. It is little 
more surprising that these agreements not only tend to 
bridge the gulfs between the various Protestant and larger 
groups within the Ecumenical Movement, but also span the 
wider chasms between major religious units in the world. 
Common, pragmatic considerations of the 11goodn possess 
amazing vitality, cutting across the cleavages of ab-
stracted philosophy and theology. Thus it is that, within 
the Ecumenical Movement, common 11middle axioms n are affirmed 
by Continentals, Englishmen and Americans, by Lutherans, 
Baptists, Calvinists, and Anglicans. For example, it is 
widely agreed that there must be a sensitive, dynamic and 
viable relation between freedom and authority in any pattern 
of the state.· 
On the operational and technical level, however, 
there is also disagreement among representatives to the 
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Movement. Disag~eement on this level cannot be predicted 
along confessional or denominational lines; it follows 
cultural cleavages and social patternings much more con-
sistently. Not only is fhere disagreement about ultimates, 
there is also a varied understanding of how these ultimates 
were to be translated into relevance for contemporary 
problems. 1 Hromadka and Dulles could agree at Amsterdam 
about basic principles, but the application of these prin-
ciples to specific cultural situations were obviously quite 
different, and even partially antithetic. On technical 
questions the Ecumenical Movement has consistently stressed 
the need for expert scientific direction, accepting the need 
for flexibility and adaptation to new and unique cultural 
needs, especially after the 1925 Stockholm Conference. 
Whereas there is strong evidence that ttagreement 
to disagree•• has been an accepted principle here, there is 
equally strong indication that this does not_constitute, at 
least for many, an attitude of despair about finding some 
ultimate common agreements. Demant and Cunliffe-Janes point 
up this feeling. 
1. Walter Muelder, "Impressions of the Evanston Assembly, n 
The Ecumenical Review, VII, 1 (October, 1954), 2. "There 
was no evidence that anyone wishes to escape the per-
plexities of responsible action. On the other hand there 
was no theoretical agreement as to how the transition 
between the ultimates in eschatology-is made to life, 
work and witness in the world. n 
Christi~n witness is weak in the matter of power 
because it is weak and divided in the matter of 
dogma, in spite of strong feeling on the ethical 
question. In order, therefore, to recover for 
the Christian conscience its proper power, we 
must cease to put too much emphasis upon its 
moral sense without an adequate intellectual 
illumination. I 
Cunliffe-Janes concurs that: 
[Though it is permissible for Christians to dis-
agree on the solution of social and political 
problems} we must be clear about the strict 
limits of such difference. All Christians in 
their social and political action are bound by 
the quality and direction of human action Which 
the Bible declares.2 
2. Efforts to Develop a Typology Based on 
Differences in the Ecumenical Movement 
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Several important efforts have been made to develop 
a typology which would illuminate the basic differences and 
similarities within the spectrum of Protestant thinking 
about the state. Those considered herein have been proposed 
in direct reference to the Ecumenical Movement, omitting such 
creative discussions as Troeltsch's ~istory of the Social 
Teachings of the Christian Churches~ or Richard Niebuhr • s 
4" Christ and Culture. 
1. V. A. Demant, "The Formation of Consciences," Ch1;istendom, 
V, l (Winter, 1940), p. 76. 
2. Hubert Cunliffe-Janes, uA Congregational Contribution," 
Biblical Authorita for Today, ed. Richardson and 
Schweitzer (Phila elphia: Westminster Press, 1951), 
'Q· 55. 3. Troeltsch, ~· cit. 
4. Richard NieDUhr:-ehrist and Culture (First Edition, New 
York: Harper and Brothers, 19St). 
Bower thinks he detects within Protestantism two 
distinct divergent tendencies, "fundamentally different 
and, when followed to their logical conclusions, [they] 
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lead in different, if not opposite, directions.rr1 These 
tendencies, he asserts, are "toward liberalism on the one 
hand, and toward a reaffirmation of a traditional medieval 
orthodoxy on the other.n2 These tendencies were incorporated 
into Protestantism at its very inception, stemming from two 
historically fertile movements in active struggle on the 
ground where the Protestant church's seed was sown. The 
historical dichotomy is that between orthodox Roman 
Catholicism and the spirit of the Renaissance. There is 
a tension, then> in the very heart of Protestantism, which 
has existed from its beginning, "because of its dual 
origin. uS He concludes, therefore: 
Protestantism has attempted the impossible task 
of living in two worlds ~- the static and author-
itative world of a priori metaphysical theology 
and the free and a~ocratic world of empirical 
thought and action.4 · 
1. William Bower, ttprotestantism' s Inner Conflict," 
Christendom, IX, 3 (Summer, 1944) p. 294. 
2. ~ .. ' 294. 
3. Ibid., 295. 
4. Ibid., 295. 
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Though serious questions may be advanced regarding 
Bower's facile historical explanation of the origin of the 
tension within Protestantism, the evident friction which 
does exist does partially explain the absence of basic 
metaphysical and philosophical affirmations in the docu-
ments of the Ecumenical Movement. 
Postulating a similar basic dichotomy, Edward Duff, 
a Roman Catholic author concludes, after detailed study of 
the documents of the Ecumenical Movement on social questions, 
that the World Council of Churches is divided by those who 
emphasize the "ethic of inspiration!' O# the "ethic of ends. nl 
Having found this tension within the Ecumenical Movement, 
he seeks to explain it, not historically, as Bower does, 
but as dependent upon whether a person accepts the Bible 
alone, or Natural Law, as the source of authority for judg-
ing social problems. "The conflict between these two 
approaches to social morality is another phase of the 
debate between the advocates of the Natural Law versus the 
Bible alone as the criterion of judgment in social problems.'~ 
Some serious doubts immediately arise concerming the 
validity and utility of Duff's thesis. 3 The dichotomy 
1. Duff,££· cit., 93. 
2. Ibid. , 94. 
3. Although this section does not p~ort to criticize the 
various categories proposed, Duff's thesis is here 
questioned. 
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between the ethic of ends and the ethic of inspiration 
(which does exist within the Ecumenical Movement, but 
obviously in mixed form) is not to be identified with the 
distinction_between those who look to natural law (and 
the Bible) for guidance, and those who look to~the Bible 
alone for guidance. For example, an "ethic of ends" can be 
founded upon the Bible (Biblical literalism, and to a lesser 
extent, "Biblical realismu). On the other hand, an "ethic 
of inspirationn can conceivably be developed out of natural 
law considerations, illustrated by Nietzsche's '~11 to 
power, 11 Bergson's "elan vital,u or a score of naturalistic 
determinists. If Duff wants to use these meaningful dis-
tinctions between those who guide their thinking about 
morality basically by an ethic of inspiration and those 
who seek an ethic of ends, let the distinction more properly 
rest upon both epistemolo_gical and metaphysical preferences 
rather than upon whether an individual accepts the authority 
of either the Bible alone, or Natural Law. 
William Clayton Morrison, whose life has been 
immersed in the Ecumenical Movement, suggests 11master dif-
ferences" under which a typology for understanding various 
strains in the Protestant movement can be developed. He 
states: 
These three major cleavages within the universal 
Christian tradition define the problem to which 
the ecumenical movement has set itself. Underneath 
all the controversial detail at Oxford and 
Edinburgh, these were the master differences: 
evangelism versus catholicism, quietism vers¥s 
activism, and historicism versus empiricism. 
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With more specific reference to diverse Ecumenical 
Movement thought about the state, several typological 
studies have been made following denominational or confes-
sional lines. Perhaps these have been the most illuminat-
ing efforts for the. present study. Prominent among such 
studies along confessional lines have been those by 
EhrenstrSm, Christian Faith and the Modern State, 2 and 
ten Doornkat, Die oekumenischen Arbeiten zur .sozialen 
Frage. 3 Ad0lph Keller4 and William Adams Brown5 have, 
within the framework of Ecumenical discussions, written 
on the notion of the State in European and American churches 
respectively. Logically, however, such differences as are 
indicated in these books should be included in the following 
discussions of various aspects of the study of the state. 
1. Charles Morrison, noxfofd, Edinburgh and the American 
Mind," Christendom, II, 4 (Autumn, 1937), p. 584. 
2. Ehrenstr8m, .2E.· cit. 
3. ten Doornka t, .2E_. .£!!. 
4. Adolph Keller, Church and State on the European Continent (London: Epworth Press, 1936). 
5. William A. Brown, Church and State in Contemporary America (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936). 
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On that account they are left for later consideration. 
The Oxford Conference Report suggests that there are 
additional typologies for Ecumenical thought about the 
state in particular; these will be presented under the 
discussions below (pp. 257 and 258). 
B. DEFINITION OF THE STATE 
Several factors combine to preclude the possibility 
of arriving at precise Ecumenical definitions of the state 
which would be accepted as valid by all its constituents. 
(1) The variety of denominations represented in the Movement 
often propose apparently irreconcilable points of view, both 
regarding general principles of theology and philosophy, 
and relating to specifics of interpreting the meaning of 
these general principles £or everyday social organization. 
(2) Few Protestant churches have, within their own affilia-
tion, developed a critical theory of the state. 1 (3) Some 
Protestants within the Wo.rld Council would regard the 
development of a metaphysic of the state impossible or 
superfluous, preferring to rely solely on the guiding authority 
1. "A notable exception to this general statement is the 
Lutheran Church, -drl.ch is unique among American Protestant 
Churches, in that it has a clearly defined body of doctrine 
regarding church and state to which it adheres strictly 
in practice." Ibid., 136. 
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of biblical teaching for pragmatic "muddling through" in 
relation to social affairs. (4) In Ecumenical documents 
we can expect to find no metaphysic of the state for, as 
the Second General Article of the Oxford Conference 
asserts: 
The report of this group [the group discussing 
the relations between church and state} sug-
gested that its purpose was not to set forth an 
abstract doctrine of the relation between Church 
and State but to express the Christian's attitude 
toward the secularisation of modern society and 
the growing power of the state, and to distinguish 
those principles and duties which determine the 
Christian attitude toward the state in all cir-
cumstances from their applications in differing 
historical situations.~ 
ttThese facts make itt:.~r;thatwe aq;eg;p:ctto find in 
Protestantism as a whole no consistent doctrine regarding 
the respective spheres of church and state and their rela-
tion to one another as exists in Roman Catholicism. uZ 
What is true of Protestantism in particular is also true 
of the broader Ecumenical Movement. EhrenstrSm remarks 
that "it will have become quite clear to us in a disquiet-
ing and even terrifying way that the Christian understanding 
· 1. Universal Christian Council for Life and·Work, "Second 
General Article," (July, 1937), p. 13. [Unpublished 
mimeographed papers, which may be found in the William 
A. Brown Ecumenical Library, Union Theological Seminary, 
New York City.] 
2. Brown, .QE.• cit., i36. 
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of the state is terribly divided."l 
Though no common definition of the state was for-
warded in the Oxford Conference's Official Report, a study 
book on that Conference's proceedings suggests that there 
was a general notion of the state. 
By the State in the most comprehensive sense 
the Conference understood the political community, 
or in other words society organized under forms of 
law. The word •state' is a narrower term than 
'nation,' which includes also the economic and 
cultural relations of a peopl~. It is broader than 
'government,' though it is through government that 
the functions of modern states are discharged. 
As the expression and organ of political life, the 
State is the most inclusive of all social units 
within a particular geographic area and has certain 
functions to discharge in behalf of all the people: 
namely, the maintenance of order, the securing of justice, the defense against attack from without, 
and the promotion of welfare within; -But to the 
Christian the State is more than a human institution. 
It is one of the instruments through which God is 
working out his divine plan of salvation. Yet at 
the same time as a human institution governed by 
finite and fallible men, it is imperfzct and may 
become a powerful instrument of evil. 
Despite this definition, however, it is abundantly 
clear that in Ecumenical discussions no common definition 
of the state obtains. Neither is there mutual understand-
ing of the nature and function of the state. Discussions 
of the state have persi~ted on the functional level in the 
1. Ehrenstr5m, .2£· cit., 143. 
2. Oxford Conference Study Series. ttchurch and State," 
(New York: Universal Christian Council, [c. 1938]), 
P• 28. 
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absence of such agreements. 
Granting the reliability of these evidences of 
division, is there any hope in trying to discriminate from 
these same documents an nEcumenicaln theory of the state? 
Will there be any value in such conclusions as may be forth-
coming? The study seems supported by two major considera-
tions, even though a uniform philosophy of the state may not 
emerge: (1) Though there is significant diversity of opinion, 
it already has been intimated that this diversity is evident 
primarily in the theoretical sphere, while there is consid-
erable agreement on general principles of the state on 
particular issues," such as the state's relation to the 
individual, to international law, to the Church, etc. 
Though almost as directionless as the Kantian categorical 
imperative, the idea of the Responsible Society promises 
at least a focal point for mutual discussion of substantive 
matters pertaining to the state. It is hypothesized in this 
project that in several teachings about the state there will 
be more diversity than division. 
(2) A second justification for the engagement in a 
search for an Ecumenical (and partly'Protestant) conception 
of the state is that it may serve to crystallize progress 
made so far. It may help sharpen those issues which require 
further refinement in the future. Ehrenstrtsm has stated the 
problem succintly in conjunction with his discussion of 
the sta1:e: "Ecumenical co-operation has resulted in a 
clearer understanding of the divergencies of view, both 
between and within the denominations, which constitute 
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distinct hindrances to that Christian fellowship of thought 
and action for which we hope and pray."1 A recognition of 
divisive barriers is a prerequisite for surmounting them. 
This discussion, it is hoped, may contribute to that recog-
nition. 
C. GENERAL THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
1. Sources for Understanding of the State 
a) General sources 
The variety of metaphysical and epistemological 
positions within the Ecumenical Movement is second only to 
the latitude of theological formulae. · Yet these have re-
ceived only inadequate consideration in the discussions of 
that body. One of the primary problems in discerning the 
Movemen1:' s philosophy of the state is that that doctrine 
is vitiated with implicit assumptions which never find 
systematic expression. In the absence of mutually accepted 
metaphysical and epistemological systems, it is nevertheless 
1. EhrenstrBm, ·EE.· cit. , 8. 
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important to work toward a general typology of Ecumenical 
thinking related to epistemology, in order that the source 
for statements about the state may be discovered. The 
focus of this section is not ttpure" epistemology, however, 
nor a description of the trends in Ecumenical epistemology 
in general. Rather is the emphasis here upon the simple 
categorization of diverse strains within the Movement to 
discover the primary source of authority in each, which 
will then be applicable to the state, under nspecific 
Sources," pp. 214 ff. 
Several severe difficulties confront one who would 
develop a typology regarding the sources of authority to 
which various elements within the Ecumenical Movement 
appeal. (1) There are no clearly defined natural groupings 
of Ecumenical theologians, even within confessional groups, 
(2) It is extremely difficult to project certain typologies 
that have distinctive significance for the understanding of 
the state. (3) The fluidity of Ecumenical conversation, 
manifest in the reports of the various conferences, clouds 
the distinctive characteristics of various groups repre-
sented in the Movement. Attempts to speak together have 
caused a minimization of sign~ficant areas of disagreement. 
In the light; of these hazazds and difficulties, the 
following typology is offered as a contribution to the 
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steady search for more adequate categorizations. If it is 
not altogether adequate, it does serve the present project 
to a significant degree. Four distinct sources of author-
ity which are acknowledged and espoused by different repj· 
resentatives to the Ecumenical Movement will be used as the 
basis for the present classification. In each of these 
positions there is obvious overlapping with other "types." 
Recognizing that no individual is exclusively loyal to 
any of the following types, the typology suggested is 
based upon whether one emphasizes as his primary source 
of authority: · (1) the Bible, (2) the Church and tradition~ 
(3) the promptings of the Holy Spirit, or (4) natural law 
and natural reason. This typology requires fuller amplifi-
cation before turning to substantive ideas about the state. 
That amplification follows. 
(1) The Bible 
Emphasis on the Bible as the primary source of 
authority has remained consistently strongest among 
Continental Lutheran and Reformed circles, whose. experiences 
with Caesaropapism and totalitarian states have been extreme. 
Within the group which stresses the.prfmacy of biblical 
authority, however, there is also wide difference of opinion. 
The now-famous controversy between Barth and Brunner 
centered on the issue of Biblical authority as distinguished 
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from natural revelation and reason. Additional evidence 
of diversity is the "Biblical Realism" of Hendrik Kraemer, 
which leaves disconcertingly ambiguous the role of reason 
in the proper use of the Bible's message. No evidence is 
to be found of fundamentalist or nliteralistn positions 
within the World Council's documents. 
Within Ecumenical circles there have been some 
attempts to find a common approach to the study of the 
Bible in an effort to realize agreement on biblical author-
ity for today. In collaboration with other biblical 
scholars, Muilenburg has developed a list of "principles 
of interpretation [which] grow out of our recognition of 
the diversity and unity of the Bible."1 
1. ttestablishment of the textn 
2. "determination of the meaning of the 
words and their relationship to each other.n 
3. "the Biblical world of thoughtn 
4. "the literary form" 
5. tthistorical criticismu 
6. ''historical setting and backgroundu 
7. "the later history (Nachgeschichte) of a 
passage" 
8. ttthe Oriental character of the Bible" 
9. nthe experience and personality of the writer" 
10. "the operation of the Holy S-pirit" 
11. "the total Biblical context"Z 
1. James Muilenberg, "The Interpretation of the Bible," 
Biblical Authorit~ for Today, ed. Richardson and 
Schweitzer (Phila elphia: Westminster Press, 1951), 
P• 207. 
2. Ibid., 207-212. 
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Though such formulae are occasionally developed 
and accepted by a conference or meeting, including men 
from widely disparate convictions, no guarantee is pos-
sible that agreements can be reached on the meaning of 
biblical injunctions for the state. Since interpretation 
is a human process colored by mutual human experiences, 
it is precisely this variety of interpretation which is 
the stumbling block of a common understanding of the 
Bible, and at the same time the basis of hope for future 
understanding. We turn now to ask to what degree is the 
Bible accepted as the primary authority among the various 
confessional groups. 
Continental Reformed theologians, notably Barth, 
Brunner, Wiesner, Kraemer, and Maury generally accept 
positions relegating natural law and natural reason to 
comparatively obscure import~nce. Barth, whose polemic 
runs to extremist statements, says: 
What man can know according to the measure of 
his natural powers, his understanding, his 
feeling, will be at most something like a 
supreme being, the ultimate and the most pro-
found, [but} this 'thing-in-itself' has noth-
ing to do with God. It is part of the intui-
tions andmaryinal possibilities of man's 
thinking, man s contrivance. • • • God is 
always the One who makes Himself known in His 
own Revelation, and not the one man thinks out 
for himself and describes as God.~ 
1. Karl Barth, Do~tics in OUtline, trans, G. T. Thomson (London: The S~ent Christian Movement Press, 1949), 
P• 23. 
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According to Barth, there is no ~ priori quality in man or 
the world Which will enable man to recognize Jesus Christ 
as divine; 1 the possibility of knowledge of God's Word 
lies in God's Word, and noWhere else. 2 
Maury's position is similar. In understanding the 
world, and developing principles of life, Maury insists 
that the Christian approach differs from that of secularists. 
The secularists, or "natural men," have no adequate perspec-
tive from which to judge the Bible. He asserts: ··•just as 
metaphysics are incapable of judging the truth of the 
revelation, Which on the contrary judges all philosophy, 
so an anthropology according to the Bible cannot be judged 
by any secular anthropology; it judges them all. n 3 
According to Brunner, the authority of the Bible 
occupies the central place in revealing to man his place 
1. Karl Barth, "Revelation," Revelation, ed. John Baillie 
and Hugh Martin (London: Faber and Faber, Limited, 1937), 
p. 47. 
2. Otto Weber, Karl Barth's Church Dogmatics, trans. Arthur 
Cochrane (Philadelphia: The westminster Press, 1953), 
p. 30. nscripture is recognized as God1 s Word because it 
IS God's Word. There is no means in this world by which 
that. fact can be proved. It can only be confessed -- but 
even then not haphazardly •••• " Ibid., 61. 
3. Pierre Maury, nThe Christian Doctrine of Man, n The 
Christian Understanding of Man, ed. Jessop and others (Chicago and.New York: Willett, Clark and Company, 1938), 
p. 248. 
in the world, but he affirms more (than Barth and Maury) 
possibility of knowledge of God through the world of 
178 
nature --not because of man's perceptiveness, but because 
God chooses to grant general revelation through his creation. 
Though in early writings Brunner made sharp divisions 
between reason and revelation, 1 he later modified his posi-
tion. 
The Scriptures are the absolute authority, insofar 
as in them the revelation, Jesus Christ Himself, 
is supreme. But the doctrine of the Scripture as 
such, although it is the absolute basis of our 
Christian doctrine, is only in a conditional sense 
the norm of the same. Critical reflection on the 
adequateness or inadequateness of the Biblical 
doctrinal testimony for the revelation to whiCh 
it bears witness, is not eliminated. • • ."2 
In fact, affirms Brunner, the Bible presupposes man's 
ability, partly through natural means, to know himself; the 
disciplines of "physical anthropology, anatomy, physiology, 
biochemistry or even psychology, sociology, or philosophic 
anthropology" should not be rejected. 3 Human beings may 
also discover something about God nin the great psychological 
and social institutions like the family, the state, and the 
1. Emil Brunner, The Word and the World (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1931), p. 16. 
2. Emil Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of God (London: 
Lutterworth Press, 1949), I, 49. 
3. Emil Brunner, ttThe Christian Understanding of Man," 
The Christian Understanding of Man, ed. Jessop and 
others (chicago and New York: Willett, Clark and Co., 
1938)' p. 142. 
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church, which he [Brunner} calls 'the orders of creation•.n1 
Speaking of the authority of the Bible, Nagy also 
directs a strong attack against the authority of natural 
reason and the conclusions of natural law: nchristian 
social ethics must not be founded on or guided by natural 
law; but only on and by the Bible and Christ."2 Believing 
that the orders and institutions of man's life are based, 
as the Bible teaches, on God's covenant with his people, 
Nagy states: nthere then is no room for the idea of 
natural law.n3 nAll doctrines of natural law have a gen-
eral character of rationalist and speculative philosophy 
with a complete disregard of Christ. They always depend 
on non-biblical conceptions of human nature.n4 
Speaking of the authority of tradition in Eastern 
Orthodox theology, Visser 't Hooft, general secretary of 
the World Council of Churches, contends: "it is also 
different from the Reformation position, according to 
which the final authority is not the church but the Holy 
1. Arthur McGiffert, nis Calvin Coming Back'ln Christendom, 
I, 2 (Winter, 1936), p. 321. 
2. Barnabas Nagy, "A Reformed Contribution, 11 Biblical 
Authoritl for Today, ed. Richardson and Schweitzer (Philade phia: Westminster Press, 1951), p. 89. 
3. Ibid., 89. 
4. Ibid., 88. 
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Scriptures. ul 
Finally, in the Reformed tradition, a report written 
by the B8hmischen BrUder also appeals to the Bibl~ as the 
central authority, from which authority in defining the 
character and function of the state will be derived. 
Von dem Standpunkt unseres reformatorischen 
Glaubens bekennen wir; dass das Evanselium J esu 
Christi, wie es in der Heiligen Schr1ft bezeugen 
1st, uns der Grund und dass Mass auch fU.r Fragen 
und Ordnungen dea 8ffentlichen Lebens ist.2 
Within the Lutheran confession, particularly in 
Europe, there is also great weight laid upon the authority 
of Scripture, but, even more than in Reformed circles, an.· 
emphasis is placed on right doctrine, 3 a fact which 
tacitly weighs heavily in the direction of tradition and 
the nofficial" position of the church. Schumann, however, 
exemplified the general Lutheran appeal to the Scriptures: 
1. Visser 't Hooft and Oldham, 2:2.· cit., 24. nnr. Visser 
't Hooft is satisfied that tne BIO!e alone furnishes 
not only an adequate ground for apprehending social 
obligations but supplies as well, at least in outline, 
the content of the principles necessary for human 
conduct, for appraising the proper functioning of 
society and judging the decisions of the State. n 
Duff,~· cit., 101-102. 
2. B8hmischen BrUder, "Zum Staatsverstindnis der Kirchen 
in der Tschechoslowakei,n Die Kirche und das Staats-
troblem in der Ge~enwart, Paul Althaus et al. (Berlin: 
urche•Verlag, Gm;H, 1935), p. 134. ----
3. Of course, it is not doctrine which saves man. 
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"Wo gew:Lnnen wir solche Unterweisungen [for principles of 
life]? ll>.arauf ist zunllchst zu antworten: Aus dem Wort 
Gottes, wie es in der Heiligen Schrift Alten und Neuen 
Testaments sich uns ve1:nehmbar macht. ul Dibelius voices 
the same sentiment when he states that in the weighty 
matters of finding normative directions in thinking and 
life we need a measuring rod, and a measuring rod which is 
not simply applicable to, and valid for, a single situa-
tion, but one with "bleibende Geltung." ~'Es gibt nur 
einen einzigen Mass-stab, die diese Bedingup.g erfUlt: ·das 
ist die Offenbarung Go1:tes, wie sie uns in der Heiligen 
Schrift gegeben ist.n2 
Within the Anglican communion the attitude toward 
the authority of the Bible becomes greatly modified by 
considerations of epistemology, the natural law, and the 
communion's interpretations of the Christian message through 
history. More specific understanding of the Anglican appeal 
to authority will be included under the discussion ofttradi-
tion and church" and "natural law, If but here a summary comment 
1. Wilhelm Menn, Die Ordnung Gottes und die Unordnung der 
Welt (TUbingen: Furche-Verlag, 1948), p. 89. 
2. Otto Dibelius, Grenzen des Staates (Berlin-Spandau: 
Wichern-Verlag Herbert Renner KG, 1949), p. 14. "Holy 
Scripture is therefore the source of the church's wit-
ness, its basis, and the 'unique rule and norm accord-
ing to which all doctrine and all teachers should be 
estimated and judged." Visser 't Hooft and Oldham, 
2£· cit., 29-30. 
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by Visser 't Hooft points in the direction of the general 
Anglican approach to the Bible: The Church is Protestant 
in that it contends that the Bible includes all teaching 
required for salvation, but it is Catholic in its appeal 
to the authority of tradition and the episcopate -- the 
"church [is] the organ through which the Spt:ttt now finds 
expression in the world.n1 
Similarly, the Bible stands in the Eastern 
Orthodox communion at the center of focus, but weight is 
given to the authority of the total church and its inter-
pretations. Indeed, as the Church derives its strength 
largely from the Bible, conversely the Bible was written by 
the church. Bible and Church are moulded together in the 
Orthodox thought in a general appeal to the authority of 
the total tradition of Christian believers. Florovsky 
comments: "The Bible is history, not a system of belief, 
and should not be used as a summa theologiae. At "the same 
time, it is not a history of human belief, but the history 
of the divine revelation.n2 
BratsioE!s insists that the Bible contains material 
of both a natural and supernatural origin. The natural 
1. Ibid., 27. 
2. Georges Florovsky, "Revelatlion and Interpretation," 
Biblical Authority for Today, ed. Richardson and 
Scweitzer (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1951), 
P• 174. 
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revelation is the law of conscience implanted in man, while 
there is contained also a supernatural revelation. 1 Thus, 
nWhere questions of faith and morals are concerned, the 
primary and dominant position as a Biblical source of 
divine revelation certainly belongs, in Orthodox theology, 
to the New.Testament."2 Although the Orthodox Church re-
jects verbal inspiration, or fundamentalist literalism, 
it does accept the fact of insptration, having two char-
acteristics: (a) this inspiration is truly a communication 
of divine truths, and (b) the Holy Spirit's presence as-
sures the right formulation of these truths, nalways 
analogously to the particular character of each of the 
inspired men."3 
The Bible is • • • the Lydian stone for the 
accurate ascertainment of the truth of tradi-
tion, although we take the view that it derives 
its validity from the Church which is 'the 
pillar and the ground of truth' (I Tim 3:15) and, 
through the Church, from its ~rincipal cause, 
that.is, from 'the Livin~ God .4 
About the ttFree Churches," particularly those in 
North America and the nyoung church" areas of the East, 
1. Panayotis Bratsiotis, "An Orthodox Contribution,n 
Biblical Authority for Today, ed. Richardson and 
Sdiiatzer (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1951), 
p. 25. 
2. ~., 25. 
3. Ibid., 23. 
4. Ibid., 21. 
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diversity makes it, again, dangerous to generalize. Largely 
because of their cultural background and affinity, however, 
these churches temper the authority of the Bible with a 
generally more individualistic and more pragmatic notion 
of the natural law. TQis does not mean that Free Churches 
think lightly of the Bible's authority. While-accepting 
the Bible as radically meaningful, the individualistic spirit 
of the free churches has caused many to emphasize the need 
for the promptings of the Holy Spirit in helping each indi-
vidual make the Biblical message relevant fo particular 
situations. The variety of teachings within the Bible, 
some apparently contradictory, has increased reliance upon 
the continuing direction and guidance ·of the Spirit. 
The late c. T. Craig of Free Church persuasion has 
indicated three main problems when reading and interpreting 
the Bible: (1) the need to realize that Biblical writings, 
as others, are ns~tuation-conditioned," and the correspond-
ing demand to get beyond the particular situ~ion to the 
vital message at its core; (2) the eschatological character 
of the Bible, and particularly of the New Testament; and 
- - 1 (3) the apparent disunity of the uBiblical message.'' 
Craig's conclusion, that the Bible stands as a Christiants 
1. Clarence Craig, "A Methodist Contribution,n Biblical 
Authoritt for Today, ed. Richardson and Schwe~tzer (Philade phia: Westminster Press, 1951), pp. 41-43. 
central authority but that it must be understood in its 
broadest dimensions and interpreted anew for each par-
ticular situation, is probably the most common Free 
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Church view. In the search for the authoritative witness 
of the Bible and its relevance for our day, Craig appeals 
not only to natural reason, but also to the tradition of 
the Church1 ~·"the internal witness of the Holy Spirit.n2 
In effect, such an approach, while taking the Biblical 
witness seriously, relies heavily on natural reason. 
(2) The Church.and-tradition 
The appeal to the tradition and authority of the 
Church is marked by a highly developed sense of corporate 
involvement, and, as Troeltsch would typify it, a marked, 
but not exclusive, absence of the individualist and mystic. 
In non-Roman circles, at least, those who- emphasize the 
authority and tradition of the Church, put comparatively 
little· emphasis on doctrinal correctness, with more con-
cern for communion of believers. This attitude results 
not so much from disdain for incisive intellectual 
endeavor, as for a strong conviction of the value of 
corporate worship and corporate aspiration after God's 
presence. Which groups stress the central authority of 
1. Ibid., 37. 
2. Ibid., 38. 
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the Church as a source of understanding the State? 
Reformed Confession representatives, like.Brunner, 
object co predominant emphasis on the authority of tradi-
tion and the church. This objection rests basically upon 
two grounds •. (a) Reliance upon the Church and tradition 
tends to "objectivism,n i.e. an identification of the 
message and practice of the Church with God's will and 
work. 1 The church, despite its responsibility, remains a 
human institution; to apotheosize the church and its teach-
ings is wrong. American theologians, particularly under 
the leadership of Reinhold Niebuhr, have revealed a further 
aspect of this problem in contending that the Church, like 
other aggregations with power, tends to absolutize itself 
and tenaciously seeks to preserve itself in its precarious 
position of power by grasping for more power, thus forget-
ting its mission to point to the living presence of God. 2 (b) 
The revelation of the Bible is continually corrupted by 
human finitude and sin (both), and distorted by the 
effort to imp()se human forms and interpretations upon it. 
Therefore, uthe Reformed churches take a more critical 
1. Henry Wieman, "God Meets Man," Christendom, IX, 1 
(Winter, 1944), p. 98. 
2. Reinhold Niebuhr~ The Nature and Destiny of Man (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953), Part It; 20-22. 
or as its critics would say a more iconoclastic attitude 
toward tradition.n1 
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Such refusal to identify tradition and the church 
with the express will of God does not imply a Reformed 
denigration of the role of the church. Indeed, the 
church has a central place in thet~~onfessional thinking: 
,.Whosoever departs from the church denies God and Jesus 
Christ" is a central dictum of Calvin, 2 In its effort 
both to affirm the importance of the church, and to deny 
that the church can be identified with the will of God at 
any moment in history, the classic distinction between the 
visible and invisible church is made. This distinction, 
however menaingful in theory, has never been resolved in 
fact. The formula can only be asserted: 
The Reformed churches [like the Lutheran] dis• 
tinguish between the visible and the invisible 
church, but this distinction does not imply a 
separation between these two aspects of the 
church. • • • The church depends therefore at 
every moment upon God's present grace •••• 
The church does not npossess" the truth, but 
receives the truth of God again and again~3 
Within the Lutheran Confession, a similar fear of 
the objectification of the visible church is manifest. 
1. Visser 't Hooft and Oldham, £1?.· ~·, 36. 
2. Ibid., 35. [From the Institutes, Book IV] 
3. ~., 36. 
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However, within Lutheranism there is a relatively stronger 
appeal to the concept of given "Ordnungen" in the world, 
among which the Church, as the agent of redemption, n is 
pre-eminently ordained. As in Calvinism, which insists 
that he who departs from the church denies God and Jesus 
Christ,1 Lutheranism insists on the importance of the 
Church, if it is properly seen within the context of 
Biblical aut}mri ty. What defines the church, for Lutherans, 
is right doctrine, and proper administration of the sacra-
ments. For Lutherans, these two ideas are incorporated 
in the idea of nThe Word. n Lutherans, too, have made a 
theoretical, but inapplicable, distinction between the 
visible and invisible church. In conclusion, both the 
Reformed and Lutheran positions assert that both tradi-
tion and the continued promptings of the Holy Spirit play 
significant roles in the ongoing and creative life of the 
church, but that these must be constantly judged and 
interpreted in the light of Biblical authority. 
Anglicans, as a communion, stress tradition and 
the corporate communion of the church. It is the church 
which, as a whole, interprets the Bib~e, just as the 
church centers its existence in biblical faith. The 
1. Ibid., 35. 
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promptings of the Holy Spirit came not so much to isolated 
individuals as to the corporate church. It is not that 
individuals are incap~ble of receiving inspiration from 
the Holy Sp~rit; it is not that the Bible does not con-
tain autho+itative truths; it. is not that man can know 
nothing of God's work through the natural world; it is not 
that the Church is sinless or infallible -- it is that men 
exist as persons in community; it is that Biblical truths 
- .. 
have to be interpreted; it is that the truths learned 
- . 
through the natural world have to be seen in the context 
of the nature and purpose of that world; it is that the 
Church aspires to righteousness and has been given God's 
promise of direction -- it is for these reasons that 
Anglicans look to the Church and its pronouncements as 
their source of authority. The Church in Anglican thought 
is not a body which dictates truth to its members; rather 
it is the structure of common worship and aspiration 
through Whiich men seek God, and through which God woos men 
toward redemption. The Church is, therefore, primarily 
visible and historical, with its authority resting upon its 
mission of service. 
Though differing in some aspects, the writings of 
Bell, Temple, Oldham and Demant buttress this conception 
of the Anglican communion. Although the Anglican position 
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will be cast into sharper focus by considering the similar 
Eastern Orthodox conceptions, one comment by Oldham pre-
pares the way for this discussion: nHis [God1 sJ will in 
each new situation in which men find themselves can be 
learned only in the light of his will already revealed in 
Ghrist, in the Bible, and in the experience of the church."l 
As a chief exponent of the appeal to the authority 
of the Church and tradition, the Orthodox communion has a 
highly developed concept of the church's role. The 
Orthodox position conceives no contradiction between the 
Bible and tradition since the former is par.t of tx-adition, 
and is formulated by it. "The Church, the Bible and tradi-
tion are and remain in inseparable unity in the·orthodox 
Church.n2 Critics who would agree with this general notion 
of the total corporate unity of the Church often charge a 
too close identification of the total Church with the 
visible Orthodox Church, for the distinction between a 
"visible" and "invisible" church is alien to Orthodox 
thought. 
On the other hand, the Orthodox conception of the 
Church and its authority differs from that of the Roman 
Church. In the first place, there is :l:.:e :So.:s; :i concern for 
1. Visser 't Hooft, ~· £!!., 220-221. 
2. Bratsiotis, 2E.· ill·, 20. 
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correctness of dogmatic and doctrinal statement. 1 It is 
"a serious error, often committed by historical 
Christianity, to elevate any theological, philosophical, 
or social-ethical teaching to the position of an absolute 
truth which can never be surpassed.n2 Secondly, and per-
haps more significant, 
It is obvious that this conception stands in 
opposition to the Roman Catholic conception 
Which, according to the Vatican Council, as-
cribes to dogmatic decisions of the pope an 
authority Which resides in themselves and not 
in the consensus of the faithful (ex esse, 
non autem ex consensus ecclesiae).J 
The sobornost idea plays a central role in the 
concept of Orthodox authority. It is. the idea that the 
total community of believers receiv~s and interprets ~he 
authority of the Holy Spirit. Commenting on Orthodox 
authority, Visser 't Hooft says: 
This consciousness of the whole church, ex-
pressed through the unit of its members (in 
Russian, their sobornost , is thus the true 
criterion of trut an as absolute authority. 
It expresses itself not only in the doct~in~ 
but above a:ll in the liturgy of the church.4 
1. In the early Church it was the eastern branch which 
stressed theological precision. 
2. N. N. Alexeiev, "The Marxist Anthropology and the 
Christian Conception of Man,n The Christian Conception 
of Man, ed. Jessop et al. (Chicago and New York: ' 
Willett, Clark and Comp-any, 1938), p. 136. 
3. Visser 't Hooft and Oldham,~·~., 24. 
4. Ibid., 24. 
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Bratsiotis defends the Orthodox position on this matter by 
contending that this is not something which has simply 
evolved out of ecclesiastical tradition. It is not the 
ecclesiastical tradition which the Church perpetuates 
through the church, ttbut principally the apostolic tradi-
tion,"1 and this is connnunicated from age to age under the 
supervision of the divine Spi~it. For the first eight 
~enturies this was preserved within the undivided church. 2 
Among the Free Churches, particularly in America, 
where individualism has run rampant and where cultural 
conditions have encouraged men to minimize tradition and 
authority, the authority of the organized church and its 
historic teachings has been depreciated. Lip service has 
been paid to the historic church, but far more emphasis 
has been put upon the Bible, upon the subjective influence 
of the Holy Spirit (in what Troeltsch would call "mystical'* 
and n sectn tendencies) and upon the prominent rational 
. . 
responsibility of man in a God-created, God-sustained, and 
God-pervaded natural world. 
From the Free Church group, Cunliffe-Janes shows 
comparatively little concern for the authority of the 
Church: 
1. Bratsiotis, £e· ~., 22. 
2. Ibid., 22. 
It is wrong to set the Bible and Church over 
against one another as though they were sep-
arate. The Bible must be understood in the 
content of the Church and the Church is judged 
and renewed by that revelation to which the 
Bible testifies. But there is a broad differ-
ence between the authority of the Bible and the 
authority of the tradition of the Church. It 
is from the Bible that the content of the 
Christian revelation is known and the social 
and political details given are significant 
for us. as examples of the impacc of that 
revelation rather than as detailed answers 
to specific problems.l 
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Perhaps primarily as a result of the impact of the 
Ecumenical Movement, there is currently on the American 
theological scene a revitalized interest in the nature of 
the church. It is interesting to speculate on what 
effect this groping for historical roots and connectedness 
will have on the individualism of American church life. 
(3) The prompting of the Holy Spirit. 
In its current discussions focussing on the doc-
trine of the Holy Spirit, the Ecumenical Movement promises 
to move toward a period of increasing agreement, for in 
these discussions the weight of historical positions, 
because of the very nature of the subj .ect, will not weigh 
down upon, and divide, the representatives of different 
confessional groups. Those who emphasize the importance 
of the Holy Spirit as their source of authority ~y be 
1. Cunliffe-Janes, 2£• cit., 56. 
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typified as usually individualistic and pietistic. Often 
a dynamic rather than static conception of historical 
processes is involved. Truth is thought to be personal 
and somewhat subjective and situational, rather than 
objective and statically formulated. Although there is 
general revelation, the Holy Spirit conveys a special 
revelation that man could not, of his own power, discern 
or unveil. It will be obvious that every confession ac-
cepts the importance of the Holy Spirit, but there are 
same differences of emphasis between them. 
In the Reformed tradition, the Spirit is author-
itative in the sense that through it alone the Bible is 
properly interpreted. For example, "The Holy Spirit alone 
is the true interpreter of the Scriptures. He reveals 
their meaning; in him the Exousia of Christ, the Teacher, 
is continued. ttl Less emphasis is put on the Church as-
the agent through which this Holy Spirit is communicated, 
than in the catholic churches, but ther.e is more regard 
for the church as the agent of communication than among 
the Free Churches. In tbi. s respect, one of Brunner's antithe-
ses illustrates the tension in which the Reformed confession 
seeks to hold the relation between the organized church and 
the individual believer. After having expressed his fear 
1. Nagy, ~· cit., 91. 
of tttraditionalism" and "churchismu in their tendency 
towards objectivism, he then turns to its opposite evil: 
Opposite to this is the evil of subjectivism. 
It is the thought and prac.tice which cast . off 
the authority of Bible, church, doctrine, 
sacrament and ceremony because ~the Spirit 
bloweth where it listeth.' Subjecti~ism seeks 
freedom, spontaneity) magnifies 'inner experi-
ence' and often talks more of rrligion and 
experience than it does of God. 
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Within the Reformed tradition the Bible, and to a 
lesser extent the church, is the regulative norm by which 
claims to inspiration by the Holy Spirit can be measured. 
But the Holy Spirit is considered perennially active, 
illuminating the mind of individuals and the church about 
Biblical meanings~ 
Though a statement of the Lutheran position per-
taining to the authority of the Holy Spirit would prove 
similar to that of the Reformed confession, a sharp 
statement puts into relief the dependence of the Lutheran 
doctrine upon the continuing presence and guidance of the 
Holy Spirit. 
The Church, which trusts itself to the power of 
the Holy Spirit, can never recognize infallible 
1. Wieman, 21;· cit., 98. Wieman speaks a moot word to 
Brunner: 1My criticism is not that Brunner himself 
fails to escape these twin evils of objectivism and 
subjectivism. We all fail. We are all caught re-
currently in one or the other of them." ·Ibid. , p. 99. 
truths of natural law, of tradition or of 
Scripture; but it can recognize the historical 
interpretation of the historical revelation (with its tradition), and empirical science. 
The victory of God's truth over human relativity 
is ensured by the powir of the Holy Spirit, per-
fecting the Creation. 
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Anglican understanding of the authority of the Holy 
Spirit puts more emphasis than either Reform or Lutheran 
theology upon the corporate body of worshippers, and the 
Spirit's connnunioation to the •church ... God witnesses to 
his will in the Scripture, and that witness is partly com-
prehended and developed by the communion of believers 
through the church's worship, liturgy, sacraments, and 
common life. In this way the Biblical revelation is 
"brought home to us. u2 
Similarly, in Orthodox thought, the Holy Spirit 
works through the church. That the Spirit might conceiv-
ably speak to one outside the historical Church is conceiv-
able, but not of primary importance; what is of paramount 
import is that the Spirit does communicate through the 
Church. And it is the Holy Spirit which, rather than men, 
preserves the purity of the Christian message through and 
1. Regin Prenter, "A Lutheran Contribution,n Biblical 
Authoritt for Today, ed. Richardson and Schweitzer (Philade phia: Westminster Press, 1951), p. 108. 
2. Alan Richardson, "An Anglican Contribution," 
Biblical Authorit~ for Toda~, ed. Richardson and 
Schweitzer (Phila~lphia:estminster Press, 1951), 
P• 121. 
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in the Church. 1 
Neither Anglicanism nor Orthodoxy emphasizes 
evangelical "personaltt communication from God through the 
Holy Spirit. Both communions are concerned, in the 
classical manner, with objective truths. In catholic 
thought, including Roman Catholic, there is a firmer dis-
tinction between reason and will, which oftentimes in 
evangelical thought becomes theoretically, as well as 
actually (in life), fused. Not that reason is divorced 
from will, as Niebuhr mistakenly charges of the classical 
Greeks, but the existentialist confusion of the two is 
unpopular among catholic writers. 
Among the Free Churches, and generally among North 
American churches, there is widespread appeal to the 
inspirational authority of the Holy Spirit, although in 
practice in these churches there is often a sort of 
laissez-faire spiritual determinism. Visser 't Hooft 
says of the Baptists: "All tradition, including the Bible 
itself, should be made subordinate to the continuing life 
of the Spirit which comes to men through their 'inward 
teacher. "'2 Such a statement is not merely typically 
Baptist; it is also typical of many American churches. 
1. Bratsiotis, 2E• cit., 22. 
2. Visser 't Hooft and Oldham, 2E• cit., 41. 
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In effect, this predominantly optimistic individu-
alism leads to a popular pragmatism and reliance on natural 
reason> for there is little possibility, and sometimes less 
attempt, for Biblical, rational, or traditional verifica-
tion of one's "spiritual" experiences. Regardless of the 
criticism one might level against the position which appeals 
primarily to the Holy Spirit, this approach has provided 
the Ecumenical Movement with not only a pragmatic point of 
reference in its discussion, but it has also helped to 
permeate the discussions with a dialectic and viable spirit, 
or at least a dynamic approach to traditional problems. 
(4) Natural law and natural reason. 
Though no member church in the Ecumenical Movement 
would support a theory of natural law as its sole authority, 
there are, nevertheless, distinctions among them in their 
degree of accepting the natural law. A fundamental source 
of confusion in discussions of natural law is semantic. 
What is "natural law?" Is natural law a given law which 
can be simply discovered through natural reason, and thence-
forward be applicable to all situations and problems? Does 
natural law refer to the inherent tendencies of created 
things toward fulfillment? 
The question of natural law impinges upon the 
Christian at the point where he asks about the nature of 
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creation. Is it good or evil? Does it reflect God, or 
can man find nothing of God's purposes in the natural 
realm? Can man, in his natural state (i.e. outside of 
the Christian revelation) know anything about God? And 
finally, but not least in importance, what, if any, is the 
distinction between general and special revelation? 
The concept of natural law used in this discussion 
is that of a rtconsistent tendency in the order of creation 
toward the natural fulfillment of individual objects of 
that creation, and that creation in its totality."! Under-
lying this definition, admittedly pregnant with problems, 
(e.g. what is "natural fulfillment., of an object's potential?) 
. 
there lies the notion of a distinction between general reve-
lation --which can be known by man's experience and reason 
not without God's presence and power, but without any unusual 
dispensation from him (all men could have it if they would), 
and special revelation -- which could not be known in the 
ordinary course of events unless God, through the Spirit, 
chose to reveal himself in that particular instance. Such 
a revelation depends not solely on man's search, but also 
1. This is the author's operational definition. It is 
adopted here because this seems to be the basic idea 
idea of natural law among those Christians in the 
Ecumenical Movement who accept any natural law ideas. 
It is also a comparatively neutral definition, which 
means that it is correspondingly more formal than 
substanidve. 
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upon God's self-revelation. Under the definition used here, 
then, natural law refers only to general revelation, and not 
to special revelation. Correspondingly, natural reason 
refers to that range of man's perceptive ability by which 
he can grasp the realm of general revelation, but cannot 
invade the "sphere" of special revelation through its own 
power. 
In the Reformed confession there is wide diversity 
of opinion on the nature of the authority of natural law 
and the capacity of natural reason. Barth, for example, 
suggests that man can know nothing about God through 
natural reason and through ttnatural law.u Man may, as the 
Greeks did, develop notions of a SUpreme Being, but these 
are simply intellectual and philosophical assertions; they 
point to a gody,but they do not introduce us to God the 
Father. Such knowledge of a personal God is known only 
through God's self-disclosure. Furthermore, man knows his 
own plight only in God's self-revelation. There is ab-
solutely no analogia entis in man which makes it possible 
for him to reach up after God. If one asks Barth how man 
recognizes God as God when He does appear (just as man must 
have some notion of what a mouse is before he can recognize 
it as a mouse), Barth reiterates that there is no analogia 
entis, which has been completely destroyed through universal 
sin; there is no analogia rationis; there is only analogia 
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fidei. Sin has not merely defaced the Imageo ~; it has 
completely destroyed it. 1 ttMan is prevented thereby from 
gaining any real knowledge of God in nature or in con-
science."2 
Brunner's position is more moderate. He agrees 
with Barth that man cannot climb the stairs of reason and 
invade God's privacy. Man could not, Prometheus-lik~ steal 
the secret of God unless God collaborated in that theft, in 
which case it would not be theft. ttBrunner yet regards man 
as possessed of some light and as retaining traces of the 
divine image, however defaced by sin they may be."3 It is ng 
1. John McCreary, nBrunner, the Theological Mediator," 
Christendom, XII, 2 (Spring, 1947), pp. 185-186. · 
2. Ibid. 1 186. ttBut, however, he [Barth} may change, Barth s fundamentals remain. Human intelligence must 
be judged by the Bible and not the reverse. There is 
no standard by which to measure Christianity and no 
r.lace for natural revelation." Edgar Brightman, 
'German Theology Through Scottish Eyes," Christendom, 
III, 1 (Winter, 1938), p. 138. 
ttit is this ultimate Kingly Authority of Jesus Christ 
not any consideration derived from 'natural law' or the 
'value of personality' or social ethics -- which is the 
foundation stone of Dr. Barth's thinking about the rela-
tion of the church and the Christian to National 
Socialism and the war." Karl Barth, nA letter to 
American Christians," Christendom, VIII, 4 (Autumn, 
1943)' p. 459. 
3. McCreary,~·£!!., 178. 
''·'"·:. ;·,, 
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simple task for man to find God, however, and Brunner con-
tinually reminds his readers that "revelation includes, 
in faith, the reason, but reason never includes revelation. 
The conception of God remains supra-rational, because God 
is the Lord, who can be known only thr.ough:revelation.n1 
"All the transcendence that I can think out for myself is 
only transcendence within immanence.n2 In writing for the 
1937 Oxford Conference, Brunner indicates that man partly 
knows himself, but that he is still a mystery to himself, 
outside of divine revelation. 3 Brunner's summary state-
ment succinctly presents his position on natural reason 
and its relation to faith: 
Hence the boundary between the sphere of the 
knowledge accessible through faith and rational 
empirical knowledge can only be defined in terms 
. of degrees. The more it is concerned with man 
as a whole, with that which includes not only 
what he is and what he ought to be but also his 
ultimate origin and his final goal, the more ex-
clusive is the attitude of:faith; while the more 
we are concerned with partial aspects of human 
existence the more autonomous, even from the 
point of view of faith does4our purely rational empirical knowledge become. 
1. Emil Brunner, Revelation and Reason, trans. Olive Wyon 
(Philadelphia~ Westminster Press, 1946), p. 388. 
2. Ibid., 367. 
3 .. Brunner, ttThe Christian Understanding of Man,u p. 151. 
4. Ibid., 143. 
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Brunner even goes so far as to affirm that catholics 
and Reformed representatives would both concur on the fact 
that there is a natural understanding of God's law in the 
universe. He claims that the controversy is primarily one 
of degree: 
Daas es eine solche naturliche Erkenntnis des 
g8ttlichen Gesetzes gebe, ist das gemeinsame 
Bekenntnis der katholischen und reformatorischen 
Theologis. Kontrovers zwischen den b~iden 
Konfessionen ist nicht das Dass, sondern das Was, 
bzw. das Wieweit.l 
Other members of the Reformed group do not, however, 
place such a high estimate on man's capacities. For eJtiunple, 
Maury contends that the Scripture is the sole criterion 
upon which the authority of a doctrine can rest. "It is 
not because it is more satisfying to the mind, or because 
it does justice more completely to the rich variety of 
hl.nnan experience, n that a doctrine is true for the church; 
it is solely because it is biblical."2 Nagy is equally 
emphatic in his complete rejection of natural law concepts: 
"If we take seriously the authority of the Holy Writ as 
being the Word of God, we must, after critical consideration, 
1. Emil Brunner, "Der Staat und das Christliche 
Freiheitsverst9.ndnis," Totaler Staat and christliche 
Freiheit, Alexeiev, et al. (Geneva: Forschungabteilung 
des OekUmenischen Rates-rttr Praktisches Christentum, 
19 38) ' p • 57 • 
2. Maury, The Christian Doctrine of Man, p. 245. 
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reject every kind of natural theology and law, or at least 
put it in parenthesis. ••1 This position is proposed since 
the acceptance of some kind of natural law authority would 
amount to the recognition of a second source of revelation. 2 
Kindt-Kiefer3 andBaadrik Kraemer4 take similar, but 
less conservative positions. The latter author tries to 
put the issue in another context. He contends that for 
Christians the question is not whether there is or is not 
"a sense of justice and the human embodiment thereof.'' 
Nor is the question whether the religionsof 
mankind do or do not manifest the same divine 
origin and destiny and the same confusion of 
man. • • • The real question is whether we, 
when we take seriously that Christ is the mean-
ing and center of history, can find room for 
natural religion, natural law, etc. as systems 
valid in themselves.5 · 
He contends that we must seek directives for life in the 
light of the central conviction that Christ is truly the 
center of history. 6 
1. Nagy, ~· cit., 88. 2. Ibid., 88. 
3. Johann Kindt-Kiefer, Katholische und ftrotestantische 
StaatsbegrUnd~(Bern: Verlag Paul aupt, 1940), p. 24. 
4. Duff,~·~-, 152. 
5 .. Hendrik Kraemer, nThe Bible and Social Ethics," 
Contributions to a Christian Social Ethic (Geneva: 
o!kumene, March, 1949), p. 29. 
6. Ibid., 29. 
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In the discussion'of the state and its origin, 
it will be seen that in the Reformed theology there is 
.frequently the positing of given "orders of creation," 
through which man lives in the natural world, even in the 
absence of special knowledge of God. These are the instru-
. ments which God uses to preserve the world until its re-
demption. These concepts have also played a prominent 
role in Lutheran theology. In a very real sense, despite 
the contrary opinion of some Lutherans, this idea of 
given orders of creation is, in effect, a natural law, 
even though they are instituted in view of man's depravity. 
These ideas of orders will be more completely defined un-
der the discussion of the "origin of the state." 
In conclusion, it is obvious ·that there is wide 
latitude of perspective among Reformed theologians re-
garding natural law. Most, however, deprecate the value 
of the concept. For man to know himself and God it is 
agreed by Reformed theologians that God must reveal him-
self -- and that not in purely general, but also in 
special, revelation. 
In Lutheran thought also the concept of natural 
law is deprecated, although in that confession, too, there 
is diversity. The Lutheran discussion centers, usually, 
around the distinction between Law and Gospel, with the Law 
being accessible to natural reason, and the Gospel known 
only through revelation. Proponents, however, are fre-
quently quick to point out that the distinction between 
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Law and Gospel does not constitute a separation. 1 Whereas 
natural man can participate in the worldly t1ordersn through 
reason, "die Ordnungen als SchBpfuhg erkennt allein der 
Glaube. 112 These orders, compelling obedience through the 
Law, help to preserve man•s life, so that the Gospel can 
awaken him to his true self. 3 Through faith we see that 
they perform a npositive" function. In this connection, 
however, Althaus insists that these orders are not given 
once and for all time, and are not, therefore, to be 
construed as a sort of natural law. 
Die Lehre von den Ordnungen bedeutet nicht die 
Behauptung eines Naturrechtes. Die Ordnungen 
sind wahrhaft geschichtlich, d.h. sie sind fUr 
uns immer nur in bestimmter geschichtlicher 
Gestalt wirklich. . • . Es gibt nie und nirgends 
ein allgemeingUltiges, allgemein anerkanntes 
Naturrecht, sondern nebeneinander und nacheinander 
eine FUlle geschichtlicher volkisch bestimmter 
Rechte.4 
1. Prenter, £R· cit., 105. 
2. Paul Althaus, Theologie und Ordnunren (Germany: 
Bertelsmann Verlag Gutersloh, 1934 , p. 81. 
c. 
3. Prenter, £R· cit., 106. 
4. Althaus, £R. cit. , 13. 
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The concept of natural law which Althaus accepts is simply 
a general affirmation that such a law exists in order to 
find some normative approach for positive law, but it can 
never have any concrete or lasting substantive formula-
tion.1 
Because of the Lutheran emphatic distinction 
between Law and Gospel, a further point with direct rami-
fications regarding the state comes to the fore. Heinz-
Horst Schrey asks whether within the Church there is any 
well-wrought doctrine of Law that could be accepted as 
authoritative. Eschewing the Thomistic system because he 
contends that it blurs the connection between the righteous-
ness of God (in the Law) and his grace (through the Gospel) 
in the separation of the natural from the supernatural, 
he calls for an understanding of law which will see law in 
the context of grace. 2 
On the other hand, Prenter warns against a new sort 
of legalism based upon the Bible, remarking that one cannot 
find in the Bible laws for governing earthly life. Rather, 
he protests, one should apprehend nthe will of God the 
Creator through one 1 s moral reason and in contact with 
one's neighbour. n3 Prenter accepts Biblical authority as 
1. Ibid., 15. 
2. Heinz-Horst Schrey, et al., The Biblical Doctrine of 
Justice and Law (London: Student Christian Movement 
Press Limited, 1955), p. 119. 
3. Prenter, ~· cit., 105. 
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primary in the field of the Gospel, but seems here to pro-
claim a kind of natural law in the realm of the Law. He 
appears, then, to assert the distinction (Gospel-Law; 
Supernatural-natural) against which Schrey has rebelled. 
In summary of the Lutheran position regarding 
natural law it may be affirmed that,· 
Lutheran theologians operate with a distinction 
between saving knowledge of truth, possible only 
through revelation, and a knowledge of God's will 
for human society (chiefly or partly) to natural 
reason. This distinction is an epistemological 
corollary of the well-known distinction in 
Lutheran theology between the two dimensions of 
man's life -- coram Deo and coram publico.l 
Though man is sinful and finite, and though it is 
"impossible to speak of the relation between natural man 
and God in terms of gradualness and continuity, r~ God's 
impress is yet indelibly placed upon his creation. The 
orders themselves are an indication of that character. 
Among the catholic comnunions within the Ecumenical 
Movement there is much reliance upon natural reason and 
natural law. Demant' s position is typical: nthe lineaments 
of this essential form of the human being can be discerned 
by the natural reason, though it can be fully apprehended 
. 3 
only in the light of redemption. Richardson asserts that 
1. Personal conversation with Dr. Ehrenstr5m on October 14, 
1958. 
2. Ehrenstr6m, ~· cit., 88-89 •. 
3. Demant, "The Formation of Consciences," p. 77. 
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this understanding of natural reason is part of the long-
standing tradition of Anglicanism: 
Broadly speaking, the view that the law of nature --
or what we would probably today call the moral 
law -- is known by our God-given faculty of reason 
has remained characteristic of the Anglican 
tradition.l 
Farmer's conception of natural law is revealed in the fol-
lowing statement: 
What is revealed in the order of redemption is 
already in some measure written in the structure 
and constitution of the order of creation and is 
in fact, as we shall later suggest, capable of 
being discerned there in a dim, confused and dis-
torted way by the natural ethical reason of man. 
This holds, even if we fully grant that the order 
of creation, and man's power to understand God's 
purpose in it, are corrupted by sin.2 
However, the Anglican tradition does not disregard 
man's need for revelation. The kind of truth we encounter 
in natural reason is not a dead and objective truth that 
we can philosophically discern. Oldam, a long-time leader 
of the Ecumenical Movement, expresses this aspect of 
Anglican thought in the following words: 
1. Richardson, nAn Anglican Contribution,tt pp. 116-117. 
2. H. H. Farmer, nchristian Faith and the Connnon Life" 
(Universal Christian Council for Life and Work 
Research Department, September, 1936), p. 2. fThis is 
a mimeographed copy which may be procured at the 
William A. Brown Ecumenical Library at Union Theological 
Seminary in New York City. It was later partly included 
in the volume under the same title, compiled for the 
Movement.} 
With the Archbishop of York [William Temple] 
we would reject decisively the view which has 
long been dominant in Christian thought--that 
conceiving of revelation primarily as the 
communication of a deposit of truth -- and 
agree with his insistence that ~the knowledge 
of God can be fully given to man only in a 
person, never in a doctrine,' and that 'what 
is offered to man in any specific revelation 
is not truth concerning God but the living God 
himself.' God is at work in the world not as 
a static principle but as a living Person, 
'expressing his constancy through appropriate 
variations.' 1 
In the context of the discussion of "ordnungenn 
Bratsiotis presents the Orthodox concept of natural law, 
stating that within Orthodox thinking there is no ground 
for a separation of Gospel and Law, and that a double 
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ethic is unknown both in the New Testament and in the 
Church Fathers. 2 While in Orthodox thought there is no 
separation of Law and Gospel, there is a marked distinc-
tion, for Orthodox theologians insist that ttthe confusion 
between natural law and Christian ethics has proved 
disastrous."3 In fact' the notion of natural law "has not 
been developed in Orthodox theology.n4 In Orthodox thought 
there is preference for speaking of "natural revelation,n5 
1. Visser 't Hooft and Oldham, .£2• cit., 220. 
2. Bratsiotis, ~· cit., 28. 
3. Ibid., 29. 
4. Ibid., 29. 
-5. This corresponds to Brunner's general revelation, as dis-
tinguished from special revelation. 
since to speak of revelation puts even this knowledge in 
the context of God's universe. 
Side by side with this revelation of God ~ 
excellence,the supernatural revelation, wli!Ch 
constitutes the centre and principa~ subject 
of the Bible, the existence of indirect or 
natural revelation is recognised in Orthodox 
theology; this is not only testified in the 
Scriptures ••• but is also, in part, contained 
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in the Scriptures. Neither does natural revela-
tion render supernatural revelation superfluous 
nor does supernatural revelation shut out natural, 
but the natural demands the supernatural and the 
supernatural presupposes the natural revelation. 
The natural revelation of God, which constitutes 
the subject of what is called natural theolo~, is 
accomplished in the external cosmos and in t e 
conscience of man on the one hand, and, on the 
other hand, in universal history. It is inadequate 
and needs to be supplemented by supernatural revela-
tion.! 
Thus the implanted natural law or moral law should neither 
be divorced from, nor identified with, the supernatural 
law. 2 The function or purpose of this natural revelation 
is twofold: (a) positively and directly, in leading men 
from creature to Creator, and (b) negatively and indirectly, 
to show man the paucity of his own knowledge and his own 
sinful condition. 3 
One 1 s first impression of the Free Churches' approach 
· to natural law, particularly in the American Church, would 
1. Bratsiotis, .2E.• cit., 18. 
2. Ibid., 29 .. 
3. Ibid., 18. 
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indicate a strong bias in favor of natural law. However, 
this impression is partly, though not wholly, misleading. 
Americans would generally deny the static concept of 
natural law accepted among traditionalists. They would 
emphasize flexibility and teleological development. 
Further, the active participation of the Spirit is contin-
ually stressed, so that man's understanding is always a 
possible fusion between his own capacities and God's revel-
ation. The Holy Spirit takes a positive role in the direc-
tion of history itself, through men; thus the doctrine of 
the state, dynamic as it must be, is at every moment 
intended to be suffused with the Christian imperative. 
Troeltsch has, in a moment of insight, called the Calvinist 
ethic a monasticism within the structures and relativity 
of the world. As a continuation of the Calvinist ethic, 
in Free Churches there. is tremendous emphasis on demonstrat-
ing the relevance of faith to life, not because man can 
discern good and act righteously in his natural capacity, 
but because theough him the Holy Spirit finds concrete 
expression. 
This natural law can be known by man through two 
media, contends Cunliffe-Janes; firstly there is something 
in his nature which, as the image of God, tends him 
toward an understanding of the world God has created; and 
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secondly, through immersion in the processes of history 
man comes to perceive what the law and will of God are. 1 
This does not ·mean, Cunliffe.-Jones reminds us, that this 
law can be materially objectified and ascertained, for, 
although it is ttobjective to the spirit of man,u it cannot 
be understood "apart from mental activities of recognition 
and assent.ui 
Natural law conceptions, according to the position 
generally held within the Free Churches, do not preclude 
the necessity of revelation. Craig points out that such 
belief in natural law, ttdespite the extreme difficulty of 
defining what it is in detail, u 3 n is not an alternative 
to dependence upon revelation."4 In the Bible this natural 
law is placed alongside revealed law without contradiction 
between the two or the elimination of either. In the 
Scripture, contends Cunliffe-Janes, there is an interde~ 
pendence between the revelation in Christ and the revelation 
through creation. 5 "The Bible knows the law of God, but 
this is not a fixed revelation of a morality entirely 
1. Cunliffe-Jones, ~· cit., 47. 
2. Ibid., 47. 
3. Craig, ~· cit., 36. 
4. flli·' 36. 
5. Cunliffe-Janes, ~· cit., 46. 
'·' 
different from the experience which men have built up. 1 
It is the purpose of revealed law to purify and give 
sharp focus to that law which men, even in their sinful 
blindness and outside of Christian revelation, may 
acknowledge, 2 for it is, indeed, nonly within the Gospel 
that the natural law is without distortion the natural 
law of God. 113 
b) Specific sources 
214 
Attention is now directed away from the various 
churches' general notion of the source of authority, and 
toward the specific directives for teachings about the 
state. A few comments about the relation between the gen-
eral sources and the specific ones now proposed is in order. 
Firstly, the first and second types, the Biblical 
and Church and tradition-centered, are more static and 
traditional than those whose primary appeal is either to 
the working of the Holy Spirit or to the comprehension of 
the natural law. This is true because the former two 
rely upon a certain corpus of past interpretation, and 
must make that interpretation relevant to contemporary 
problems. Conversely, those who rely primarily upon the 
l. Craig, £e· cit., 36. 
2. Cunliffe-Jones, £e· cit., 50. 
3. Ibid") 47. 
Holy S~irit or natural law have comparative freedom in 
interpretation, and thus find it relatively easy to be 
relevant. 
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Secondly, there is no clear and precise parallel 
between the types posited as the general sources of 
authority and derivative doctrines of the state. Many 
variables, including pragmatic concerns and historical con-
ditioning prompt similar attitudes towards the state across 
typological distinctions. There is no direct and absolute 
correspondence between the types proposed, and specific 
philosophies of the state. This consideration does not 
mean that these general types are useless for an Ecumenical 
study of the state. Whether or not a representative is 
consistent with these sources of authority is not so 
important as the fact that he tries to be. It would be 
difficult, therefore, to understand the various streams of 
Ecumenical thought about the state in the absence of a 
general understanding about ultimate sources of authority 
which they adopt. Finally, then, though no exact corres-
pondence between general types and specific doctrines of 
the state can be established, the development of typologies 
is revelant to an adequate understanding of Ecumenical 
ideas of the state. 
In the light of these comments, the discussion of 
specific sources for the understanding of the state centers 
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on those who appeal to the first (the Bible) and second 
(the Church and tradition) authorities. Both inspiration 
by the Holy Spirit and the natural law, the other two 
basic categories used in this study, are both "general" 
and n specificu sources. Therefore the comments about 
these two types which has been pursued under "general 
sources"· (pp. 172 ff.) need not be repeated here. 
Before turning to the discussion of the political 
authority of the Bible and the Church, however, brief 
mention ought to be made of two categorizations of 
Ecumenical political thought which have evolved from the 
Movement itself. Nils Ehrenstr8m classifies the nchristian 
approaches" to the state in four basic groups. (1) The 
state stems from natural human interaction. The nature and 
condition of man is knowable through natural means and 
reason, but this knowledge is sharpened by revelation. 
Therefore, the Christian faith is relevant to the state 
for it brings to its life a norm of judgment, both negative 
and positive. 1 This approach is basically that of 
"catholic" elements in the Movement, but finds acceptance 
in some Protestant groups. 
(2) According to a second view, no distinction is 
possible between the laws perceivable through earnest 
search for truth and right political relations, and the 
1. Ehrenstr8m, ~·.cit., 19. 
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Christian idea of the same. The Christian faith and 
philosophy are closely identified. What is primarily 
needed, is a critical scientific analysis and reconstruc-
tion of data. There is no unique Christian standard by 
which political science and political relations can be 
judged, although there always remains the possibility of 
judging between advanced experiments in politics and less 
mature ones. But these judgments are not distinctively 
Christian in the sense that there is a standard outside 
the realm of political scienceo 1 Proponents.of this view 
might be called "humanists,n "liberals," etc. 
(3) The third type which Ehrenstr8m proposes is 
that group which searches the Bible for political prin-
ciples and norms. 
The continual interplay between these basic 
affirmations and political facts and theories 
can produce a concrete political ethic:lwhich 
• • • tries to formulate the necessary cri-
teria and standards which will provide guidance 
for Christian conduct in the flux of political 
life.z 
Among those who appeal to the Bible there are various 
methods of interpretation, running the whole spectrum 
from literalism to liberalism. That group which is most 
1. Ibid., 19-20. 
2. Ibid., 20. 
--
characterized by this approach is the Continental-
Protestant group, including both Lutheran and Reformed 
elements. 
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(4) The fourth group includes those who make a 
radical distinction between Gospel and Law, maintaining 
that there is no particular Christian idea of the state, 
and that there is no way for the Christian message to speak 
to the vagaries of the state; "that the transcendental 
message of the Gospel relegates all temporal affairs to 
the relative plane."1 nAll political thought and action, 
including that of the Christian, takes place in the 
secular sphere and is a matter of political wisdom and polit-
ical expediency.••2 Positive or negative Christian criticisms 
of the state are impossible. This view was most vocally 
espoused during the period of the Oxford Conference, and 
found advocates among Lutheran and Reformed cir~les. That 
there was no clear-cut position in this regard is evidenced 
by prolonged and confusing discussions of "die Ordnungen," 
the relations between Gospel and Law, and the interactions 
between the spiritual and temporal realms. A fuller dis-
cu,,ssion of these issues follows under the substantive 
_, 
discussion of the origin of the·state. 
1. Ibid., 20. 
2. ~., 20. 
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While Ehrenstr6m's classification is particularly 
fruitful in clarifying divergent positions within the 
Ecumenical Movement in the 1930 1 s, it has not been adopted 
in the present project for three main reasons. (a) The 
classification does not do justice to the "Free Churches," 
and particularly to the American brand of Free Church, which 
could not be classified with any of the above types, but 
which does hold an important position of its own. The 
positive orientation of the Free Churches is their 
acknowledged dependence upon the guidance of the Holy 
Spirit, which is neither solely Biblical nor catholic, 
and surely cannot be construed as a natural law position. 
Nor could it be subsumed under that group which divorces 
Law from Gospel. Such a type is net restricted to the 
churches of the United States, nor only to the Free Churches; 
it also includes those whose orientation isgnadaminantly 
mystical. 
(b) Since ~he Oxford Conference, and particularly 
during and after World War II, the last type mentioned by 
Ehrenstr8m has been neither particularly vocal nor influ-
ential in the meetings of the Movement. Preoccupation with 
11die Ordnungentt has become unpopular. This group was 
hardly evident at either Amsterdam in 1948, or Evanston 
in 1954. 
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(c) Ehrenstr8m's typology reflects a theological 
finesse which is not apparent in the statements of the 
Movement. It is probably true that within the Movement 
there .h·; a,s~·, been insufficient philosophical and theolog-
ical agreement on the metaphysical foundations and pur-
poses of the state. Until more concurrence is attained 
it may be simpler to develop a typology of positions 
based upon orientation of authority rather than upon dis-
tinctive theological conclusions. However, the present 
study is indebted to the pioneering research in 
Ehrenstr8m's classification. 
A second classification of ideas about the specific 
source of authority for the state stemming from the 
Movement is found in the Oxford Conference Report. It 
states the following: 
Many Christians • • • are convinced that the 
Church is the only true interpreter of the divine 
law implanted in the essential nature of things, 
and consequently is entitled to speak the authori-
tative word not onlr in regard to tpe motives 
whlch determine men s attitudes in the political 
order, but also regarding the purpose and nature 
of the State. Similarly others find in the 
witness of the-Bible as a whole not only standards 
for the exercise of Christian responsibility in 
politics but also a deeper insight into the consti-
tutive elements of political life than the ordinary 
reason of political experience can give. Others 
again believe that the Christian message does not 
include any new understanding of tre meaning of 
the State, but only provides divine guidance for 
the personal attitude of the Christian within 
the political order.l 
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These three categories, though suggestive, are not adopted 
for this project because of two considerations. (l) Using 
the four types established under general sources provides 
more consistency. (2) This typology does not adequately 
suit present Ecumenical strains of thought. 
In eschewing these classifications, however, it is 
important to recall the limitations of that typology ac-
cepted in this project. (p. 173) It will be remembered 
that there is no direct and precise relation between the 
four basic sources for the understanding of the state, 
and the developed theories of the state adopted by repre-
sentatives. Though there is no consistent relation, how-
ever, these sources of authority are relevant to an under-
standing of various ideas of the state. 
Attention is now directed toward the various inter-
pretations of the Bible and the Church as specific authori-
ties in political thought. It has been suggested above 
that types three and four (the guidance of the Holy Spirit, 
and natural law theories) need not be discussed here because 
the relation between them as general and specific sources 
is quite clear. It was also suggested above that the first 
1. [Oxford Conference], The Churches Survey Their Task 
(London: George Allen and Unwin, Limited, 1938), p. 253. 
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two types are much more static and traditional, while the 
latter two types tend toward a fluid and dynamic concep-
tion of the state. In these latter groups, then, there is 
relatively little difficulty in implementing viable prin-
ciples to changing, but concreae~ situations. 
Turning to those who accept the Bible as their 
primary source of authority, it becomes readily apparent 
that among them various interpretations of the relevance 
of the Bible for political thought are proposed. In com-
menting on the Paris Conference, in preparation for the 
Ox~ord Conference of 1937, EhrenstrBm says that the Bible 
was, in some sense at least, the beginning point of thought 
about the state, as well as of theology. 1 Richardson, 
speaking from quite a different orientation, voices the 
same sentiment: "The Bible gives us no rule of thumb 
guidance for the ordering of our political and social 
life. But on the othe~ hand it is supremely authoritative 
in these spheres. 112 Writing from still anothercperspective, 
Nagy concurs that, 
l. 
aus, et 
p. 148. 
2. Richardson, "An Anglican Contribution," p. 126. 
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The Holy Scriptures, being the Wori of God, enable 
us to recognize, in the light of God's revelation, 
the meaning and destiny in God's plan for human 
life-in-community and its fundamental 'orders,• 
i.e. marriage, the family, nationality, work, 
economic activity, law, the S·tate etc •••• The 
Bible reveals to us the ultimate presuppositions 
by which these orders can be shaped in accordance 
with their destiny and the divine purpose.L 
Yet within this general consensus there are diver-
gencies: (1) same contend that definite teachings regarding 
concrete political contexts are furnished, such as those 
who seek a sort of theocratic government following the Old 
Testament standards. In commenting on Section III of the 
Oxford Conference, on "Church and State,*' Max Huber, chair-
man of the Section reveals that some members would have 
preferred that every thesis regarding the state should be 
directly grounded in the Bible. Huber suggests that such 
a procedure was not pursued because "it is not necessary 
to show a special scriptural authority in every concrete 
question which faces us today. u 2 
(2) Others feel that the Bible contains broad out-
lines from which only principles about the state can be 
derived> but even these are not concretely given. For this 
1. Nagy, 21!.· cit., 86. 
2. Max Huber, .. Life and Work - The Oxford Conference, Church 
and State (Section II)," The Churches in Action, 15 
(November 1937), p •. 3. 
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group many degrees of dependence upon Biblical doctrine may 
be found. For some, political matters are peripheral to 
the central theme of the Gospel, and are regarded as having 
a very loose connection with it. Others, however, conceive 
faith and works as so tightly interwoven that to divorce 
ethics from the Gospel is impossible. 
Wolf proposes that the nfunction of Biblical 
guidance on law is thus a dual one"; (a) it acts as a check 
upon man's will to _assert his own right and to shape the 
law according to his private will, and (b) it serves as a 
"guide for social life corresponding to God's will which 
Holy Scripture shows to be creative of order for men."1 
Biblical guidance does not abrogate individual conscience 
nor substitute for individual decisions. The guidance 
which the Bible provides is nnot legal maxims ,'n but "basic 
principles of law,n which can be treated as 
leading ideas for law-givers, judges, counsel, 
government officials, and also for every indi-
vidual citizen in private dealing with the law. 
Its guiding rules are not rigid, abstract prin-
ciples, but active ones, reguiring reinterpre-
tation as each case arises.Z 
1. Erik Wolf, nThe Rule of Law,u -Biblical Authorit* for 
Today, ed. Richardson and Schweitzer (Philadelp ia: 
Weatminster Press, 1951), p. 280. 
2. Ibid., 280. 
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Brunner takes a similar attitude. He concurs that 
though there is no daily program for political _life in the 
Bible, the inner lines of that program can be discerned in, 
and derived fram, the Bible.1 But, 
Es gibt darum nicht ebenso wie es eine vollstlndige 
christliche Lehre von der Kirche gibt auch eine 
vollstftndige Lehre vom Staat, sondern nur sozusfgen 
einen christlichen Beitrag zur Lehre vom Staat. 
Opposition to biblical literalism's understanding 
of political life stems from many sources. Nagy denies 
the existence of a mechanical authority regarding "the 
right ordering of social and political life, set out in 
paragraphs like a legal code, but a spiritual and religious 
authority.n3 In this feeling Nagy is joined by the 
B8hmischen BrUder.~ 
Some members who appeal to Biblical authority see 
the political and social life, while coming under the aegis 
of the Gospel, as ephemeral matters. Writing in 1954, 
Wright reflects this attitude. A basic problem involved 
in looking to the Bible for principles of social life, he 
1. Emil Brunner, Die politische Verantwortung des Christen (Zurich: Zwingli-ver1ag, 1944), p. 14. 
2. Emil Brunner, "Kirche t.ind Staat, n Die Kirche und das 
Staatsproblem in·der Gegenwart, ed. Althaus et al. 
(Berltn: Furche-Verlag GmbH, 1935), p. 10. 
3. Nagy, 2E.· cit., 84. 
4. B8bmischen BrUder, ~· cit., 134-135 •. 
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asserts, is that the Bible was written with little concern 
for permanent social institutions. 1 There are several 
instances in which the apostles gave instructions to their 
communities regarding aspects of communal life, but these 
being peripheral to the Gospel message, should be minimized. 2 
(3) There is a third group, referred to by Ehrenstr8m 
as those who divorce the Christian message from the temporal 
sphere. An example of this view is Muilenberg who ques-
tions the possibility of deriving permanently valid prin-
ciples or ethical norms for social life from the Bible. 
The content of Biblical revelation does not center around 
such norms or principles. 3 And speaking of the attempt 
within· the Movement in later years to refine "middle axioms" 
as guiding lines for social action, Wolfgang Schweitzer 
disparages the effort, 4 commenting that "no development of 
ethical principles from the Bible, and no direct application 
of them to present problems, are possible .. " 5 Barth 
1. G. Ernest Wright, "From the Bible to the Modern World," 
Biblical Authori ta for Today, ed. Richardson and 
Schweitzer (Phila elphia: Westminster Press, 1951), 
p. 234. 
2. Ibid., 234-235. 
3. Muilenberg, ~· cit., 214. 
4. Wolfgang Schweitzer, "Biblical Theology and Ethics Today, n 
Biblical Authorita for Today, ed. Richardson and 
Schweitzer (Phila elphia: Westminster Press, 1951), p. 151. 
5. Ibid., 150. 
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vehemently protests against this separation of the temporal 
sphere from the rule of God, and is a leading agitant for 
the affirmation that God reigns over all. But to counter-
act the Lutheran separation of realms, Barth does not rely 
on human understanding. His appeal is radically Biblical-
centered. "What the divine order means in the family, the 
state and society, understood in the sense of a personal 
concrete call, here and now, can be known and affirmed 
only in obedient listening to the Scriptures, under the 
leading of the Holy Spirit.ul 
Ehrenstr6m reports that in the discussions for the 
Oxford Conference, quietist elements also submitted that 
the church had nothing to say about the state as Christians, 
nor about any of its forms. 2 
This third group also includes those who elaborate 
systems of 110rdnungen" in an effort to maintain both (i) 
that god is still in control of his world, and (ii) that the 
Christian message does not fundamentally pertain to men's 
temporal affairs. Ehrenstr6m shows that this discussion 
of "Ordnungen" developed primarily out of two movements. 
The first was a growing awareness that the individualistic 
ethic of late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
1. Ehrenstr5m, ~· cit., 83. 
2. Ehrenstr8m, "Diskussionsbericht,u p. 148-149. 
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Lutheranism, was unable to cope with the disintegration 
of the modern world. The sense of frustration that frag-
mentation of society intensified motivated the secular 
philosophies of ntogetherness" and ncohesiveness." Social-
ism was but one expression, romanticism another, and the 
Volk movement in Germany its crudest and perhaps most 
powerful form. 
Secondly, in search for roots and integration 
within the Church, there was a re~examination of Reforma-
tion doctrines. During the Reformation the sense of 
cohesiveness was expressed in the rather undeveloped 
notion of the."Orders.u Furthermore, as EhrenstrBm 
demonstrates, this concept of orders, having been origin-
ally designed to destroy dependence upon the Roman 
Catholic theory of the two-storied universe of nature and 
supernature, 1 provided the structure under Which (a) the-
ologians of the thirties would not need to capitulate to 
Roman Catholic doctrines, (b) German theologians could 
co-ordinate their theology with their political situation, 
and (c) the resulting theology would be both historically 
justified.and relevant to the needs for a community of 
believers. 
1. Ehrenstr6m, Christta~ Baith and the Modern State, p. 69. 
-·---·-::-··.,~· •::.·.·-
A further ramification of this idea of orders was 
perhaps even more significant for Continental Christians. 
The original reformers had not permitted the divorce 
between Gospel and Law; this was part of the reason for 
its attack against the Roman Church, Yet within 20th 
Century Lutheranism this separation emerged. Ehrenstr8m 
suggests how this separation occurred: 
For the previous fluctuation between an ascetic 
and a theocratic solution of the relations 
between the spiritual and the temporal power, 
the thinkers of the Reformation substituted 
their new understanding of the Gospel and the 
ruling powers as differing agents of the divine 
action in this world, both of which are regarded 
as springing directly out of the fatherly will 
of the sovereign God. It has, however, been 
the nemesis of Lutheranism that it has confused 
this distinction with another alternative~- the 
·spiritual sphere of love and the temporal 
sphere ·of the law, the inner man who lives within 
the sphere of the freedom of grace and the outer 
man Who lives under the conditions of the world. 
The endeavor to preserve the purity of the gospel 
led to the separation of the temporal and the 
spiritual realms. The result was that usually 
the different attempts to reunite them only led 
them to an oscillation between exaggerated forms 
of the same errors with which the Catholic doc-
trine has been charged.l 
Turning toward those who emphasize the primary 
authority of the church and traditions, more unanimity is 
evident, QUt a degree of diversity is still apparent. 
1. Ehrenstr6m, Ohristia~ iaitft.and the Modern State, pp. 69-
70. 
Among the Anglicans and Orthodox there is much greater 
acceptance (than among Bible-centered representatives) 
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of the capacity of natural reason for rational comprehen-
sion and application of Christian social principles. 
Bratsiotis, an Orthodox theologian, provisionally accepts 
the Old Testament as containing tta definite ethos of 
eternal validity,n an ethos which, "together with faith 
in Christ ought to inspire and govern the attitude of the 
church and of each one of the faithful to matters polit-
ical and social.nl 
Among Anglicans, the espousal of the natural law 
is common. Archbishop Temple, V. A. Demant, and Farrer all 
illustrate this perspective. According to Temple: "We have 
no specific revelation of God's intention for the State 
over and above the actual history of the State. To this, 
therefore, we must go. n 2 Or more fully: 
We shall not seek the divine operation chiefly in 
any kind of interventions, or in the delegation 
of authority from above, but rather in the irresist-
ible logic which appears in the history of the 
development of states, attaching success to same 
methods and failure to others, stability and 
prosperity to some aspirations and calamity to 
others.3 
1. Bratsiotis, ~· ~., 27. 
2. William Temple, Christianitr and the 
Macmillan and Company, 1928 , p. 40. 
3. Ibid., 41. 
State (London: 
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Demant insists on the possibility of a Christian sociology, 
founded upon principles which do not derive exclusively 
from a particular revelation. 1 Farrer agrees that revela-
tion does not supply a system of ethics and social thought 
and an accurate knowledge of man's composition, from which 
a notion of social laws could be deduced. 2 But this atti-
tude is to be distinguished from those who separate Gospel 
and Law on principle, for Farrer does contend that it is 
possible to derive principles and norms for social life 
from religion. Natural reason is the primary source of 
such directives. 
In summary, the remarks of the Study Department's 
Paul Abrecht point to the past descriptively and to the 
future hopefully. Speaking of the variety of belief re-
garding the source of authority for teachings about the 
state and social order, he says: "There is not, and 
probably never will be full agreement about the principles 
and standards which should be used by Christians to guide 
their thinking about social problems."3 ttBut," he goes on 
1. V. A. Demant, God! Man and Societ{ (Milwaukee: 
Morehouse Publish ng Company, 193 ), p. 50. 
2. Austin Farrer, ttThe Christian Doctrine of Man," The 
Christian Understanding of Man, ed. Jessop et al:--
(Chicago and New York: Willett, Clark and Company, 
19 38) ' p • 18 5 • 
3. Paul Abrecht, ttChristian Action in Society," 
Ecumenical Review, II, 2 (Winter, 1950), p. 143. 
.,. 
to say, nthere is growing ecumenical consensus about the 
basis of Christian social concern. • • • For want of a 
better term this embodiment of Christian hopes has been 
called The Responsible Society.nl This concept ttpoints 
to a society which accepts the fact of a deep tension 
between justice and freedom, tension that will always 
force men to break through the stereotypes which are 
formed by history and to seek new and fresh solutions."2 
2. Philosophical and Theological Foundations 
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Any attempt to summarize the theological and philo-
sophical discussions in the Ecumenical Movement which lie 
in back of the ideas of the state which it propounds must 
be cursory. Either consciously or un-m.ttingly, assertions 
regarding the state presuppose theological and/or philo-
sophical notions. Within the Ecumenical Movement today 
it is contended more strongly than ever that basic theo-
logical discussions cannot be escaped. Furthermore, it is 
asserted occasionally that until some kinds of theological 
agreements are reached, it is fruitless to promulgate 
doctrines about social relations and institutions. Ten 
Doornkat remarks that the Paris Conference (1934) recognized 
1. Ibid., 141-151. 
2 • Ibid. , 143. 
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that assertions about the state involve sociological and 
theological ideas. ttEine kirchliche Besinnung Uber den 
Staat nicht:m8glich ist, ohne zugleich Glaubensaussagen 
Uber Sch8pfung and SUnde, Uber Erl8sung and Reicherwartung 
zu machen."1 Brunner posits the same idea when discussing 
the problem of human freedom as a theological question. 2 
Commenting on the Oxford Conference proceedings, 
Ehrenstr8m concurs in this integral relation between con-
cepts of the state and theological understandings: 
Jedes genuin christliche VerstHndnis des Staates 
steht in engster Beziehung zu einem bestimmten 
GesamtverstHndnis der christlichen Glaubens und 
kann nur von ihm aus gewonnen und beurteilt 
werden. 3 
Though there is· mounting agitation for founding 
social teachings on theological foundations, the official 
reports of the Movement show no consistent and unanimous 
theoretical structure of thought. Ei;the1e:::one of two 
tendencies is apparent in the reports: (1) towards 
developing statements that can be endorsed by all member 
churches simply because some central words are vague 
enough to permit each denominational or confessional unit 
to attach to it its own peculiar meaning, or (2) making 
1. ten Doornkat, ~· cit., 94. 
2. Ibid., 94. 
3. Ehrenstr8m, ttniskussionsbericht," p. 146. 
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social statements Which are pragmatic and occasional, 
rather than metaphysical. In view of these considerations 
it is evident that the concept of middle axioms is not 
simply particularly appropriate to principles of Protestant 
thought, but is also an effort to escape the two unsatis-
factory tendencies mentioned above. 
Since only the broadest generalizations regarding 
theological backgrounds can be intimated here, only three 
areas of theology will be considered: (a) nature and 
creation, (b) man, and (c) society and the social structure. 
The categories used in the discussion of the source of 
authority (supra.) cannot be used meaningfully in this 
context, so that the basic positiens will be presented 
without overall categorization by types. 
a) Nature and creation. 
Two distinctive views are prevalent among representa-
tives to Ecumenical meetings regarding nature and creation. 
These views cut across denominational lines, geographic 
borders, and depend in no precise manner upon what source 
of authority one appeals to for his understanding. 1 
1. For example, those who depend upon the centrality of 
Biblical evidence find that the Bible offers no clear-
cut artd decisive theory of creation. For instance, 
the thirteenth chapter of Romans and the thirteenth 
chapter of Revelation appear contradictory, as Barth 
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The main views taken are the following: (1) God's 
creation was completely good, because it was his creation. 
But the Fall, variously interpreted, so alienated that cre-
ated product from God that the creation which was originally 
good now has no, or at most stringently limited, potential 
for good, so that God must redeem it in his mercy. Though 
it is impossible to make precise correlations between those 
who hold this view and denominational, geographic, or other 
groupings (such as those suggested under appeals to author-
ity), it is generally true that persons taking this view of 
creation and nature are affiliated with the Reformed group, 
European culture and experience, and that group which ap-
peals to the central authority of the Bible. This view is 
less popular among the American and Younger Churches. Obvi-
ously, those whose orientation is toward a natural law 
authority have little in common with this perspective. 
(2) The second basic view of the relation between 
creation and nature rejects the idea of radical discontinuity 
between creation and nature. God's will has not been so 
lias reminded us. Karl Barth, "Aus der Diskussion in 
Budapest am Vormittag des 1. April, 1948, "Christliche 
Gemeinde im Wechsel der Staatsordnung (Zollikon, Zurich: 
Evangelischer Verlag A. G., 1948) p. 49. 
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effaced through a llall that man is incapable of good. This 
group conceives the Fall as primarily symbolic of the sin 
that man experiences in history. 1 Nature has not fallen, 
but man, in his freedom, sins and cannot adequately per-
ceive nature's meaning or God's will. The problem of man 
is both epistemic and moral. Descriptively, man falls --
continually, but metaphysically he is not "Fallen." Be-
cause there is a connection between God's creation and the 
present state of nature, God's will can be partially, 
though dimly, perceived in the world. This view is strang-
est among the American and Younger Churches, and among 
those who do not trace their theological parentage through 
"traditionaln churches. 
In Lutheran and Reformed circles there has been a 
-long tradition of "radical discontinuityn thought. But 
several factors converged to encourage the autonomy of the 
American churches from their European fathers~ (i) the 
Revolutionary War and the "Amerioani~ation" of even the 
tradition-centered churches, (ii) the frontier movement 
and the individualistic, emotional religion it engendered, 
1. "There cannot be a 'historical' account of the creation; 
nor, likewise, can there be~ 'historical' account of 
the fall. In Jesus Christ it is revealed to faith that 
we have been created in the Word of God, and also that 
we have fallen away from this our origin." Brunner, 
"Christian Understanding of Man,n p. 163. 
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(iii) the impact of new scientific theories (especially of 
Charles Darwin in 1859) at the same time that Biblical 
criticism was crossing the Atlantic and reaction against 
frontier emotionalism was increasing, (iv) the impact of 
new social problems and social thought, which gave new di-
rection or focus for Christian expression, 1 .and (v) the 
fact that large numbers of clergymen, particularly in the 
individualistic churches, were comparatively uneducated in 
the history of Christian thought and doctrine. 
It is charged sometimes that the American and 
Younger churches are basically optimistic about progress 
because they have suffered little in the long courses of 
history. This optimism is sometimes forwarded as an ex-
planation of their hope in natural growth in history, of 
their inability to fully appreciate the irreconcilable 
forces and ambiguities.in the world. As a matter of des-
cription these churches are least. dependent upon tradition 
and heritage; these churches depend less upon traditional 
Christian doctrine. This factor could be as significant 
as "naive optimism" in the rejection of that view which 
emphasizes that nature has "fallenn from its Creator's 
intentions. 
1. E.~., the teachings of Jesus were stressed rather than 
the divinity of Jesus; the Jesus of history was dis-
tinguished from the Christ of faith. 
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At any rate, the continuing debate about the state 
in the Movement must work within the tension between these 
two basic views. When it is fully recognized that such 
diverse elements co-operate in the Ecumenical Movement, 
the tremendous significance of the middle axioms moving 
toward a Responsible Society become evident. 
b)~ 
Theological conceptions of man play a central role 
in the Christian understanding of the state. Yet, aside 
from Christological discussions, there is probably no more 
diversity of belief and innuendo•of meaning on any theo-
logical issue than this. Neither is there indisputable 
help from the Bible, which points in the direction of an 
answer. 
1. 
The Bible gives no philosophical treatment of 
human depravity. Is man totally or only parti-
ally depraved? Is he predestined to salvation 
or destruction or does he have the c~pacity 
within himself to accept or reject divine grace? 
The Bible gives no clear and incontrovertible 
answer to these questions because they represent 
an intellectual cogitation on man as a 1 substan-
tive1 and because they shift the focus of atten-
tion from flexible, moving narration of man-in-
relation-t~-God to abstract, propositional 
dogmatics. · 
' 
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These differences are not only confessional and denomina-
tional, they are also geographic. Tittle remarks about 
this when he reflects upon the difference between American 
and European conceptions of the nature of man. 
There is, to be sure, an important difference 
between the European way and the American way 
of looking at man. The one is speculative, the 
other empirical. The one views man in the 
light of theological theories concerning his 
•nature,' both before and after an alleged 'fall'; 
the other1takes account of observable attitudes and acts. 
Between confessional families there is great dis-
agreement about the nature of man. Ideas run the whole 
range from Reformed pessimism about man's capacity for 
progress to the ttFree Churchesn optimism. In between these 
two poles lie the Anglican and Orthodox positions. 
(1) The first controversial belief about man centers 
in the meaning of the fact that he is •tcreated in the 
image of God." What has happened to this image?- Some 
elements in the Ecumenical Movement conclude that this 
Imageo Dei is so effaced in the Fall that man has no 
capacity for good. But even among those of this persuasion 
there is variety of belief. Barth stresses the absolute 
difference between God and man, asserting that in the Fall 
man lost all capacity tQ relate himself to God. The only 
1. Ernest Tittle, 11God in History," Christendom, IV, 1 
(Winter, 1939), p. 3. 
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remnant of his former relationship with God, Barth contends, 
is an Analogia Fidei, which enables him to have faith. 
Indeed, even this faith is a product of God's will rather 
than man's aspiration. Man is utterly incapable of 
righteousness or knowledge of God. 
Brunner also emphasizes the Fall and man's subsequent 
depravity. Yet he contends that man retains a remnant of 
understanding, by which he can respond to God's self-
revelation. Man possesses an analogia entia through which 
his relationship to God,. though corrupted, is not severed. 
Therefore, among those who are most strongly conscious of 
the biblical and historical roots of orthodox Christianity, 
the idea of the Fall plays a prominent role, and with it an 
insistence upon the depravity of man. 
There are other elements within the Movement, how-
ever, who, not so convinced of the congenital sinfulness 
of man, assert that there remains a relation between man 
and God! While not denying the existence and seriousness 
of sin, this group generally chooses to stress man's rela-
tion to God because created in his image. Because man is 
made in the image of God, these members contend, and be-
cause he is integrally related to creation, he can discern 
glimpses of God's will through his own experiences and 
thoughts. Man could not penetrate God's mysteries if God 
did not will self-revelation, but this group postulates 
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that God has chosen to reveal himself in his creation, in-
cluding man's personal and social experiences. Man can 
know God not only philosophically, but personally. Among 
this group are the more sociologically and philosophically 
oriented Anglicans, such as Temple and Demant, and a large 
number of the American delegates. This mood characterized 
Stockholm far more than the Amsterdam and Evanston 
Assemblies. It was even possible for a representative 
in 1925 to suggest that expept for a few occasional set-
backs, history was constantly progressing to better times. 1 
(2) A second core of ideas about the nature of man 
centers around his capacity for good and evil. It is con-
tended by some delegates that man is inherently evil, since 
the Fall, and that he is an endemic sinner. Man• s clepravity. 
causes his every action and thought to be vitiated with sin 
or selfish rebe~lion against God. The more moderate spokes-
menr. of this position, such as Reinhold Niebuhr, speak of 
the "impossible possibilityn of man performing a good act, 
or escaping from sin. 2 All that man does and thinks tends 
·1. G. A. Brandelle, nchristian Fellowship in Life and Work," 
The Stockholm Conference, 1925 (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1926), p. 662. ttAside from the insane. 
outbreak of 1914, I doubt not that the world is improv-
ing in nearly every way. Indeed, I know it, for the days 
of my childhood were not like unto those of today.n 
2. Niebuhr, The Nature and Destint of Man. [This idea perme-
ates book one on "The Nature o Man." ] 
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toward corruption, and man's corporate acts are no better 
than his private ones, since the possession of power ac-
centuates the desire for more power. As power in an 
individual's life tempts a man to rely on his o'tom strength, 
so power in corporate life tempts man into ever:greater 
corruption. 1 
Many radical proponents of the depravity theory 
of man's nature represent the Reformed tradition, like 
Maury. 2 "The notion of sin in Christian doctrine must 
indeed be understood in a radical sense. Sin is not a 
mere modification of the first nature of man, of his 
creaturely state; It is the absolute contradition of it."3 
On the other hand, other delegates are dissatisfied 
with the talk of man's utter. incapacity for good. Among 
this group are those who, recognizing the evil that man 
does and the good towards which he strives, contend that 
man is neither totally depraved nor righteous. Man is a 
composite potentiality for good and evil; in life these 
ambivalent tendencies both find expression. 
Nicht zwei Seelen finden wir tm Menschen, sondern 
zwei geistige Zentren -- das eine strahlt das 
GUte aus (dess~n:Wesen hier ersch6pfund als 
1. Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society (New 
York and London: C. Scribner's Sons, 1932), passim. 
2. Visser 1 t Hooft and Oldham, op. cit., p. 121. 
3. Maury, ttThe Christian Doctrine of Man," p. 253. 
Hingabe an Gott bezeichnet wird); das andere 
strt5mt dunkle KrM.ft aus und lenkt uns zum 
B8sen (dessen Wesen hter erschBpfend als 
Widerstand gegen Gott bezeichnet wird).l 
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Man's moral decisions tend toward distortion and corrup-
tion, but they often began as moral thoughts. From this 
view, then, it is.improper to speak of man as exclusively 
predisposed to either evil or good. 
(3) A third focal point in the Movement's dis-
cussion of man's nature is his need for redemption. No 
member of the Movement would deny man's dependence upon 
God's grace for salvation. No delegate would propose 
that man can find fulfillment outside of God's loving 
mercy. But theories of redemption are legion. 
Once again, there are those who, convinced of man's 
impotency to will or achieve any good, minimize or totally 
exclude man's role in personal salvation. 2 Since man 1 s 
natural capacities, given through creation, are effaced, 
man must depend solely upon God's grace, known only in 
faith. Redemption, according to a large number of delegates, 
l. W. W. Zenkowsky, "Das B8se im Menschen," Kirche, Staat 
und Mensch by Alexeiev et al. (Helsinki: K. F. 
:Puroriiiehen Kirjapaino Oy.,l:'937), p. 365. 
2. For most delegates holding this view, the focus of 
faith becomes the Bible, which itself is accepted not 
on reasonableness, but upon faith that it itself wit-
nesses to the fact that it is God's word. 
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depends upon faith alone, involving the complete abandon-
ment of reliance on one's personal powers and unreserved 
trustful committal to God's live. To seek redemption 
through good works, through mystical union with the Divine, 
or through other human means is folly. "There is no way 
of salvation Which leads from man to God~ no ascending 
scale of moral effort and religious practice by which man 
can restore the lost personal fellowship with God."l 
Other delegates to the Ecumenical meetings, how-
ever, posit a larger role for man in his redemption. 
According to this group, man's sin necessitates God's 
redemption. Man is dependent upon God for life, under-
standing and direction. Yet this group stresses man's 
God-given freedom; it emphasizes that man is a child of 
God. God is ever calling to man; he is ever wooing man, 
but man is responsible for turning toward God. God woos 
man through man's thoughts and experiences. But, they 
contend, man's freedom is not invaded to the extent that 
the "sparktt of man's personality is extinguished. In 
freedom, man has responsibility for at least a part of his 
redemption. 
It will be obvious that these differences imply 
conflicting concepts of the state and its function, but it 
1. Visser 't Hooft and Oldham,~· cit., 121. 
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is also interesting to note, as indicated below, that 
these theological distinctions have led to differing con-
cepts of the state far less often than might be expected. 
(4) There are three other aspects of man's nature 
which play a central role in the Ecumenical discussions, 
and about which there is general agre_ement (many important 
distinctions would need elucidation in another context). 
' 
In the first place, it is generally agreed that in Jesus 
one sees God's intention for man in clearer light than 
anywhere else. In Jesus man knows the paucity of his own 
accomplishments and the depth of his failure; in Jesus, 
variously understood, man finds his· true relation to the 
will.of God. But here again basic cleavages appear. Some 
elements within the Movement stress the sacrificial aton-
ing work of Jesus. Others look to the life and teachings 
of Jesus in the hope of finding concrete moral and ethical 
direction for· their own lives. In/the first view, man is 
convicted of sin and unworthiness; in the second man per-
ceives his sin and failure, but in the context of respon-
sibility for something better. 
(5) Among members of the Movement there is also 
agreement on the corporate character of man, and an 
individual's involvement in creation as a whole. Nations, 
social philosophies, businesses, and labor have recently 
thrived on the cult of togetherness and mutual involvement. 
The slogan has been "community ,n or "das Volk," but the 
practice has often been simply "bigness." The Ecumenical 
Movement shares in this mood of the times that "no man 
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is an island." The New Testament, it is claimed, supports 
this emphasis. "Man's social nature is something assumed 
in the New Testament, and can only be demonstrated by the 
description of the new community formed by and in Jesus 
Christ."1 
The recognition that man is a social animal, though 
accepted by most, does not lead to identical conclusions 
in every instance. Some, as Demant, suggest this is the 
basis for the existence of a state in every society, the 
state being a natural expression of human life. Others, 
like Maury, recognizing the interdependence of man, view 
the state as a d~e which protects the weak from exploita-
tion at the hands of the strong, who see the state as a 
means of ensuring that the dependence of the weak shall not 
mean their imprisonment to the whims of the strong. 
(6) A final attribute on which there is general 
agreement is that man possesses freedom. Predestinarianism 
has not succumbed to Arminianism., but Calvinism is generally 
interpreted broadly enough to permit room for man's freedom. 
Writing in a World Council of Churches study book, Wright 
1. Wright, The Biblical Doctrine of Man in Society, p. 47. 
states the general notion of man's freedom in the Bible. 
Rebellion implies freedom, which the Bible 
assumes. It is, however, a freedom under God, 
for the normal expression of man's freedom is 
obedience and service.· Freedom is God's gift 
to man to enable him to accept and fulfill his 
divinely given task. It is not a natural or 
absolute condition in itself. It is the ground 
of manis dignity, given in order that he may 
serve. . · 
Man's freedom is not absolute, for he is limited by the 
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very characteristics of his creation. Furthermore, man 
finds true freedom as he attunes his life to the will of his 
Creator. But he does possess that freedom which makes sin 
and goodness live options. Demant reiterates the traditional 
distinction between libertas minor and libertas major. Man 
has a degree of freedom in the world even aside from recog-
nizing his reliance upon his Creator, but he finds greater 
liberty and freedom as he increasingly realizes the will of 
God. Demant contends that man has responsibility in that 
process, and that the process itself constitutes an aspect 
of redemption. 
Der Mensch muss einen Weg von dieser libertas 
minor zur libertas major finden, d.h. zu der 
Freiheit, nach der er nur durch seine eigene, 
wahre, in Gott seiende Natur begrenzt ist. Was 
dem Mensch metaphysisch gegeben ist, hat er 
ethisch zu verwirklichen. 2 Darin besteht der Heilsprozess in Christus. 
1. Ibid. , 43. 
2. V. A. Demant, nchristliche Freiheit und sUkularer 
!!otalitM.t...,anspruch,n Totaler Staat und christliche 
Freiheit (Genf: Forschungsabteilung des Oekcimenischen 
Rates fur Praktisches Christentum, 1935), p. 78. 
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This assertion of human freedom leads to the idea 
that the state should provide for as much individual de-
cision making as possible, both by those who avow man's 
capacity for good and evil, and those who stress the evil 
of man. Among the latter group, however, more provision 
is urged for the restriction and legalization of man's 
freedom. Curious twistings of this principle develop, 
however, for there are some Who, convinced of the sin of 
man, appeal to the ideal of maximum possible freedom in 
society to eliminate all unnecessary exploitation through 
a system of balance of powers. 
It will be apparent with the most superficial 
consideration that theological conceptions of man signifi-
cantly affect one's philosophy of the state. Political 
philosophers, like Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, develop 
their ideas of state organization on philosophical notions 
of man. In similar manner, the theological presuppositions 
of delegates to the Ecumenical Movement find expression in 
their notions of what the state is and how it ought to be 
organized. Oldham has properly asserted that "all the 
modern attempts to save and reform society rest in the last 
resort on assumptions, conscious or unco~scious, regarding 
the nature and destiny of man.n1 Notions of the. State are 
1. J. H. Oldham, "The Function of the Church in the Social 
and Political Sphere," (October, 1936), p. 10 .. [These are 
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included in this judgment. 
The affect of theology upon one's idea of the state 
is reiterated time and agin in the statements of individual 
members of the Ecumenical Movement. Niebupr's classic re-
mark bears repetition: Man's capacity for justice makes 
democracy possible, but man's inclination-. toward injustice 
makes democracy necessary.nl Berggrav suggests the implica-
tion of theology for theories of the state: 
History [not theology!] tells us that there are 
two tendencies which in the long run destroy faith 
in inner authority. The one is pessimism and the 
other is its opposite, the glorification of man. 
Both those who make man worse than he is and those 
who make him better than he ~s are actually playing 
into the hands of despotism. 
\ 
Ehrenstr8m infers that it is because of man's sin that one 
attribute. of the state must be the exercise of power. This 
would not have been necessary had man not fallen and des-
troyed the o~iginal harmony of creation. 3 Under the dis-
cussion of the nature of the state these theological roots 
will become of evident importance. 
from unpublished mimeographed sheets at William Brown 
Ecumenical Library at Union Seminary, New York City. 
They are working papers of the Universal Christian 
Council for Life and Work.] 
1. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Children of Li~ht and the Children 
of Darkness (New York: Charles Scri ner's Sons, 1950), 
p. xi. 
2. Eivind Berggrav, Man and the State (Philadelphia: 
Muhlenberg Press, 1951), p. 3. 
3. Ehrenstr8m, nniskussionsbericht," p. 153. 
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c) Society and the social structure. 
Since within the writings of Ecumenical delegates 
there is frequently a confusion of society as a whole with 
the state, one can speak of a general theology of the ttsocial 
order" with more precision. However, main emphasis in this 
discussion is directed toward the state. Again, two opposing 
fields of thought become evident: (1) those who stress the 
fallen and sinful nature of creation, and (2) those who 
stress the continuity between creation and Creator. Ten 
Doornkat observes these two tendencies in the Ecumenical 
discussions, and applies them to teachings about the.state. 
In der Hauptsache werden in dieser Frage zwei 
Meinungen vertreten: 
1. Hauptsichlich in der au£ die Reformation 
bezogenen Theologie wird die strenge Bezogenheit 
aller Aussagen auf die spezielle Offenbarung in 
den Vordergrund gestellt. Darum kann es keine 
umfassende, mit profaner Lehre konkurrierende 
christliche Lehre vom Staat geben, sondern nur 
einen specifisch christlichen Beitrag. 
2. Auf der anderen Seite wird die Forderung 
einer 'Christian Sociology' erhoben, einer 
Wissenschaft von besonderer DignitRt. Ein 
Beispiel solcher Behandlung der·einshigigen 
Fragen, in diesem Falle des Freiheitsproblems, 
finden wir im Aufsatz des Anglo-katholiken V. 
Demant. Dem Totalititsanspruch des modernen 
Staates soll die religibse Ganzheitsauffassung 
entgegengesetzt werden.l 
Among the first group there are those who surmise 
that prior to the fall of creation states would have been 
1. ten Doornkat, 2£· cit., 95. 
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unnecessary. Now they are part of God's special "Erhaltungs-
ordnung," through which he preserves his creation unttil re-
demption. In history the church is to be distinguished, ac-
cording to this view, from the orders of creation and preser-
vation. The family, for example, belongs to the order of 
creation, (Sch8pfungordnung). The church belongs to the 
"Erl8sungsordnung," whereas the state belongsto the 
nErhaltungsordnung." The state acts as a dyke against man's 
sin, and is a manifestation of God's law and will for a 
fallen world. The Church's task, on the other hand, is not 
the maintenance of the law, but the communication of the 
Gospel. In this world the state is to be obeyed, since it 
expresses God's will, so that state and church are not to 
be seen as antagonistic. Althaus, a German Lutheran, 
defines this position as follows:. 
Staat, d.h. Herrschaft in der Form des Rechts, 
~st nach lutherischer Lehre, obleich Uberall 
durch Menschen enstanden und verwaltet, eine 
Ordnung Gottes, durch welche Gott in einer 
Welt der Sunde und des Widerstreites die 
Menschheit vor dem Chaos bewahrt und Leben in 
Gemeinschaft erm8glicht. Die grundlegende 
Aufgabe des Staates ist daher die Verwaltung 
des Rechtes.l 
The contention that the state exists as a dyke against sin 
in a fallen world is particularly prominent in Reformed circles. 
1. 
• 
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On the other hand some delegates view creation to-
day as a continuing, but partial, expression of God's will. 
God's purposes can be seen in history. Historical social 
institutions are seen as part of God's intentions in cre-
ation. Institutions like the state and family grow out of 
the very nature of creation; they are natural expressions 
of the essence of God's creative will. Through man1 s sin 
they become distorted and perverted, but it is possible 
for man to purify and refine his relations to others through 
these social institutions. It is, furthermore, possible 
to speak of a Christian sociology because distinctive 
Christian principles are applicable to man's social life. 
According to this view the Gospel does not counsel despair 
with this world, for there is conviction that the gospel 
is relevant to the conditions of this world. These views 
are shared most frequently among delegates from the Anglo-
Saxon tradition, and are particularly strong in American 
Protestantism. 
Oldham suggests that there are three basic under-
standings of the relation between the Christia~ message 
and the institutions of society. It is the third which 
is the mediating position, and which finds increasing 
numbers of advocates. 
There is the view which regards the world as 
so corrupted by sin that it is vain to think 
- : ••• - ":>'...._ -~- -. ' 
of the achievement of anything could be a 
Christian order. The task of the Church 
is to proclaim the Word of God to men, to 
dispense the sacraments to them, and thus 
by these means of grace to gather the true 
'people of' God out of the people of fhe 
world who are hastening to perdition. · 
There is at the other extreme the view that 
finds in the teaching of Jesus a specific 
way of life which it is our task to apply in 
every relation of life and which provides a 
clear and definite social programme.4 
There is also between these extremes the 
view which recognizes .both the fact of sin 
and the limiting conditions imposed by the 
institutions of society, but believes that 
these institutions are included in God's pur-
pose, that His Providence is at work in the 
world as well as in the Church, and that it 
is the task of the Church to cooperate in 3 the realization of His purpose for mankind. 
1. Oldham, "The Foundation of the Church in the Social 
and Political Sphere," p. 2ili. 
2. Ibid., p. 21. 
3. Ibid., p. 21. 
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Continually, but not always consistently, 
·these theological beliefs have direct bearing upon 
various delegates' concepts of the state and its func-
tion. The Oxford Conference of 1937 tried to formu-
late a fundamental theological orientation for Ecumeni-
cal thought concerning the state, but its theology was 
too diverse to achieve this goal. Rather than abandon 
the attempt to discover points of fundamental agreement 
upon which a philosophy of the state could be built --
rather than a return to the spirit of Stockholm -- the 
concept of the Responsible Society and middle axioms 
has evolved, providing the context for further theolog-
ical consideration. The dialectic of middle axioms 
discussion is not only more expedient for an organiza-
tion like the World Council of Churches because it makes 
possible serious and fruitful discussion in the midst 
of major disagreements, it is also more consistent with 
the spirit of Protestantism, which is historically less 
metaphysical and more existential in orientation than 
the Roman Church. 
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D. SPECIFIC THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
1. Origin of the State1 
Discussions of the various theories of the origin 
of the state have frequently) and fruitfully, centered 
around the differing confessional families. Notable among 
1. It is imperative to remember that in the Ecumenical 
Movement discussions of the state the focus is almost 
exclusively theological rather than sociological or 
influenced by the whole field of political science. 
Few participants in the discussion would have been im-
mersed in the history of political philosophy and the 
various theories of the origin of the state which it 
has evolved. The interest in the Ecumenical Movement 
debates has centered around religious and theological 
interpretations of the state and its relationship to 
God and the Church. When men like Demant and Temple 
speak from a background of political thought and soci-
ological analysis, they have had little impact on the 
deliberations of the total movement. It is true, 
however, that the movement in Ecumenical Circles is 
toward a more scientific appraisal of historical insti-
tutions, rather than an exclusively theological analy-
sis. Even the Church has come under the scrutiny of 
men with technical training in measuring social phenom-
ena; it is now being evaluated as an institution which 
possesses characteristics common to other human institu-
tions. Even superficial reading of Ecumenical Movement 
literature leads one to recognize that non-theological 
factors are increasingly discussed, and the sociology 
of religion promises to have rising influence upon 
ecumenical debate. An example of this is the current 
Study group of the Faith and Order Commission on 
Institutional factors in Church division and union. 
However, though the Stockholm Conference viewed social 
conditions with alarm and responded with potent moral 
sentiment, and though the Oxford Conference sought an 
answer to the state abuses of the time in a theological 
understanding and formulation, neither of these Confer-
ences came to grips with technical theories of the 
origin of the state. 
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such discussions is Ehrenstr6m's Christian Faith and the 
Modern State, which has the advantage of demonstrating the 
relation between theology and the ideas of the state. It 
achieves a clear and concise presentation of the views of 
the state from the Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, 
Anglican, Lutheran, and Calvinist perspective. Further, 
it suggests some of the major areas of controversy between 
these confessional units. It demonstrates that Ecumenical 
discussions of the state developed primarily out of the 
circumstantial need to answer the claims of the rising 
totalitarian states. For this reason the discussions of 
the Oxford Conference are permeated with considerations of 
the legitimate relation between church and state. 
For several reasons this denominational or con-
fessional approach, illustrated by Ehrenstr6m is not 
adopted here. Firstly, though illuminating, the typology 
developed along confessional lines does not make apparent 
the points of issue and conflict represented within the 
World Council of Churches -- the issues become fastened 
to their historical roots, which, though demonstrating 
the integral relation between theology and social thought, 
does not put the central issues into relief. Secondly, 
lines of cleavage do not follow denominational and con-
fessional loyalties alone; rather are they conditioned by 
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non-theological factors as well, such as geographic and 
cultural tempers. And, thirdly, Dr. Ehrenstr8m's dis-
cussion gives scant attention to n~w significant elements 
in American and Younger Church theology. 
Excerpts from the typology suggested in the Longer 
Report at the Oxford Conference are used as the basis for 
this discussion of the Ecumenical attitude toward the 
origin of the state. This Report states that there was 
general agreement among aU delegates that the state 'tis 
not a sphere of action unrelated to God."1 uThe State has 
a divine sanction. Its authority and its dignity are 
based upon this fact. But it is not an end in itself nor 
a final end. It exists to serve the purposes of God.n2 
In the framework of this basic affirmation, however, there 
is considerable disagreement of interpretation. The 
Oxford Report focuses these differences around four poles. 
Many Christians regard the State as an expression 
of the divine law which penetrates the universe 
as a whole. The State is an order based upon the 
need of men for social life and serves the purpose 
of ensuring order, peace, and temporal welfare for 
the community. The divine law in the nature of 
things is both the origin and the criterion of all 
political life. It is an idea which lays prac-
tical obligations upon mankind. But only in the 
Church does the higher meaning of the State become 
evident. The State is a temporal means for guiding 
1. The Churches Survey Their Task, p. 256. 
2. Ibid., 257. 
-
man toward his supernatural end. 
There is another view which also derives the 
authority of the State from the divine moral 
world order. The moral obligations which 
are written in the conscience of all men are 
to be realized in the State. The State 
serves the divine purpose by realizing the 
ideals of humanity -~ freedom, equality, and 
universal well-being -- and by guaranteeing 
to all men the most favourable external condi-
tions for their free self-development. 
A fhird view lays special emphasis upon the 
connection between the State and the nation, 
and the nation is regarded as the pre-eminent 
form of social life, established by God him-
self. In this view the nation is conceived 
as the social form of human life which tran-
scends all others. The State is the organiza-
tion of the national community and it is the 
agent by which its historical mission is 
achieved. Since by its sovereignty it pro-
tects and furthers the undisturbed development 
of the national character, it must be recog-
nized by the Christian Church as an instrument 
of the divine will manifested in history. 
In a fourth view the main stress is laid on 
the element of coercion in the State, and on 
the radical disintegration which continually 
threatens the community through the presence 
of human sinfulness and social evil. The 
State is regarded as a dyke to keep out the 
floods of chaos, as a harsh and indispensable 
instrument of the divine will which makes 
possible a relatively peaceful and humane 
life. It belongs to the paradoxical nature 
of the State that in its exercise of force it 
seems to be absolutely opposed to the 
Christian virtues of love, humility, and gentle-
ness, and yet that it must be accepted as a 
well-fitted instrument of the sovereign will 
of God for the prevention of disaster. The 
authority and legal order of the State is the 
one fixed point upon which in the fallen world 
the whole social order depends.l 
1. Ibid., 257-258. 
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In the discussions of the Movement the first two types 
tend toward fusion, and While distinct, tend toward a com-
mon optimistic view of man's role in history~ admitting 
belief in general revelation. These advocates tend to 
minimize the distinction between general and special 
revelation, since all revelation comes from God. Even 
when such a distinction is made, however, it implies that 
some general revelation of God's will is available for 
man. The first of these [Oxford Report} types stresses 
natural law -- not to the exclusion of revelation, but 
emphasizing that there is some knowledge of God outside 
of special revelation. The second type outlined by the 
Report has a more personalistic, philosophical, and 
existentialist perspective, but still relies on the 
ability and responsibility of man. Whereas the first 
type would see the origin of the state in a natural law 
in history which men could perceive, the second posits a 
kind of divine law in the conscience of man, prompted by 
the Holy Spirit, which directs man's developing understand-
ing of the state. 
The third view is a peculiar development in Germany, 
stressing the romantic notion of~~· The state is 
the expression of that people. It is not, however, 
rooted in a universal natural law conception of the 
world. The fourth view here outlined is convinced of the 
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sin and depravity of man. In desperation man needs to 
turn to God, as He makes himself known through the Bible 
and the Church. The origin of the state in this per-
spective is not something which man develops out of his 
natural needs; rather does the state result from man's 
fallen condition. The state is a special dispensation 
from God to preserve his fallen creation from further 
destruction, until such time as Gpd shall have redeemed 
human life. According to this view, the state plays a 
negative rather than a positive role in man's redemption, 
i.e. it holds the expression of man's sin in check while 
God works through various channels for man's salvation. 
Advocates of the first two groups are most fre-
quently affiliated with the Anglican and American churches, 
but some Lutherans, also, conceive the state as having a 
positive, i.e. supralapsarian origin. The state is seen 
as a natural expression of man's corporate nature and 
God's indirect will in history. Mick+~'s statement 
typifies this attitude: 
I do not believe that the existence of sin and 
the fact of man's fallen nature are the. primary 
conditions Which necessitate the existence of 
the state as an institution. I believe that 
even in a perfect and sinless world the insti-
tution of the state would well be a necessity 
because we need organization which provides 
.,·~·r 
for civil and social order and subseryes the 
convenience of the people as a whole.l 
Temple and Dem.ant ~~:a:sf.milar position~ 2 Temple traces 
the historical development of the notion of state, and 
acknowledges agreement with Plato's formulation of the 
dual character of the state, i.e. that element of the 
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state which stems from a recognition of the power of mutual 
destruction, so that an agreement is reached Which outlaws 
certain kinds of anti-social behavior, and secondly, the 
principle of mutual help which rests upon the recognition 
that people's gifts and capacities vary, and that co~operation 
can reap benefits for all. Temple claims that actual so-
cieties rest upon both of these principles, and that progress 
results from the increasing preponderance of the latter 
over the former. 3 Temple also expresses agreement with 
some aspects of the Roman Catholic philosophy of the state, 
as represented in the works of Suarez and Molina, 11for they 
saw that Society is an inherent fact of human nature, and 
1. [William Adams Brown's notes on Oxford discussions, 
unpublished. These may be found in the William Adams 
Brown Ecumenical Library at Union Seminary, New York 
City.] 
2. Ehrenstr8m, 2£· ~., 54. 
3. William Temple, "Christian Faith and the Common Life~' 
(April, 1936), pp. 3-4. [Mimeographed papers at 
William Adams Brown Ecumenical Library at Union Seminary, 
New York City.] 
that Sovereignty is a necessary organ of a politically 
developed Society.nl 
Demant's notion of the positive origin of the 
state, i.e. in God's intention in creation, closely cor-
responds to Temple's. Ehrenstr8m defines his position 
with the following statement: 
The state is the co8rdinating organ, inherent 
in the nature of man, of human social func-
tions. • • • Man is by nature a being in whom 
individual and social elements are indissolubly 
united. The tendency of human nature toward 
community finds its expression through the 
family, the tribe, the nation and through all 
kinds of cultural associations, in accordance 
with the aims given by the Creator, and thus 
provides personal life with new opportunities 
for development and enrichment. It is here 
that we find the origin and sanction of the 
state.2 
Ehr~nstr&m reports that this basically Anglican 
and Old Catholic position was expressed at the Paris 
Conference. He does not mention, however, that this 
. . 3 
position is taken by most American thinkers. Reporting 
in another passage on the Anglican position, he states: 
Der Staat steht nicht auf einer anderen Ebene 
als die Ubrigen Gottesordnungen, sondern 
geh8rt wie sie zu Sch8pfung. In der Ehe ist 
l. Temple, Christianity and the State, .P• 99. 
2. Ehrenstr5m, ~· £!!., 52-53. 
3. Ehrenstr8m, "Diskussionsbericht,n p. 152. 
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die Familie und die Volksgemeinschaft 
angelegt, die im Staat ihre Gerechtigkeit 
undFrieden ~rende Organizationsform 
findetz;.:l 
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The most prominent Old Catholic thinker to take this posi-
tion regarding the origin of the state was Keussen of 
Germany. He avers that the state is a product of the 
natural order. 2 
Unsuspected support for the positive view of the 
state comes from the B8bmischen BrUder, who see;; the sta:te 
as a product of God's will, indirectly developed on the 
basis of his promptings in the conscience of man. 3 This 
belief that God1 s natural law is perceived in the con-
sciences of men is complemented by such men as Buxton, a 
delegate to the Stockholm Conference. 4 William Adams 
Brown also supports the more positive view of the origin 
of the state, and suggests, perhaps too optimistically, 
that this view is gaining ever wider recognition and sup-
port. He asserts that ttthey are coming more and more to 
1. Ibid., 153. 
2. Rudolph Keussen, "Naturrecht, Staat and Kirche in ihrem 
Verhliltnis and ihrer Begrenzung," Die Kirohe und das 
Staatsproblem in der Gegenwart ed. Althaus et al. 
(Berlfri: Furche-Verlag GmbH., 1935), p. 78:---
3. B8lnnischen Brtlder, .QE.• E&·, 136. 
4. Harold Buxton, nThe Substitution of Law for War, n The 
Stockholm Conferenceb 1925 (London: Oxford Univers1ty 
Press, 1926), pp. 52 -7. 
. . -. -;- - --:'"'---: ·-:·~·· ~ 
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think of government as an agency of social welfare through 
which the people as a whole can do together things which 
they are unable to do (or do as well) separately." 1 
Theological debates in the 1930's were animated 
by intense interest in society and the state. Many Christ-
ians sought a theory of the state which would (1) recognize 
the sovereignty of God over history, and consequently the 
state, and (2) discover a Christian rationale for limiting 
the totalitarian tendencies of modern states. Many Protest-
ants wished to achieve these goals without "retreating" to 
natural law theories. What should be the Christian answer 
to Fascism and Communism? These overbearing concerns re-
vived the discussion of 11 0rdnungen." (These ideas are repre-
sented by groups 3 and 4 of the Oxford classification.) 
Althaus defines "Ordnungen" in the following way: 
"Ordnungen" nennen wir die Gestalten des 
Zusammenlebens der Menschen, die unerl.l:l.ssliche 
Bedingungen des geschichtlichen Lebens der 
Menscheit sind. Ihnen allen eignet der Zug, 
dass sie die Menschen in bestimmter Art 
an~inan~er binden und zum Dienste aneinander 
we1sen. 
According to much "Ordnungentt thought, there are 
basically three important orders: (1) The 
1. William A. Brown, A Creed for Free Men (London: Student 
Christian Movement Press, 1942), p. 94. 
2. Althaus, Theologie und Ordnungen, p. 7. 
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"Sch8pfungsordnung, n (2) the "Erhaltungsordnung, n and 
(3) the "Erl8sungsordnung."l The"Sch8pfungsordnung' refers 
to the order(s) which God has written into history through 
his creative intention. These orders existed by the will 
of God before the Fall. "Erhaltungsordnungen, n however, 
are God's response to man's Fall. To be sure, they exist 
in God's will --as does everything --but would not have 
been necessary had God's will in creation not been broken. 
These orders are negative since they ·accomplish nothing 
towards the redemption of man; they exist simply as dykes 
against the chaos which man's sin would otherwise invite. 
These dykes preserve man' s life while God seeks man' s 
redemption through the"Erl8sungsordnung, .. the Church. 
These latter then, are the organic and institutional 
means which God uses to redeem creation. They have the 
positive function of guiding man toward redemption. 
Within Anglican and American circles there is a 
general rejection of the whole theory of orders developed 
on the Continent. This rejection is based upon the feeling 
that (1) the theology of orders tends toward the rigid 
separation of Law and Gosp~l, thus implicitly denying the 
authority of God over all aspects of his creation; (2) the 
1. Some delegates rejected these. ttorders11 altogether; 
others saw different numbers of orders, or conceived 
different relations between them. 
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theology of orders suggests ttnatural" law at the same time 
that it seeks to escape one; (3) they tend toward the en-
trenchment and justification of the status quo; (4) they 
posit a too radical discontinuity between Creation and the 
present state of nature after the "fall"; and (5) in prac-
tice they encourage a pessimistic and one-sided concept of 
historical life in general, and of the state in particular. 
Bevan's reaction against the theology of orders is 
characteristic. He contends that we say that certain 
orders, such as the state, are created by God simply because 
in human experience we find them useful, and because we 
identify the good with God's will. 1 For Bevan, the state 
is ttmuch more obviously a creation of human will. n2 He 
asserts: 
If Wendland is right [referring to his article 
in the Oxford series} in calling People and 
State 'institutions of God,' they can be that 
only insofar as they are the acts of human will, 
constituting or maintaining them, men were moved 
by Gog to act in a way Which, in God's eyes, was 
good. 
1. Edwyn Bevan, 11Remarks on Wendland's Two Papers,n (April, 
19 35) , p. 8 • !These are unpublished mimeographed work-
ing papers of the Universal Christian Council for Life 
and Work, and may be found in the William A. Brown 
Ecumenical Library at Union Seminary, New York City.J 
2. Ibid., 8. 
3. Ibid.; 8. 
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Temple adamantly rejects the idea that the State belongs 
to the order of nature, While the church belongs to an 
order of grace. His rebellion against this notion rests 
upon his rejection of the evil notion that the state has 
its own principles of action which need not be related to 
the Christian message. He avers that the sole reliable 
deterrent against totalitarian states is the recognition 
that all states, as parts of creation, must seek to 
incorporate Christian principles of action. 1 
Among Lutherans, however, and in some Reformed 
circles, the idea of nordnungen" assumed great importance. 
Of course, this blanket generalization needs modification, 
e.g. many Lutherans reject the negative idea of the state 
implied in the "orders." Ehrenstr8m, himself a Lutheran, 
contends that the major element in Lutheranism conceives 
of the state as having a positive purpose, but that there 
is a group of Lutherans who would conceive the state as 
God's response to man's Fall. 
The general Lutheran view of the state at the 
present. time regards the impulse which leads to 
the formation of the state as an integral part 
of the equipment of man, given by the Creator. 
The state is based on the social nature of man; 
it is the product of the will of the community. 
It is a social objectification of the impulse to 
order which is inherent in all the activities 
1. Temple, ttchristian Faith and the Connnon Life," p. 54. 
···?-· ... 
and institutions of human life. There is also 
the other position which sees the state as a 
means of pr~serving order among selfish and 
greedy men.l 
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One of the major reasons causing confusion about 
Lutheran thought about the state is its historic concept 
of the "two realms." It has sometimes appeared that 
Lutherans think of the state in purely negative terms, 
since its function is to uphold the Law, whereas it is 
the Church's responsibility to preach the Gospel. Some 
outside observers have concluded that Lutherans think the 
state plays a subsidiary and negative role. Against this 
notion, Barth's attack on Nygren is directed. Barth 
fears that the concept of two realms bifurcates God's 
authority, suggesting that::~dd is not active in his 
entire creation. 
Among those Lutherans who accept a doctrine of the 
"orders" there is also disagreement. Relatively few, how-
ever, conceive of the state as"Erhaltungsordnung~•2 The 
state belongs to the order of creation, and though it is 
1. Ehrenstr8m, Pl\ri.$_ti..:an :Fiith and the Modern State, p. 98. 
2. An example of an exception is Wendland. See Heinz-
Dietrich Wendland, ttnas Christliche Versttindnis der 
Geschichte, 0 (July, 1935), p. 12. [Mimeographed study 
papers for Oxford Conference to be found at William 
Adams Brown Ecumenical Library at Union Seminary, 
New York City.U 
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not fully developed in creation (since there are continual 
changes and intricacies demanded by history), there is no 
fundamental difference between such orders as the state and 
that of the family, nfor history is connected with creation.'~ 
Characteristic of the Lutheran position is the statement by 
Webb, "when the order of creation is contrasted with the 
order of redemption, the State must be assigned to the 
former, the visible Church to the latter·. ''2 But, on the 
other hand, the state is related to the redemptive process. 
Aristotle was right in regarding • • • the State 
as arising in the course of the normal develop-
ment of man's capacities, although belonging to 
the order not of redemption but of creation~ yet, 
like creation generally, the object of redemp-
tion.J 
Among Lutherans, however, there is not only disagree-
ment about the various social institutions and their respec-
tive relation to the ••orders"; as Oldham suggests, some 
reject the whole conception of "orders. tA- Werner Wiesner is 
1. Martin Dibelius, ttThe Message of the New Testament and 
the Orders of Human Society," Christian Faith and the 
Common Life (Chicago and New York: Willett, Clark and 
Company, 1937), p. 28. 
2. Clement Webb, nNature and Grace,'' (April, 1935), p. 12. 
[Mimeographed.papers to be found in the William Adams 
Brown Ecumenical Library at Union Seminary, New York 
City.] 
3. Ibid., 10 •. 
4. Visser 't Hooft and Oldham, .QR• cit., 135. nThere are 
Lutherans who repudiate utteri(. these doctrines and re-
gard them as highly dangerous. • 
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one who "rejects decisively the Whole doctrine of the orders 
being in their historical givenness a manifestation of the 
will of God."l Wiesner comments: 
From all this it follows that the Scripture does 
not set over us as divine laws any impersonal 
and static orders, whether ascribed to creation 
or preservation~ nor any rational human structures 
such as the state, but personal powers. The insti-
tutions which human reason has created for the 
purposes of social life, the life of the sexes, the 
family, the nation, and the state, are and remain 
human institutions with Which men cannot dispense, 
and have only human authority. But God has given 
to history and per~onal powers and authority to 
rule and judge us. 
There are, therefore, no timeless divine orders, 
but particular his~orical powers, which are not as 
such more acceptable to God than anything else man 
can show as his work, but which have a mandate from 
God to bear rule, though this can be withdrawn from 
them again.3 . . 
This opposition to ttorders" should not be surprising when 
it is remembered that there are political as well as 
theological reasons for challenging the ·position; many 
theologians were accepting a facile identification of exist-
.ing states with the will of God. Such an identification was 
1. Ibid., 135. 
2. Werner Wiesner, "The Law of Nature and Social Institu-
tions,., Christian Faith and the Common Life, (Chicago 
and New York: Willett, Clark and Company,.l937), p. 127. 
3. Ibid., 125. 
particularly frustrating to the German Christians who 
opposed Hitler. 
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A major characteristic of German Lutheran contribu-
tions to the Ecumenical Movement about the origin of ·the 
state is that of the relation between ~ Volk1 and the 
state. This has been typed as the main characteristic of 
the third position in the Oxford Conference Longer Report 
on church and state. However interesting its roots in 
German social and political philosophy, these cannot here 
be even intimated,even in outline. At any r~te, German 
theologians turned to the idea of das Volk to explain the 
state's origin. It has been said suggestively that in 
England the sense of ~ Volk led to. ·the creation of the 
English state, while in Germany the state developed the 
notion of~ Volk. 2 It is significant that German theol-
ogians of the 1930's stressed the state's origin in das 
Volk. All people must live under a state (generically 
conceived), a fact which suggests that states are part of 
God'.s nsch8pfungsordnung," but historical states vary in 
response to the character and needs of das Volk from Which 
1. There is no English word which adeauately connotes the 
same idea as the German "das Volk. '' 
2. Historically this is probably inaccurate, though the 
Nazi state did much to popularize the notion of das 
Volk already familiar to Germany. · 
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they grow and which they represent. It is this considera-
tion which prompts Dibelius' branding of Hitler's "eternal 
Germany" as completely misleading. 1 ttner Staat ist Uberall 
ein Produckt der Geschichte. Dass ein Volk da ist oder 
wenigstens ein Stamm~ das ist die Voraussetzung, gewiss.n2 
Althaus, a chief proponent of the theory of various 
orders in social life, 3 suggests the mutual interdependence 
of the state and~~· They belong together. The Volk 
needs the power and protection which the state can guarantee: 
Umgekehrt hilft der Staat mit zur Bildung eines 
Volkstums. Der Staat schUtzt mit seiner Macht 
das besondere Leben seines Volkes nach innen und 
aussen. Das Volk bedarf des Staates, um sein 
eigenes Leben unter der den V8lkern zu bewahren 
und zu entfalten. So ist der Staat die torm, in 
der ein Volk geschichtliches Leben lebt. 
1. Dibelius, Grenzen des Staates, p. 25. 
2. Ibid., 23. 
3. Otto Iserland, Die Kirche Christi (Einsiedeln/K8ln: 
Verlaganstalt Benziger and Company, 1940) p. 192. 
Althaus sees three orders in society: (1) the orders 
of creation, (2) the artificial orders which man 
evolves through his cultural experiences, and (3) the 
orders of redemption, which God has instituted in 
history. He proposes that the state be considered an 
order of the second category. Here one of the diffi-
culties of the systems of orders is illustrated. Their 
difficulty is not only theological, as Barth suggests; 
it is also impossible to determine in which category 
various social institutions ultimately belong, since 
social institutions possess varied attributes. In 
Althaus' scheme, if the state is an artificial order 
created by man does he mean that some men can liye to-
gether without the state? What is it in man that prompts 
him to make these n artificial" orders~ 
4. Paul Althaus, nThesen zum gegenw!rtigen lutherischen 
$:ta:-.a:t s-v:ersdlndnis, n Kirche und das Staatsproblem 
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Though no common Lutheran idea of the origin of the state 
is proposed, with some refusing the idea of ttorders" and 
others accepting and developing the uorder" into an 
intricate theory, the distinctive characteristic of recent 
Lutheran thought about the origin of the state is its 
emphasis on the relation between ~ Volk and the state. 
Although some Lutherans conceive of the state as 
originating in man's sin, it is fundamentally in Reformed 
circles· that this idea is mos.t consistently expressed. 
Representatives of the Reformed group have also been 
involved in the discussion of "Ordnungen." It is their 
characteristic position that the state originates with the 
fall of man and the subsequent necessity of maintaining 
order among men. Therefore the state is not"Scht:5pfungsord-
nung;' as in Lutheranism. On the other hand, there is 
difference of opinion among the Reformed group regarding 
whether the state is purely"Erhaltungsordnung!' or whether 
it is also ''Sch8pfungsordnung." Brunner's position is 
ambiguous: 
Der Staat ist, vom christlichen Glauben aus 
besehen, ein Werk und zugleich ein Gebot der 
erhaltenden Gnade Gottes. Der theologische 
Ort des Staates ist weder die Sch8pfung noch 
in der Gegenwart (Berlin: Furche-Verlag, GmbH. 1935), 
p. 6. 
die Erl8sung, ~ondern die Erhaltung. Der Staat 
ist eines der Mittel, durch das Gott die durch 
SUnde aus der Sch8pfungsordnung gefallene Welt 
auf das1kommende Gericht und Gottereich hin erhlllt. 
But in another comment, he says: 
Der Staat geh8rt, sofern er bloss die universal 
Gemeinschaftsform ist, zur Sch8pferwillen, die 
Menschheit zu einem universellen Verband 
zusammenzuschliessen; es liegt auch im Wesen 
der g8ttlichen Sch8pfung> jeder Individualitllt, 
also auch der V8lkerindividualitllt, ihre 
relativ autonome Ausdrucksfbzw. Gemeinschafts-
norm zu geben. Diese beiden Mamente aber 
konstitutieren fUr sich noch nicht den Staat, 
sie sind bloss Mitkonstituentien.2 
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On the other hand Barth stresses God's sovereignty 
over all aspects of his creation; he insists that the Law 
is not divorced from God's will. Therefore, when he was 
asked if the state belongs to the order of creation or the 
order of redemption, he responds that it. belongs to the 
latter, for God's merciful work is not splinte~ed in 
unrelated areas. 3 In another work he reiterates the same 
feeling: "Die BUrgergemeinde hat mit der Christengemeinde 
sowohl den Ursprung als auch das Zentrum gemeinsam.u4 A 
l. Brunner, "Kirche und Staat," p. 12. 
2. Brunner, ttner Staat und das christliche Freiheitsver-
stlindnis,n p. 42. 
3. Barth, nAus der Diskussion in Budapest,u p. 47. 
4. Karl Barth, ChristelRemeinde und BUrgergemeinde (Stuttgart: W. Koh ammer, 1946), p. 13. 
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tension between those who would see the state's origin in 
11Sch8pfungsordnun:g' and"Erhaltungsordnung' is reported by 
EhrenstrSm, but he reports that tension was not dissolved. 1 
This tension, however, is not primarily within the Reformed 
church circles, but between confessional units. 
Characteristic statements of the Reformed view of 
the negative origin of the state are the following by 
Huber, Lecerf, and an Evangelische Kirche group in Germany. 
Huber contends that in the Bible the state is ~egarded as 
a product of the fall rather than of creation, enabling 
God to pursue his redemptive purposes. According to 
Lecerf, 
Der Staat ist nach der SchSpfungsabsicht Gottes 
nicht organisch mit der menschlichen Natur 
verbunden. Er ist ein Mittel gegen die zerset-
zende Kraft, die in das Gesellscbaftslebeu und 
seine TRtigskeitgebiete eingedrungen ~st.4 
The report of the Deutsche Evangelische Kirchenleitung 
concurs in this idea of the negative origin of the state. 
Die Obrigkeit, der Staat, ist demnach von Gott 
eingesetzt, ist ein spezielles Mandat Gottes. 
Er ist in die gefallene Welt hineingeschaffen 
und soll Gottes SchSpfungswerk sichern. Die 
D!monie der sUndigen Welt kann nur durch sta~ke 
l. EhrenstrSm, "Diskussionsbericht," p .. 15L 
2. 
staatliche Gewalt eingedammt werden. Demnach 
ist das Wesen des von Gott eingesetzfen Staates 
ein ausgesprochener tl!Wehrcharakter.tt 
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In the relation between Volk and Staat, Lutherans 
pad posited an integral connection. Among the Reformed 
churches this theory was not acceptable. Ehrenstr8m 
reports that in the discussions at the Paris Conference 
there was a sharp distinction between the nvolku as an 
order of creation, and the state, avoiding the danger of 
identifying existing states with God's will..2 · Ten Doornkat 
writes that this should be understood as a separation of 
the Volk, belonging to the "Sch8pfungsordnung," from the 
State, belonging to the"Erhaltungsordnung.'3 But the 
issue is not quite that clear, since a considerable amount 
of reaction to the ideas of the Lutherans was political 
rather than theological, being based upon the specific 
conclusions about existing states. 
In Orthodox thought the discussion of "orders" is 
deprecated. It is contended that the State is part of 
God's creative will and has been instituted as a preserver 
1. Lecerf, ~· ~., 86. 
2. Deutsche Evangelische Kirchenleitung, ttzum Staatsver-
stU.ndnis der Kirchen in der Tschechoslowakei," Die 
Kirche und das Staatsproblem in der Gegenwart, nthaus, 
et al. (Berlin: Furche-Verlag GmbH., 1935), p. 140. 
3. ten Doornkat, ~· cit., 102. 
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of order, working harmoniously with the redemptive acts of 
God without being their agent. 1 But though its origin is 
seen as a method far keeping sin under control through 
power, in which this position agrees with the Reformed 
theologians, the state has been established by God in the 
a~~t of creation, and in this it differs from the 
Erhaltungsordnung\ concept of the Reformed circles. Finally, 
among Orthodox scholars there is hesitancy to discuss the 
relations between state and church in terms of ttorders"~ 
rather is the central idea of the Orthodox Church one of a 
"symphony" between various attributes of God's creation. 
This symphony is frequently cacaphonous, but G.::.ci'd·: acts 
in every aspect of history. Though some institutions in 
history possess negative origins and functions, they remain 
under the aegis of God's intention. 
Since the discussion of the origin of the state is 
so closely bound up with a consideration of the purposes 
and functions of the state, that subject is the next consid-
eration. 
2. Purpose of the State 
It is generally agreed in ecumenical circles that the 
state is willed, in some sense, by God, and that consequently 
1. Ehrenstr8m, uniskussionsbericht,n p. 150. 
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individuals owe obedience to that state~ It is also gen-
erally agreed that the purpose of the state is the assur-
ance of its constituents' welfare. However, in the 
definition of what constitutes welfare divergencies appear 
.which are based upon varying conceptions of man and the 
course of history. 1 On the one hand, there are those who, 
convinced of the depravity of man and the negative 
character of history, regard the state as primarily a 
dyke against sin and chaos. The state's purpose, therefore, 
is to employ power in the maintenance of law. Among this 
gvoup are th~se who contend that, had not man fallen, there 
would be no need for a state. The state has been insti-
tuted by God as an "Erhaltungsordnung,tt whereby man's 
destructive and anarchical tendencies are held in check 
while the Church or Gospel (and Brunner in particular 
emphasizes that it be the latter), as elements in the 
1. Tittle suggests this diversity: "Up to this point there 
is universal agreement among Christians1 all of whom be-lieve that God is not only aware of man · s predicament but 
concerned to do something about it. All Christians, how-
ever, do not hold the same view of God's activity in. 
history. Some believe that God works in history to save 
individuals from the world, allowing the world for the 
most part to"""Sfil'ft for itself. Other's believe that God--ts 
concerned for the salvation of the world, that is, of polit-
ical institutions, social customs, and economic practices. 
The first of these views is characteristic of European 
Christianity, especially on the continent, but it is by 
no means confined to Europe. The second, since the begin-
ning of the present century, has become increasingly in-
fluential in American Christianity, but it is not simply 
an American development. tt Tittle, .21!.· .ill.·, 3-5 •. 
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uErl8sungsordnung,n prepare for ah.d effect man's redemption. 
On the other hand, however, those who put less 
emphasis on man's radical sinfulness and who stress the 
continuity between creation and the present state of nature, 
define the purpose of the state in more positive terms. 
From this perspective the state is a natural expression of 
God's will in his creation, and, therefore, while one of 
its purposes is the maintenance of law and order, it also 
possesses the positive role of participation in the redemp-
tive acts of God in history. It is contended that there is 
an integral connection between Law and Gospel, or between 
the ''Erhaltungsordnung' and the"Erl8sungsordnung~' (if·, indeed, 
the terms of Orders be employed) since the"SchSpfungsordnun~' 
has not been that radically disrupted. Some members of 
this group rebel against the whole debate about "Ordnungen," 
convinced that while this discussion of orders attempts to 
eliminate the notion of natural law, the positing of a system 
of orders is, in itself, an affirmation of a natural law. 
Representatives of this group came primarily from 
.the European Continent and are delegates most frequently 
from the Lutheran and Reformed churches. The Orthodox 
Communion agrees with these churches in emphasizing the 
negative character of the state, even though historically 
the Orthodox communion has insisted that, properly seen, the 
state and the church are harmoniously related in the 
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symphonic acts of God. Orthodoxy rejects the alleged 
individualism of the Protestant elements in the World 
Council; it has also avoided involvement in the elaborate 
discussion of orders. Yet it joins with these groups in 
their insistence that states tend towards perversion and 
sin. Orthodox representatives stress that states are 
not only the instruments of God for the prevention of 
chaos; they are also the instruments of evil because 
power in human hands tends towards increasing co;ruption. 1 
Though these groups share the conviction that the state's 
purpose is fundamentally negative, it should not be under-
stood as exclusively negative~ 
· Some statements issued by v~rious Ecumenical 
delegates in conjunction with discussions of the function 
of th~ state serve to throw into focus this idea of the 
predominantly negative role of that institution.~ 
Ehrenstr8m has quoted one of the significant passages from 
Fedotov•s discussion: 
1. Ehrenstr8m suggests that this particular character of 
Orthodox thouyht may have been strengthened by the 
modern church s experience with totalitarian states, 
and the Bolshevik revolution. Ehrenstr8m, ebristta~ 
Eii~.and the Modern State~ pp. 39-40. 
2. Barth, the most famous Reformed theologian, insists that 
the state should not be considered inferior to the church, 
for both are the tools which God uses to implement his 
will in history. Barth is particularly cricical of the 
traditional Lutheran distinction between the two realms. 
Power- or sovereignty, as part of the hierarchy 
of salvation of the divine love, belongs to the 
richness of the divine nature in whose image 
man was created. Man has been called to rule 
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the world with God, and, as a member of the human 
family, must base his relations with his fellow 
men on love. • • • Through the fall, disharmony 
and strife have taken the place of the natural 
harmony of love in human life. In the communal 
life of humanity power has assumed the form of 
law and has girded on the sword of compulsion 
in order to carry out its ideal task in the 
service of love. It has become a complicated and 
contradictory phenomenon -- a weapon used in the 
fight against sin and simultaneously an instrument 
of sin.I 
The state is ffan earthly instrument in the hand of the 
Almighty God in his fight against the sinister, destructive 
and anticreative forces of evil.n2 Following in the same 
tradition, Alexeiev suggests a comparable function of the 
state: "Es ist eine alte christliche Idee, dass ohne 
Staat, d.h. ohne BeschrHnkung der Entscheidungsfreiheit, 
·, 
die Menschenwelt zerfallen muss unter dem Anstupn der 
unorganisierten und cbaotischen KrHfte, die in der Seele 
des Menschen schlummern.n3 
Within the Reformed tradition this negative idea of 
the state's function is illustrated by several statements. 
1. Ehrenstr8m, Chrisft&l). F.aitli.and the Modern State, pp. 404L 
2. Ibid., 41. 
3. N. N. Alexeiev, nGesellschaft, Staat und Kirche," 
Totaler Staat und christliche Freiheit (Genf: Forschung-
sabteilung des OekUmenischen Rates fUr Practisches 
Christentum, 1938), p. 15. 
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Piper contends: In this world, we cannot dispense with 
the State. As a result of the universal lack of goodwill 
and brotherhood, an organizatwn is needed which represses 
crimes and anti-social behavior."~ Wiesner asserts that 
"it is !!2,! our task to alter the world and to improve it, 
but only to maintain it in justice and in peace until 
the Day of Jesus Christ."2 Despite their many disagree-
ments Barth and Brunner agree on this negative function 
of the state. Brunller states: "Die Funktion des Staates 
ist kein sch8pferische, sondern eine ordnende •. Er soll der 
verschiedenen '·Gebiete des Lebens zusannnenordnen, n 3 
Die Legitimation des Staates ist~- die Eindammung 
des B8sen. Die viel weitere Funktion des Staates 
aber ist die der Ordnungsschaffung, Befriedung 
und zweckdienlichen Mitwirkung an al!en Lebens-
verrichtungen der Volksgemeinschaft. 
1. Otto Piper, nsome Critical Remarks on Professor Clement 
Webb's Paper on 'Nature and Grace,'" (June, 1935), p. 7. 
[Unpublished mimeographed papers to be found in the 
William Adams Brown Ecumenical Library at Union Seminary, 
New York City. These are part of the Life and Work Stuqy 
papers for the Oxford Conference.] 
2. Werner Wiesner, "The Christian Faith and. the Common Life," (September, 1936), p. 10. [Unpublished mimeographed · 
papers to be found in the William Adams Brown Ecumenical 
Library at Union Seminary, New York City. These are 
part of the Life and Work Study papers for the Oxford 
Conference.} · 
3. Emil Brunner, Der Staat als Problem der Kirche (Bern und 
Leipzig: Gotthelf-Ver!ag, 1935), p. 17. 
4. Brunner, Kirche und Staat, p. 14. 
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Again Brunner states, "orders [including .the stateJ must be 
understood not as forming an ethically neutral framework 
of personal life but as agents of a definite divine 
purpose .. " 1 
Barth concurs with this idea of the purpose of the 
state: "Sie dient ja dazu, den Menschen vor dem Einbruch 
des Chaos zu schUtzen und also ibm Zeit zu geben: Zeit fUr 
die Verkllndigung des Evangeliums, Zeit.zur Busse, Zeit zum 
Glauben."2 When asked by students influenced by the 
Communist theory of the withering away of the state if in 
Christian thought there is room for the idea that there can 
exist a society without a state, Barth responded that such 
a theory is based upon a grotesquely optimistic view of 
human nature; the time can never come when the state will 
be superfluous because the alternative is destructive 
chaos. 3 Huber4 and others of the Reformed tradition could 
be cited as accepting this fundamental conviction of the 
negative purpose of the state. 
1. EhrenstrBm, Christian Faith and the Modern State, pp. 85-86. 
2. Barth, Christengemeinde und Burgergemeinde, p. 13. 
3. Karl Barth, nAus der Diskussion in Budapest," Christliche 
Gemeinde in Wachsel der Staatsordnung (Zurich: 
Evangelischer Verlag A.G., 1948), p. 48. 
4. 
Within the Lutheran element the purpose of the 
state is conceived likewise as basically negative. 
EhrenstrSm, a Lutheran, although not holding a completely 
negative concept of the state, quotes Gogarten: 
The state is that order by means of which man 
tries to secure his position against the forces-
of chaos and destruction which menace his exist-
ence within the world, and indeed, against the 
destructive forces which issue from his own 
nature.l 
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Similarly Althaus sees the state as the instrument through 
which God preserves a sinful world. 2 Berggrav reflects 
the doctrine of the two realms, asserting different roles 
for the church and state. The latter, he proposes, has 
no spiritual authority or task; 
It is the duty of the worldly power to create 
order, justice, and peace, so the souls can live 
in freedom, In the c-arrying out of this func· 
tion the state has more than enough to do. If 
it goes beyond and invades God's realm, then it 
is robbing God. Thus, while the Church and 
state cannot_exist without one another, still, 
if they invade each other's territory, they 
become demonic.::s 
Finally, Runestam suggests the purpose of the state in 
relation to the church, implying the doctrine of two 
-realms: 
1. Ehrenstr8m, Chrietta~ !aith and the Modern State, p. 101. 
2. Ibid., 101. 
3. Berggrav, s:!.. .£!:!:.. , 305. 
Der obserste·und vom christlichen Standpunkt 
allein lagittme Masstab bei der Beurteilung 
eines j eweiligen Staates besteht darin: seine 
FShigkeit 1 eine solche Ordnung in menschlichen Zusammenleben durchzusetzen, dass dem 
Evangelium m8glichst freie Bahn zu den Herzen 
und Gewissen der vielen Einzelnen bereitet 
wird.l · 
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This conception of the state's function finds ex-
pression in the official report of the Oxford Conference, 
although it is balanced with a more positive and optimistic 
view. ttThe concern of the State is to provide men with 
justice, order, and security in a world of sin and change. 
• • • The State • • • has the duty of maintaining public 
order, and therefore must use coercion and accept the 
limits of the practicable.u2 Again, "the di'stinctive 
character of the State's activity, whatever its constructive 
function in the cultural and social life may be, is the power 
of constraint, legal and physical."3 
From the preceding comments it is obvious that the 
group which advocates a basically negative idea of the 
state is both·vocal and strong. On the other hand signifi-
cant elements within the Ecumenical Movement contend that 
1. 
2. Universal Christian Council for Life and Work, The 
-Churches Survey Their Task, pp. 81-82. 
3. Ibid., 82. 
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the state possesses a positive purpose. Delegates holding 
this view come prtmarily from the Anglo-Saxon tradition, 
from American and English churches. Strangely enough, it 
finds some support in groups Whose parentage is traceable 
to the pietistic elements in 17th century Protestantism, 
which had themselves held a negative attitude toward the 
state. For example, the B8bmischen BrU.der take the posi-
tion that there is a sort of moral law written in the 
conscience of man. Among this latter group the state's 
primary task is conceived as the protection of the 
individual's freedom in order that his inner nature may be 
developed through the work of the Holy Spirit. ·~nen Ursprung 
der Rechts~rdnung, die vom Staate garantiert und geltend 
gemacht wird, sehen wir tm sittlichen Gesetze, das von Gott 
ins menschliche Gewissen geschrieben wurde.ul On the 
basis of this idea of man, the state is seen as stemming 
not only from man's sin and self-seeking, nor solely as a 
response to'demonic powers, but as a means through which 
God' s will can be realized in the wo.rld. 2 The function of 
the state, according to the statement by the B8hmischen 
BrUder, is fourfold: (1) n der WM.chter der Ordnung und des 
Friedens zu sein," (2) ndas Recht und die Gerechtigkeit zur 
1. B8bmische Bruder, 2E.• cit., 136. 
2. Ibid., 135. 
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Geltung zu bringen," (3) ttdie Schwachen zu schUtzen, und" 
(4) "das "offentliche Leben richtig zu verwalten.nl 
The view which contends for a positive role in the 
state rests upon theological considerations. The 
B8bmischen BrUder report~ suggests an interpretation of 
man and God's operation in history which is basically 
optimistic. William Temple is optimistic about the nature 
of man through God's continual activity, so that the aim of 
the state should be provision for individual freedom. 2 The 
purpose of the state is to seek freedo~ not only for indi-
viduals, but also to develop a fruitful co-ordination of 
groups and forces in society, 3 for the aim of political 
activity is "the temporal well-being and happiness of the 
community.n4 Two characteristic statements from this 
perspective about the purpose of the state follow. 11No 
form of community, from the family to the state, can ulti-
mately save a man, though it may do much to help him ful-
fill his personality. n 5 
1. Ibid., 138. 
2. William Temple, Essays on Christian Politics and Kindred 
_Su1ects (London! Longmans, Green and Company, Liliitted, 
192 ), p. 40. 
3. Dem.ant, God, Man and Society, p. 182. 
4. Ehrenstr8m, Christian F~ith and the Modern State, p. 58. 
5. George Thomas, "Creation and Redemption," Christendom, 
X, 3 (Summer, 1945), p. 372. 
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In short, the state is redemptive when it is gen-
uinely an organ of the common life and when its 
activity arises freely out of the moral and 
spiritual unity of the people in their various 
associations. Otherwise, it is little more than 
a necessary evil, restraining lawlessness by the 
forcible.imposition of external order.l 
Bevan optimistically asserts that today there is 
general recognition that the state has more than a nega-
tive function, which is the promotion of a ncommon life 
rich in cultural values."2 Despite his optimism, others 
feel that such a victory has not been achieved. William 
Adams Brown, a prominent American leader in years of 
Ecumenical dialogue, states that though his committee 
tried to do justice to the positive conception of the 
role of the state, "as a member of a country where that 
side of the life of the state is taken for granted • • • 
there is something in the way _of emphasis that is still 
lacking in cmr report. ••3 Brown contends that God edu-
cates man through various social institutions, including 
the state, and not simply through the church. In the 
redemptive process 
1. Ibid., 371. 
2. Bevan, .9E.· cit. , 8. 
3. These are notes from William Adams Brown • s personal 
notebook of the Oxford Conference, and have no number-
ing. These are on file at the William Adams Brown 
Ecumenical Library at Union Seminary, New York City. 
God uses the institutions of human society, 
the family, the neighborhood, the school, the 
State and the Church. As developing institu~ 
tions in a world of change they are all . 
imperfect, but through each God is teaching 
us lessons that we need to learn.L 
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Finally, the idea that the state has some positive 
functions does find mention in the Oxford Report. It 
states that the laws of justice, for which the state is 
responsible, are not merely dams against social chaos. 
The organization of political and economic factors in so-
ciety can actually express, implemen~ and encourage human 
brotherhood "by serving and extending the principle of 
love beyond the sphere of purely personal relations.n2 
The positive,. co-ordinating function of the state 
finds expression in later documents of the Movement and 
World Council of Churches. Neither the Amsterdam Assembly 
of 1949 nor the Evanston Assembly of 1954 engaged in a 
consideration of the metaphysical basis of the state, but 
implicit in their reports is the idea that the state has a 
natural and positive role in society. Perhaps the theo-
retical and theological speculations of the nature and 
function of the state will never be agreed on in the 
Ecumenical Movement, but it operates on the assumption,· 
1. Brown, A Creed For Free Men, p. 266. 
2. Universal Christian Council for Life and Work, The 
Churches Survey Their Task, p. 94. -
often tacit, that the state acts both as a preserver of 
order and a creative agent in promoting the common good, 
neither of which is divorced from the redemptive acts of 
God. 
3. Nature of the State 
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The following discussion of the nature of the 
state aims to define what various delegates to the 
Ecumenical Movement see to be the essence or integral 
character of the state. (1) Firstly, as seen in preceding 
sections, it has naturally been assumed~ and frequently 
stated, that the state possesses its authority from God 
and exists in his pleasure. Under the origin of the 
state several theories of "die Ordnungen" have also been 
presented. 
(2) Not only is the state under God, it is, 
secondly, an historical product and consequently assumes 
varying forms and condi.tions through history. Implicit 
in all the Movement discussions of the state is the pre-
supposition that states are not only historically different, 
but that they should be sufficiently flexible to permit 
expression for varying needs. This flexibility of the 
state will be considered in the next section, under the 
"organizationtt of the state. 
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(3) Turning, however, to the ttessential nature" 
of states, in whatever their historical forms, there is a 
general agreement that states possess the basic attribute 
of power or compulsion on the one hand, and law on the 
other. Some delegates stress the coercive aspects of the 
state's "nature," insofar as they see the need for a 
regulative power to keep check on the chaotic expressions 
of human will to power and sin. Other representatives, 
however, insist that the state is basically law rather than 
power, even though this law must be buttressed by power. 
Both those who conceive the nature of the state as basically 
power, and those who see the state as primarily law, accept 
the relative importance of the other aspect of the state's 
nature. The former perceive that power, though frequently 
arbitrary, needslaw for expression and should be controlled 
through law. They are, however, little disposed to find a 
positive relationship between the·Law and the Gospel, 
between justice and love. Power and law are necessitated 
by sin. The latter conceive the state as primarily an 
expression of law, or the common will of the people for 
mutual sharing. But this law needs to be assured by 
force, because though man is capable of sharing, he is 
'also sinful. Those of this persuasion are more likely 
to posit an integral connection between Law and Gospel, 
or between justice and love. Law is the basic attribute 
of the state, and is written into the universe through 
God's intentions in creation. 
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Stressing the element of power and compulsion in 
the state are those affiliated with the Reformed circles, 
the Orthodox church, and the Lutheran confession, although 
there are varying degrees of emphasis within these groups. 
Although Brunner's position regarding the compulsive 
power of the state is more moderate than other Reformed 
theologians, his assertions are plain: "Der Staat ist 
seinem Wesen nach das, was mit Gottesne.ich unvereinbar 
ist: Herrschaft durch Zwang, rUcksichtlose, wenn nBtig 
auf Kosten anderer geschehende Selbstbehauptung."l Or 
again, uFtlr den Staat ist wesentlicher als das Element 
der Gemeinschaftsform das der Herrschaft durch Zwang. 
Dieses Moment aber ist bedingt durch die Stlnde.n2 Not 
only is the state currently founded on power; it will con-
tinue to be so since man never escapes his sinfulness. 3 
And despite the fact that he uses the word "law' in this 
context, it is a negative rather than positive -- a 
re_gulative -- idea. The state can never be an order 
1. Brunner, Der Staat als Problem der Kirche, p. 4. 
2. Brunner, "Der Staat und das christliche Freiheitsver-
standnis~" p. 42. 
3. Brunner, Kirche und Staat, p. 14. 
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of love, as the church is.i Therefore, the state must 
possess both authority and physical power in order to per-
form its regulative function. 2 
Within modern Lutheranism there is more stress 
than in the Reformed circles on the state as an expression 
of the spirit and life of a people, bearing particular 
relation to the Volk and expressing its corporate life. 
Yet hhere is wide recognition of the element of power in 
the state. Althaus contends that the essence of the state 
is power, which is both the indispensable means for the 
life of th~ people and an agent of demonic perversion. 3 
Berggrav insists that the state cannot become human, for 
"it is, and will remain, a thing of power."4 He intimates 
the basic Lutheran dichotomy between the two realms and 
the separation between Law and Gospel. Law has primarily 
to do with preservation, and the Gospel with redemption. 
Berggrav continues, "Power, in the last analysis, is 
nature, and nature has no regard for humanity."5 Not all 
1. Brunner, Die politische Verantwortung des Christen, 
p. 11. 
2. Brunner, Der Staat als Problem der Kirche, p. 12. 
3. Althaus, Theologie und Ordnungen, p. 23 .. 
4. Berggrav, op. cit., 64. 
5. Ibid., 64. 
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Lutherans, however, are satisfied with this implicit dis-
tinction between the sphere of love and the sphere of law. 
Ehrenstr8m, a Swedish Lutheran with a long history of 
participation in the Ecumenical Movement, speaks of this 
temptation to separate two realms as the "nemesis of 
Lutheranism.n His words are particularly succinct and 
appropriate:they bear repeating here. 
For the previous fluctuation between an ascetic 
and a theocratic solution of the relations 
between the spiritual and the temporal power, 
the thinkers of the Reformation substituted 
their new understanding of the gospel and the 
ruling powers as differing agents of the divine 
action in this world, both of which are regarded 
as springing directly out of the fatherly will of 
the sovereign God. It has, .however, been the 
nemesis of Lutheranism that it has confused this 
distinction with another alternative:-- the 
spiritual sphere of love and the temporal sphere 
of law> the inner man who lives within the 
sphere of freedom and grace and the outer ma.tl 
who lives under the conditions of the world.L 
This separation of realms and the corresponding distinc-
tion between private and public morality have encouraged 
the Lutheran quietistic attitude toward public ethics and 
towards an individualistic ethic. 
As a final spokesman for the Lutheran tradition 
which emphasizes the power of the state, Dibelius may be 
cited. He stresses the fact that not only is the state 
primarily an agent of power and compulsion, but that this 
1. Ehrenstr8m, <ebm;is.ttan Faith and the Modern State, p. 69. 
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power tends towards expansion. No state, he insists, can 
be ruled with love alone; all forms of society need the 
support of power and compulsion. His authority for this 
sentiment is the Holy Scripture, Which teaches this 
lesson "auf jeder Seite."1 "Keine Gemeinschaft kann 
bestehen ohne Zucht. • • • Und Zucht bedeutet immer 
Zwang .... Zwang gegen sich selbst und gegen ande:ltan3 
Finally, ttthe State, and in a special sense the modern 
State, cannot be understood unless account is taken of the 
element of power.n3 . 
The nature of power itself has received consider-
able attention in Ecumenical circles, and some comments 
on the subject deserve mention here. A primary attribute 
of power, it is widely contended, consists in its inherent 
tendency toward expansion, totalitarianism, and corruption. 
Such a concept of power is reflected in the Orthodox 
theory that the state is paradoxically an agent for the 
control of demonic forces at the same time it gives 
expression to demonic force. 4 "· • • Jeder Staat tendiert 
l. Dibelius, Grenzen des Staates, pp. 17-18. 
2. Ibid., 17-18. 
3. Universal Christian Council for Life and Work, The 
Churches Survey Their Task, p. 256. ---
4 .. J. Fedotoff, unie Kirche und der Staat, .. Die Kirche und 
das Staatstroblem in der Ge~enwart, by Althaus et al. (Berlin: urche-Verlag, Gm H., 1935), p. 35. --
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notwendig zu einer universellen Ausbreitung seiner Funktionen, 
., 1 
tendiert zum Totalitatsprinzip.n Perhaps the most pictur-
esque statement of this tendency within power for expansion 
is that of Dibelius: ttMacht ist wie Meerwasser; j e mehr 
man davon trinkt~ um so dUrstiger wird man.n2 Huber, from 
the Reformed tradition in Switzerland, states that the more 
powerful and influential a state becomes, the more it is 
tempted to think of itself as the originator and source of 
its people's life, and therefore na~yJ:f:t grows increas-
ingly totalitarian in its claims. 3 Finally, this tendency 
towards corrpption in the state is expressed in the words 
of Berggrav: 
States do not, as in the case with biological 
entities, become senile and die. On the con-
trary, they become corrupt. Their basic prin- · 
ciples are such that the very thing which com-
pels them to continue existing is the very thing 
that destrQys their capacity for continued 
existence.4 
There has been a tendency in some writers to think 
of power as solely, and inherently~ evil. ·American 
writers, such as Reinhold Niebuhr, have sometimes conveyed 
this impression in such books as An Interpretation of 
1. Alexeiev, nGesellschaft, Staat \Uld Kirche,tt p. 6. 
2. Dibelius, Grenzen des Staates, p. 32. 
3. Huber, nEvangelium und Nationale Bewegung," p. 75. 
4. Berggrav, BE.· ~·, 35. 
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Christian Ethics, and Moral Man and Immoral Societl (even 
though Niebuhr's position seems to have shifted from the 
main stress of this latter book). 1 Against this conception 
of power, other representatives to the World Council of 
Churches have held that power itself is ethically neutral 
and ought not to be seen as either inherently "goo~' or 
ttevil. 11 This view is reflected in the statement by Tillich 
that'power in itself is a structural principle of historical 
existence.na Vyscheslavzeff; writing in the Orthodox tradi-
tion, also asserts that the state and power can be used for 
both good and evil; their use depend~ upon whether or not 
they are subordinated to the will and sovereignty of God. 3 
Holt's comment is directly to the point: 
Folitical power should always be exercised with 
a full sense of responsibility. All government 
involves the exercise of power, and there is 
therefore nothing unChristian or unethical 
about the nature of power itself. But wherever 
there is power there is temptation to use it 
selfishly and carelessly, without due regard 
for the needs and interests of those who are 
aff.ected by it. Such irresponsible use of power 
is definitely unChristian.4 
1. See his Irony of American History (New York:. Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1952), p. 145. 
2. Faul Tillich, nThe Kingdom of God and History," The 
Kinfdom of God and History (Chicago and New York: 
wii ett clark and Company, 193a), p. 125. 
3. 
4. Ivan Holt, "The Church's Effort on. the Brink of War," 
Christendom~ V, 2 (Winter, 1940), p. 89. 
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V. A. Demant has signifi~antly suggested that the striving 
after power may not be immoral at all, but rather may be 
part of an individual or group's expression of the need for 
fulfillment. "The striving after 'totality' is a spiritual 
and intellectual effort that need not necessarily be 
associated with the power of the state. nl Brown's posi-
tion is that men do not always strive after power for 
power's sake, but for the freedom, justice, and stable 
social order which power seems to guarantee. 2 
Both the negative tendency toward the corruption of 
power through totalitarian expansion, and its possible use 
for moral ends, are summarized in the statement of the 
preparatory commission for the Evanston Assembly. Recog-
n~zing that there had been intense interest in the problem 
of power in America from 1949-1954, the committee refers to 
a statement made by the Federal Council of Churches of 
Christ in America made in 1949: 
As Christians we believe that this nation holds 
its power under the providence of God, to whom 
all nations are subject. We [hope] ••• that 
our nation shall resist both the temptation to 
use its ·power irresponsibly and the temptation 
1. J. de Zwaan, "The Totalitarian State and the Christian 
Conception of Freedom," (October, 1936), p. 2. [Mimeo-
graphed papers of the·Life and Work Movement to be found 
in Union Seminary's Ecumenical Library, New York City.} 
2. Albert Day, .,Unifying Faith to CUre a Disintegrating 
Society," Christendom, VII, 2 (Spring, 1942), p. 275. 
to flee the responsibility of its power •••• 
The corollary of all power is responsibility. 
Power can corrupt. So, too, it can be made to 
serve worthy ends. • • • Power is a trust for 
which we are accountable to God.L 
(4) Among delegations tb:.the Ecumenical Movement 
which take a more optimistic view of human possibilities 
in hi~.tory, the state is understood as basically law. 
TGis conception of the nature of the state is most prom-,_ 
inent among American and English delegates to the 
299 
Ecumenical Movement meetings, although some others accept 
it as well. 
The Lutheran theologian Runestam attempts to dem-
onstrate that even though power is a tool of the. state, it 
may not be exercised independently of the people's will. 
Even when the state uses force it must appeal to the 
spiritual values of ·das Volk in order .to justify its 
actions. 2 ttso far as the state does embody power, it will 
be a power that is not an end in itself, for even the 'cult 
of power' is a form of morality, paradoxical as that may 
seem to the Christian.n3 Berggrav:concurs in these 
l. World Council of Churches, ninternational Affairs 
Christians in the Struggle for World Cotmnunity," Six 
Ecumenical Surveys (New York: Harper and Brothers, 
1954), p. 6. [Preparation for Evanston] 
2. Runestam, ~· cit., 110. 
3. W. Lyndon Smith, "Is the Separation of Church and State 
an Illusion?" Christendom, VIII, 3 (Summer, 1943), 
p. 312. 
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judgments when he comments fram a more· negative perspective: 
nit is absolutely necessary, therefore, for the state to 
throw a cloak of morality over its plundering claw.tt1 
Implicit in these conceptions is the idea that compulsion 
is a secondary element of the state, which is exercised in 
support of a common morality, or spirit, expressed in law. 
Other delegates who express belief that the state 
is primarily law are not naively unaware of either the 
power of the state, nor the need for power to sustain law. 
But the emphasis is frequently placed on the supportive 
role of power. ~or example, Grubb sees power as that 
force which sustains law and enables the spread of love in 
human life. There is a positive connection between law and 
love, or between Law and the Gospel. 2 Demant also conceives 
of power as an instrument of the state rather than its 
essence. Furthermore, he insists that power itself is not 
evil, but that which is evil is the illegitimate use and 
extension of power. In the same way, the state is not sin-
ful, but absolutism of the state does constitute sin, for 
3 
thereby the legitimate role·of the state is falsified. He 
agrees basically with William Temple, when the latter asserts: 
1. Berggrav~ .2£· cit., 14. 
2. ten Doornkat, .2£· cit., 111 . 
.3. Demant, nzum Staatsversdlndnis des Anglikanismus, n 
pp. 33-34. 
This distinguishing mark of the state, then 
is not the possession of force, but its self-
expression through Law, which employs force 
as the guarantee of that yniversality which 
is the essence of nature. 
Kindt-Kiefer suggests that the basic Protestant 
conception of the nature of the state rests upon the 
principle of justice. And although he sees this justice 
as different from the Gospel, that justice must be ex-
pressed through the law of the state. 2 
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Time and again the sentiment that the state's es-
sential feature is the provision of justice through law 
is expressed in Ecumenical circles. Clark, 3 the B8bmischen 
BrUder,4 and Tillich5 are but a few representatives of this 
theory. 
These two poles, of justice expressed through law, 
and compulsion, are brought together in three comments 
from differing traditions. The first is by Barth: 
"Staatsordnung heisst: Rechtsordnung durch das Mittel der 
1. Temple, Christianity and the State, p. 114. 
2. Kindt-Kiefer, "Katholische und protestantische 
StaatsbegrUndung,n p. 39. 
3. Professor Clarke, ttNotes on Education in Relation to 
State and Society,n (June, 1935), p. 8. [Mimeographed 
papers of the Life and Work Movement at Union Seminary's 
Ecumenical Library, New York City.] 
4. B8bmische BrUder, 2e• £!!., 135. 
5. Tillich, .2E.• .£!!·, 118. 
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Macht, Machtordnung zur ihre Rechtes."1 J. H. Oldham also 
recognizes the elements of both power and justice in the 
state in the following comment made on the essay ey Barker: 
When Professor Barker finds the essence of the 
state is a purpose of law, he is emphasizing only 
one side of the ambiguous entity of the state. 
There is also in the state a natural, nonrational 
element~-the brute fact of power. Might is 
inseparable·from the existence of the state. It 
belongs to its nature to use force in self-defense 
against external enemies and as a means of con-
trolling its own members.~ 
And finally, the report of the Calhoun Commission asserts 
that both power and law are essential to the state. "Law and 
force are the twin pillars of government, and the state is 
the enduring custodian of both. Its distinctive task is to 
maintain order, among the diverse members of the inclusive 
co~ity."3 As far as possible, this order will be main-
tained through persuasion and reason -- through moral 
power, but coercive power must be used against the recalci-
trant for the sake of the common good, "in accordance with 
the laws understood to be in force for the whole community. n 4 
1. Barth, "Aus der Diskussion in Budapest, .. p. 33. 
2. Visser 't Hooft and Oldham,~· cit., 170. 
3. Calhoun Commission, "The Relation of the Church to War 
in the Light of the Christian Faith,n Christendom, X, 2 
(September, 1945), pp. 280-281. 
4. Ibid., 280-281. 
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One of the significant contributions of the 
Ecumenical Movement which promises to ensue from these dis-
cussions of the relations b~tween justice and power is an 
intensified interest in the nature of justice and of power. 
Much has already been written about the nature of power 
within the context of the Ecumenical Movement. There is 
also a new interest evident in Ecumenical circles on the 
nature of rtjustice,u and its relationship with nlove" and 
the Christian ethic. Under the auspices of the World 
Council of Churches, Wright has recently contributed an 
exposition on the "bil>lili:.al doctrine of justice, ul and 
there is promise of continuing research in.this area. 
In summary, then, regarding the nature of the state, 
there are two polar emphases within the constituency of the 
Ecumenical Movement. In between are numerous shadings or 
co~erations. These two poles are (1) the conviction that 
the essence of the state is power, and (2) the belief that 
the state is basically justice expressed through law. 
Neither position would exclude the relative significance of 
the other. Within .the context of the World Council of 
Churches there has been considerable discussion of the 
element of power in the state~ with some delegates emphasizing 
1. George Wright, The Biblical Doctrine of Man (London: Student C r st an Movement Press, 
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the tendency of power toward totalitarianism and corruption 
of its legitimate role. Others, however, agreeing that 
power may be abused, aver that power is morally neutral, 
and that it may be used responsibly or irresponsibly. 
The tension between power and love may be understood as 
reflecting the dialectic between· evil and righteous impulses 
in the heart of man. As long as theological disagreements 
about the nature of individual and corporate man exist, dif-
ferences in the interpretation of the relation between 
justice and love, and justice and power, will persist. These 
in turn will be reflected fu.·.conceptions of the essence of 
·the state. 
· 4. Authority of the State 
a) Distinction between authority and power 
This discussion is based upon a distinction between 
authority and force, although this distinction is not 
clearly enunciated in the debates of the Ecumenical Movement. 
The characteristic of power is that it can compel obedience, 
while the distinctive attribute of authority is that it 
possesses legitimate power or a moral right to exercise 
power. Whereas the discussions in the Ecumenical Movement 
presuppose such a distinction nebulously, it is not explicitly 
formulated. Brown does hint at such a distinction: 
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Most sociological definitions make the right to 
use force determinative for the conception of 
the state. But this right is subject to two 
qualifications: ·(a) that its exercise is con-
fined to a definite geographical area and is to 
be used for social, rather than·purely individual 
purposes; (b) that it is used to conserve or 
promote interests recognized as legitimate~ ··by -
law (either written or traditional).l · 
The Youth section report·at Amsterdam also states: 
Christians need to be made more aware of the 
tension created between the moral claims of a 
sovereign God and the political claims of a 
sovereign state. Thus, they must be prepared to 
criticise those claims of the state to be the 
absolute guardian of law; the sole defender of 
freedom, the final dispenser of justice, and the 
only institution justified in the use of power, 
both nationally and internationally. Through 
frank ecumenical discussions the Christian should 
be helped to distinguish between the claims of 
his nation Which can be considered as just and 
those claims which conflict with the sovereignty 
of God.2 . 
Berggrav also distinguishes between authority·and 
force~ but his definitions are not always clear. He sug-
gests a dichotomy between authority and force, and implies 
that at some ftme force will be superfluous: 
Force is only a substitute. Authority is the 
real thing. Wherever there is genuine authority 
no one thinks of using force. • • • Force is the 
ultimate means only in those instances where 
authority is not und~stood, or does not move 
the person involved. 
1. Brown, Church and State in Contemporary America, p. 33. 
2. Visser 1 t Hooft, The First Assembly of the World Council 
of Churches, p. 196. 
3. Berggrav, £e• cit., 97. 
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This project presupposes that the difference 
between authority-and power is not that one is internal 
and the other external; the question is whether the force 
or power exercised is or is not legitimate. Authority is 
not based upon an individual's acceptance or rejection of 
that authority. Is the claim to authority legitimate? 
In discussions of the state, the issUe is determined by the 
source of the state's power, and the understanding of the 
state's assigned functions and the proper means of perform-
ing them. Brunner's contention that the state's fundamental 
character is might rather than right blurs the relation 
between power and authority. 1 
b) Source of the state's authority 
In Ecumenical documents there is little concentra-
tion upon political theory. For this reason there is lit-
tle discussion of the derivation of the state's authority 
in other than religious terms. That theory which conceives 
of the state's authority as founded upon the conse~t of 
the governed, though frequently tacitly assumed, is not 
fully articulated or espoused. That Ecumenical discussions 
do not reflect the history of political theory suggests two 
facts: (l) delegates to the Ecumenical discussions are 
1. Ehrenstr'6m, 0pria1!.:ta.IJ. E'.S.fth and the Modern State, p. 126. 
seldom social or political scientists, with orientation 
to the thought of these fields, and (2) the focus of 
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the discussions is religious, and therefore deals primarily 
with the implications of the state for religious and 
theological thought. 
Several statements of the churches on social ques-
tions, however, apparently presuppose that a state's 
authority is founded upon the consent of the governed. 
Some Anglican authors, e.g. Dexnant and Temple have stressed 
the subordination of the state to the people or community, 
a typical English idea. According to this view, the state 
originates in and derives its authority from the corporate 
will of the _community. The community, therefore, is always 
considered superior to the state, since the latter is 
merely a function of the total community. "The state is 
an organ of the community; it has a derived existence and 
a conditional authority. It is not, therefore, an ultimate 
object of lo~alty. The ultimate object of political loyalty 
is the national conmunity.n1 
This same centrality of the community, with its 
predominance over the state, is inherent in the concept 
of ~ Volk, evolving from the Lutheran theology, despite 
1. TemPle, Christianity and the State, p. 124. 
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the perversions of this principle in the totalitarian 
state of Hitler's Germany. Here the problem was an abandon-
ment of the principle, inasmuch as the state was permitted 
to disguise its promulgations as the will of the people. 
Statements regarding the source of the state's 
authority have consistently affirmed that God's will super-
cedes the state's authority. "Alle legitime AutoritM.t eines 
Menschen Uber einen anderen Menschen kommt von Gott und is 
von ibm gegeben."1 The sole legitimate totalitarian claim 
is that l'ilmb. God makes upon his creatures. Creatures, and 
their social organizations~ are all subordinate to his will. 
The state, also, exists in, and is subordinate to, God's 
will. Even the heathen state is a tool in God's plan. 2 
The state, therefore, derives its claim to authority from 
its function in God's plan for the redemption of man. Its 
authority roots in its obligations. 
Since the functions of the state are interpreted 
variously among representatives to the Ecumenical Movement 
(supra.), there is a variety of opinion regarding the range 
1. Lacer£, HThesen zum christlichen Staatsverst!ndnis zum. 
Calvinismus," p. 85. 
2. nEven when a state is heathen it, and its authority, are 
to be respected. n [My translation. } Huber, 11Evangelium 
und nationale Bewegung,u p. 56. See also William Muelle;-, 
Church and State in Luther and Calvin (Nashville: 
Broaaman Press, 1954), p. 3o. 
' , 
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of the state's authority. 1 Some stress the state's role in 
maintaining order through force, as a dyke against human 
chaos; others conceive the state as having a wider func-
tion -- that of providing for positive social development 
through co-ordination of society's various facets -- and, 
therefore, a broader authority. These differences in the 
interpretation of the function and authority of the state, 
however, do not cause significant disagreement in interpre-
tations of state authority. 2 Pragmatic considerations lead 
to a wide agreement in statements regarding the legitimate 
range of state authority. 
c. Limits of authority 
Because the state is ordained of God, possessing 
its authority only insofar as that authority is exercised 
consistently within its role and right, it is constantly 
reiterated that its authority is not totalitarian, though 
it frequently strives after totalitarian power. Ecumenical 
thought sees the state as properly limited by other claims. 
Firstly, the state's authority is bounded by God's will. 
God alone, as creator, claims total authority. The authority 
of the state is properly challenged not by those who 
claim an inherent authority of their own, but by those 
1. Brown, Church and State in Contemporary America, pp. 90-
91. 
2. Ibid., 91. 
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who claim authority which stems from th~ir relationship to 
God. 
Secondly, those primary units which, under God, 
limit the authority of the state are the following: 
(1) the church and its inherent rights to witness to the 
sovereignty of God and to seek to lead people to a recog-
nit~on of that sovereignty; 1 (2) the individual and his 
inherent right (and obligation) to follow the dictates of 
his own conscience; 2 (3) the Law, meaning either the moral 
law, whether it be natural or revealed, or codified 
constitutional law; 3 (4) the community, of which the state 
is a product and to which it is a servant; 4 (5) other states, 
1. Universal Christian Council for Life and Work, The 
Churches Survth Their Task, p. 256. See also Rengsdorf, 
"The church, e State and the Economic Order,tt (September, 1936), p. 3. [Mimeographed papers of the 
Life and Work Movement to be found at William Adams Brown 
Ecumenical Library at Union Seminary, New York City.] 
2. B8hmische Bruder,~· cit., 136; Berggrav, ~· cit., 
108; Althaus, ttzum. gegetiW!lrtigen Lutherischen Staatsver-
stllndnis, n p. 8.; Visser 't Hofft, The First Assembly 
of the World Council of Churches, p. 91. 
3. Conference on International Law,."The Church and Inter-
national Law," Ecumenical Review, III, 1 (October, 1950), 
p. 75. 
4. "At all stages of political development and in the face 
oJf all the problems noted here, the Christian community 
must act as a conscience for the nation and ceasely re-
mind all who hold power of God's purpose for the nation 
and of God's judgment upon their use of power... Evanston 
Working Papers for Section III, 1~0A6, p. 9. [Unpub-
lished papers at the Ecumenical Library, Union Seminary, 
New York City.] 
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representing other communities and peoples; 1 (6) inner 
associations and units, 2 whose authority rests upon natural 
law considerations, upon the appeal to a pluralistic soci-
ety, or upon the affirmation of varying social orders in 
society with a variety of functions; 3 and (7) the defini-
tion of its own function and purpose. 4 These are considered 
under specific sections discussing the state's relation to 
each sphere. That discussion is not engaged here. 
1. uLoyalty to the State as an instrument for justice is a 
divine injunction. But Right is above the State, not the 
State above Right; therefore the State must respect the 
rights both of individuals and of other States. ft nworld 
Alliance --Message to the Churches,tt The Churches in 
Action, (November, 19 35) , p • 9 • 
2. Rengsdorf, ~· cit., 3. 
3. nNach allgemeiner christlicher Auffassung findet der 
.Staat seine Grenzen auch in den anderen Ordnungen (Kirche, 
Volk, Familie, Wirtschaft) und an der menschlichen 
Pers8nlicbkeit; die Frage ist aber, wie diese Grenzen 
n!lher zu bestimmen sind.n Oekumenischer Rat fUr 
Praktisches Christentum nDie Kirche und das Staatsdenken 
der Gegenwart,n p. 3. fFor the Ecumenical Study Conference, 
April 8-14, 1934. Union Seminary's Ecumenical Library, 
N.Y.C.} "Der totale Staat ist nicht nur durch die Freiheit 
der Kirche, sondern in ganz derselben Weise durch jegliches 
Freiheitsrecht, sei as der Einzelnen oder jener 'autonomen 
Sph!lren' -- Familie etc. -- begrenzt.tt Brunner, nDer 
Staat und das christliche FreiheitsverstU.ndnis," p. 55. 
4. "The limits of its authority, however, have to be decided 
not from the standpoint of the Gospel or of the claims of 
the individual, but from that of the responsibility of 
the State to order and protect the common life.n Universal 
Christian Council for Life and Work, The Churches Survey 
Their Task, p. 269. 
312 
d) Exercise of authority 
Three principles regarding the state's exercise of 
its authority have been particularly evident in Ecumenical 
Movement circles. (1) The first principle, a cardinal as-
sertion since the 1937 Oxford Conference, is that the 
state must continually be mindful of its limits under God, 
manifest in the claims of other aspects of God's creation. 
(2) The second principle of the exercise of authority is 
that, no two situations being alike, no universal formula 
applicable for all societies and states can be proposed. 
The concept of the Responsible Society is an effort to 
provide for stable principles to be applied variously in 
differing conditions. It provides for the stability and 
flexibility which was sought at Oxford, but not discovered. 
(3) The third principle regarding the exercise of state 
authority is that there is continual, even endemic, move-
ment toward the corruption of power and authority. 1 The 
nature of authority, it is asserted, is to strive for more 
authority. Reinhold Niebuhr has been a chief exponent of 
1. "They [democratic humanists} hold the ideals of equality, 
freedom, and justice, and assume far too easily that in 
societies committed to the democratic way of life none 
of these ideals is denied in fact. But inequality, dis- · · 
crimination, injustice, reliance on naked power, exploita-
tion, and aggression are not absent from democracies, 
and only man centered self-righteousness can believe that 
they are." nEcumenical Chronicle,n The Ecumenical 
Review, VI, 4 (July, 1954), p. 451. 
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this proposition, but his ideas have changed somewhat in 
the 20 years between Moral Man and Immoral Society, and 
The Irony of American History. 1 His ideas illustrate the 
prevalent attitude in the Ecumenical Movement which sees 
the state's exercise of authority as tempting it to extend 
its power further. 
5. Organization of the State 
Within the Ecumenical Movement there are a few who, 
in view of man's depravity and his consequent inability to 
perceive God's word, and in the belief that there exists a 
radical separation between existing societies and the will 
of God, contenrl that there is no genuinely Christian doctrine 
of society or the state. Keller suggests that the Reformed 
theologian, Bishop Ravasz of Hungary, takes this position. 
Keller imputes to him the following attitude! nThe church 
must keep aloof from political parties in order to stand 
alone on God's side, remaining transcendent in order to 
1. In the first he sees the temptations of group power cor-
rupting the morality of individual men, primarily because 
there is a greater amount of power available to men in 
groups. In the latter book, however, he senses the 
possibility of group pressures holding in check the sel-
fish drives of individual men for power. To be sure, 
his second~entioned book does not abrogate his earlier 
thesis that power tends toward corruption, for his later 
statements are primarily appeals to balance of power 
within society rather thanca new theory of the nature of 
power itself. 
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keep her immanence efficient.ul Surely this same attitude 
toward the state is implied in replies which officials of 
the World Council of Churches have received after sending 
invitations to members of the Orthodox Church in Russia. 
At the other pole are delegates, particularly from 
England and America, who interpret the Gospel message to mean 
direct responsibility of the churches for judging social 
conditions -- and not only judging, but also working to 
change them. In between this view and that indicated above 
are those who see the church as responsible for exercising 
negative criticism over social conditions, for positing 
positive principles for the $tate to use as guides or norms 
of action, or for taking an active part in social reconstruc-
tion even, occasionally, through political parties. 
Recognizing that some Christians feel no responsibil-
ity for the organization of the state, and that others feel 
that the Christian message implies critical judgment of, and 
action in, society (with all shades of interpretation in 
between), it is now proposed to turn to more specific teach-
ings within the Ecumenical Movement regarding the structural 
organization of the state. Obviously such teachings came 
from representatives who feel compelled to find a Christian 
view of the state. Before proceeding, the reader is 
1. Adolph Keller, nPolitical Theology in Europe,u 
Christendom, IV, 3 (Summer, 1939), p. 387. 
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reminded that specific patterns of state organization are 
not under consideration here; rather is this a consider-
ation of general principles of organization which are 
valid for all states. A few comments at the end of the 
section deal with specific forms of state. 
a) No ideal Christian state. 
The first Christian principle of state organization 
is that no state may be identified with the Kingdom of God, 
and that, further, no state may be construed as fully 
implementing the Christian message. There is no such thing 
as an ideal Christian state, for all states are composed of 
sinful and finite men. Agreement on this point cuts across 
almost all confessional and geographic lines. William 
Temple says, 
First may I stress with.all possible emphasis 
that there is no such thing as a Christian social 
ideal, if by that is meant a pattern or constitu~ 
tion deducible from the Christian Gospel, to Which 
we ought to conform1the actual arrangements of our various states. · 
Brunner, Lecerf, and Huber, all of the Reformed tradition 
concur in the idea. Brunner states "es gibt keine beste 
Staatsform., weder eine autoritlire ~och eine domokratische.n2 
Similarly Huber asserts, ttkein politisches System kann sich 
auf das Evangelium berufen und sich als spezifisch 
1. Temple, Christianity and the State, p. 3. 
2. Brunner, Kirche und Staat, p. 15. 
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christlich bezeichnen.n1 And Lecerf agrees that ndie Form 
der Staatsregierung (Monarchie, Republik, Oligarchie.usw.) 
ist theologisch gesehen nicht wesentlich.n2 
Speaking from the Lutheran tradition Wendland 
states, hthe Kingdom of God is no state, no society, no 
nation, no team or family, no business or corporation. It 
knows no earthly power or authority ••• n3 And Runestam 
says that the Christian state is not a given state type 
and never a total realization. 4 Or again, nDie richtige 
Staatsform kann nicht ein fttr allemal, sondern nur fur jede 
Zeit gesondert festgestellt werden."5 In the Orthodox 
Church the same position is accepted in the writings of 
Fedotoff. 6 In the American churches, where there is more 
willingness to state what the Christian message means for 
the organization of the state, men like Reinhold Niebuhr 
and John c. Bennett are spokesmen for the view that no state 
or social order can be identified with the Christian message. 
1. Huber, 11Evangelium und nationale Bewegung,n p. 68. 
2. Lecerf, uThesen zum christlichen Staatsverstlindnis des 
Calvinismus,u p. 86. 
3. Heinz-Dietrich Wendland, "The Rei:evance of Eschatology for 
Social Ethics,n The Ecumenical Review, V, 4 (July, 1953), 
p. 365. 
4. Runestam, ttDas Christentum und der Staat," p. 102. 
5. Ibid., 102. 
6. Fedoto££, "Die Kirche und der Staat, 11 p. 38. 
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So general is the agreement that there can be no 
ultimate identification of a certain social and political 
pattern.with the Christian ethos, that these ideas are in-
corporated into several public statements of the Ecumenical 
Movement. The Rengsdorf Conference Report states: nwe 
reject every attempt and line of thought which would sug-
gest that it lies in the hands of man to realize the perfect 
order. Our discussions lead to a demand for soberness and 
realism.."1 The Oxford Conference Report asserts: 
Every tendency to identify the Kingdom of God 
with a particular structure of society or 
economic mechanism must result in a moral con-
fusion for those who maintain the system and a 
disillusimnment for·those who suffer from its 
lim.itations.2 
The evolving idea of the Responsible Society since 
the Amsterdam Assembly partially results from this position. 
At the same time, however, it constitutes a victory for 
those who insist on the relevance of the Christian message 
for social institutions. Duff is right in commenting that 
nthe World Council's Second Assembly repeated the conviction 
of previous ecumenical meetings that no one form of .govern-
ment has universal claim on Christians. n 3 This view is 
1. Rengsdorf, ~· cit., 8. 
2. Universal Christian Council for Life and Work, The 
Churches Survey Their Task, p. 96. 
3. Duff, ~· cit., 122. 
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based not only on the historical and ethnological variety 
of the church • s environment, l:iuti: no social institution can 
fully embody Christian principles. 
Within the Ecumenical Movement this view of the 
state is not una~ously endorsed, despite the fact that 
it is by far the predominant view. That there are other 
perspectives is indicated by the comment written about the 
Section III Report of the Amsterdam Assembly, in preparation 
for the Evanston meeting. 
There is no considerable body of Christians who 
would challenge the conclusions of Section III 
at the Amsterdam Assembly, that the Christian 
churches should avoid the identification of 
Christianity with any economic system, and that 
in·relation to political and economic problems, 
'it is the responsibility of Christians to seek 
new, creative solutions which never allow either justice or freedom to destroy the other.•l 
Some leaders, While insisting that no form of 
state organization should be identified with the Christian 
message, evidence strong preference for a particular system, 
as being that kind of organization which is most in con-
formity with Christian ideas, or which best assures the 
promulgation of the Christian message. Wilder comments 
that "Professor Miskotte of Leiden represents a striking 
defense of a Christian theocratic view of the state."2 
1. nsocial Questions - ... The Responsible Society in a World 
Perspective," Six Ecumenical Surveys (New York: Harper 
and Brothers, 1954), pp. 61-62. 
2. This refers to Miskotte's book on The Freedom of the 
Gospel and the Ordering of Society. Amos Wilder, 
nTfieological Discussions in Germany!" The Ecumenical 
Review, V, 2 (January, 1953), p. 2:6. 
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In Ecumenical circles, however, the appeal to the establish-
ment of a Christian theocracy, moulded after the Old 
Testament conceptions, is generally repudiated. 
One scholar who specifically denies the relevance 
of a Christian theocracy is the American John c. Bennett, 
who contends that even though suCh a group in power might 
represent the truth more adequately than other rulers, or 
specifically a govermnent by the majority, it ttwould soon 
become a privileged oligarchy unable to resist the tempta-
tion to use power for their own ends. nl In its place, 
Bennett urges democracy as the form of social organization 
most compatible with the Christian Gospel. 
The Christian conception of the human situation 
seems exactly fitted to the needs of democracy. 
On the one hand the Christian has faith in human 
possibilities. • • • On the other hand the 
Christian knows more realistically than the 
secular humanitarian the degree to which men are 
tempted by power. • • • If this balance is upset 
two roads to tyranny are opened, that of2cynical pessimism and that of careless optimism. 
However, Bennett is careful to warn that his preference for 
democracy does not imply the belief that Christianity can be 
"identified with any of the existing institutions of 
democracy.n3 
1. John Bennett, "Christianity and Democracy,n Christendom, 
V, 2 (Spring, 1940), p. 167. 
2. Ibid., 171. 
3. Ibid., 163. 
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Bennett's colleague, Reinhold Niebuhr, also prefers 
democratic government, but refuses to identify any .. · 
government with the Christian message. Based upon his 
theological conception of the human predicament, Niebuhr 
asserts that "man • s capacity for justice makes democracy 
possible, but man's inclination toward injustice makes 
democracy necessary.nl It is because democracy provides 
both a dyke against chaos and sin, and a framework for 
personal and social development, that it so adequately 
meets the needs of social organization. In democracy, 
ttfreedom and order are made to support and not to contradict 
each other. ttl 
Democracy finds rather strong support from an unsus-
pected source, Karl Barth, whose support is unsuspected 
because of his usual reticence to speak in positive terms 
of existing soci~l forms. His statement in support of 
democracy follows: 
When I consider the deepest and most central con-
tent of the New Testament exhortation, I should 
say that we are justified, from the point of view 
of exegesis, in regarding the democratic conception 
1. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Children of.Li~ht and the Children 
of Darkness (New York: Charles Scri ner's Sons, 1950), 
P• X1.. 
2. "Contemporary Books: Other Reviews," Christendom, X, 2 
(Spring, 1945), p. 260. [This is a review of Niebuhr, 
The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness.] 
of the state as a justifiable expansion of the 
thoughts of the New Testament.l 
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This is because democracy comes closest, he believes, to 
contradicting and withstanding all political, social, and 
economic tyranny and anarchy; it makes the rights of com-
munity and personal responsibility the yardstick or order. 2 
To be sure, Barth does not contend that democracy is the 
only possible form of the state consistent with New 
Testament exegesis, but his announced prejudice for any 
form of state suggests a s~rong preference. 
Berggrav, a Norwegian Lutheran, prefers the feder-
ative principle of state organization. "As a principle of 
structure, federation is universally vali~'3 because it 
provides for individuals and local groups to retain their 
identity and freedom while participating in the larger 
decisions of the overall political unit. 4 It also presents 
a feasible pattern for international government as well as 
national states. "As a framework federation makes room for 
the loftiest thoughts and strivings of the race, and also 
1. Karl Barth, Church and State, trans. G. Ronald Howe (London: Student christian Movement Press, 1939), p. 80. 
2. Barth, ttA Letter to American Christians," p. 455. 
3. Berggrav, ~· ~., 92. 
4. Ibid., 92. 
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for the ethical principles of Christianity."1 This does 
not imply, however, that it constitutes a guarantee against 
sin. 2 
In general, then, Ecumenical thought ~nsists that the 
church refrain from identifying her message with that of any 
particular state, and that she avoid confusing the Christian 
Gospel with any socio-political utopia. Once this broad 
principle is accepted, it behooves individual Christians, 
within the context of their own national problems, to 
exercise critical judgment on and participation in the life 
of their respective states. 
b) Necessity for continual adaptation of state forms 
The second principle regarding a Christian under-
standing of the organization of the state which permeates 
the Ecumenical Movement is that the historical form of the 
state constantly must be adapted to meet its particular 
function in each new cultural situation. The purpose of the 
state remains constant, but the forms which may be designed 
by social technicians may, and ought to, change. A state 
which refused to modify its organizational pattern would 
function irresponsibly. Brunner asserts that far more 
important than the form of the state is its ability to 
1. Ibid., 94. 
2. Ibid., 93 ... 94. 
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change in varying social conditions in order to most fully 
perform its aim, which is justice and law, rather than 
national unity or culture. 1 Runestam corroborates this 
view o~ the flexibility in state organization: 
Als Antwort auf die Frage nach dem richtigen 
Staat kann vom christlichen Standpunkt nur jene 
negative Ab&enzung vorgenommen werden. Der 
christliche Qlaube empfiehlt keinen besonderen 
Staatstypus und keine besondere Verfassungsform.2 
In preparation for the Oxford Conference the 
Rengsdorf Conference promulgated that "the creative and 
ordering will of God for human society must be found for 
every period and its conditions by courageously following 
the call to seek it; and its historical expression can 
therefore not be laid down once for all.n3 Because the 
political order always stands in the service of the order 
of grace, explains Runestam, "Die Rechtsordnung ist deshalb 
auch nicht ein fur alleni:.a..l fixierbar, sondern wechse1t mit 
den Zeiten und UmstKnden.n4 
The variety of state forms, therefore, depends on 
the faith that God is operative in history, and that his 
dealings with man bring them new understandings of 
1. Brunner, Der Staat a1s Problem der Kirche, pp. 16-17. 
2. Runestam, noas Christentum und der Staat,n p. 124. 
3. Rengsdor£, BE.• ~·, 2. 
4. Runestam, "Das Christentum und der Staat," p. 126. 
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corporate life, new sensitivities, and new capacities for 
mutual sharing. Because God is imma.nent in the historical 
process, the forms of historical existence can never be 
static. 1 
How God communicates this understanding to man is 
variously conceived~_ depending upon theological presupposi-
tions. According to Demant and other Anglicans, the nnature 
of man, with its hierarchy of functions, is • • • the most 
important source of kr~owledge for Christian sociology. n 2 
Although this dictates no specific form for state organiza-
tion, it does suggest some regulative norms and principles 
that should be implemented in whatever state is formed. 
Demant. and other Anglicans posit a sort of natural law as 
the basis for Christian criticisms of the state. Wiesner, 
however, insists that there be no return to "the law of 
nature,n but that there be "a radical effort at thinking 
out what is involved in God's law in its total claimu as 
the church seeks to speak to the problem of social organ-
ization.3 
1. urt is in the nature of God and the human soul to en-
gender continual change in the social structure, and 
the future of human society on earth is unknown to man. n 
Demant~ God, Man and Society, p. 37. 
2. Ehrenstr8m, Christian Faith and the Modern State, pp. 51-
52. 
3. Werner Wiesner, "The Law of Nature and Social Institu-
tions," Christian Faith and the Common Life, p. 142. 
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For Wiesner, the law of God is known through 
Biblical revelation, a view which is buttressed by the 
Rengsdor£ discussions. That Conference announced that God's 
will for human society could be discovered in the light of 
revelation, and then such revelation would be, as Demant 
has stated, only in terms of general principles rather than 
specific conclusions. 
Whereas the direction and patterns of change are not 
agreed upon, there is general agreement that no one form of 
government is totally Christian. All historical states 
must be adaptable enough to serve the changing needs of 
its constituency. 
c) Appeal to general principles expressed through middle 
axioms 
A third principle regarding the organization of the 
state has been the shifting away· from concrete formulae, 
and from the discussion of "left" and ttrighttt.qualities of 
existing systems.1 Attempts to state general principles 
have been substituted for concern for specifics, with the 
insistence that technicians of social organization can best 
work out the particulars. 2 It is increasingly asserted 
1. 11Social Questions-- The Responsible Society in. a World 
:Perspective," Six Ecumenical Surveys, p. 26. 
2. "'To draw up the details of such a plan or of any plan 
and to advocate them is not the duty of the churches; it 
falls to the statesmen to work cntthafibeJ:~st scheme must 
that the task of the church is to lift up principles in 
the form of "middle axioms, u in accordance with which 
social technicians may plan. Middle axioms, therefore, 
are intended to be neither too nebulous for direction 
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in concrete situations, nor too specific to be generally 
valid. The concept of the nResponsible Societytt involves 
an idea of the responsible state, and is the climax.of 
the relatively new appeal to.middle axioms. 
Several motives lie behind the current appeal to 
principles expressed through middle axioms, and integrated 
in the concept of the Responsible Society. (1) The dis-
cussions of the state in the context of the Ecumenical 
Movement were hopelessly mired in a number of key theolog-
ical disputes, and it appeared that no basic theological 
agreement could be reached. Nevertheless, same delegates 
felt compelled to state the church's concern for social 
questions. (2) An Appeal to principles presented the 
church with a much more viable and dynamic social ethic 
than did the discussions of the relative merits of exist-
ing "statictt forms of social organization·. The adaptabil-
ity of principles to a variety of concrete problems and 
fulfill if it is to meet with the approval of the 
Christian heart and mind. 0 ' Holt, "The Church's Effort 
on the Brink of War,tt p. 92. 
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situations provided the church with an opportunity to be 
relevant and yet not identified with a particular situation 
or system. (3) The dependence upon principles a1ited the 
spirit of modern Protestant theology, with its existential-
ist orientation, because at the same time that principles 
provided stability, there was ample room for reinterpreta-
tion and new application of these principles. (4) The 
principles ·accepted were sufficiently universal and prag-
matic to hold together in mutual discussion several diverse 
elements, notonly in theology, but also in political 
allegiance, thus providing the framework for persisting 
common work. 
These principles are variously derived -- from 
natural law, from the church, from Scripture, or from God's 
historical action through the Holy Sptrit. But in spite 
of the origin of these principles, there is common agree-
ment that the state should be guided by certain over-
arching principles. Demant's statement illustrates the 
idea behind the appeal to principles: 
It has already been made clear that acceptance 
of the Christian faith does not imply belief 
in one fixed pattern of society, but demands 
certain conditions in the ordering of life 
which give priority and importance to the respec-
tive activities of human existence in relation to 
the supernatural end of human beings .1 
1. Deman~, God, Man and Society, p. 177. 
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Various specific principles have been appealed to. 
EhrenstrBm claims that the basic principle in Anglican 
thought is whether a state is atomistic, or whether it 
encourages the development of an organic community. 1 
Berggrav contends that the state's structure must make pos-
sible an active interplay between rights and duties, or 
liberty and duty. 2 Brunner•s ideas are reflected in the 
Ecumenical Movement report which states that "the relative 
and departmental standard for all social arrangements and 
institutions, all the economic structures and po1itical 
systems, by which the life of man is ordered, is the princi-
ple of justice."3 Oldham speaks of the values of a free 
society which provides best for the continual approxima-
tions of man's life to the ideal of justice. 4 
Within the context of ttThe Responsible Society" dis-
cussions, several principles are mentioned. The principle 
of adaptability itself is written into the definition of 
that ttsocietytt: 
1. EhrenstrBm, ttoiskussionsbericht," p. 159. 
2 .. Berggrav, .2E.· ~·; 91. 
3. 
4. J. H. Oldham, "A Responsible Society,n Christendom, XIII, 
3 (Summer, 1948), p. 308. 
The Responsible Society is not another system, 
It points to a society Which accepts the fact 
of a deep tension between justice and freedom, 
a tension that will always force men to break 
through the stereotypes which are formed by 
history, and to seek new and fresh solutions.l 
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The Responsible Society does not stand as an alternate sys-
tem of social organization, but.as a standard by which all 
social formulae shall"be governed. 2 It seeks a balance 
between freedom and order, justice and liberty. 3 
Some suggestive specific principles developed through 
the notion of the Responsible Society are the following: 
there must be protection of basic human rights; freedom 
for individuals to express their religious, moral, and 
political convictions; ~rovision for channels of governmental 
change by the people without recourse -to violence; provision 
for the relative independence of inner associations and 
societies within the society, so that they may operate on 
their own principles without inner control by. the state. 4 
The specific axioms evolving from the Amsterdam 
Assembly regarding the Responsible Society are thecfollowing: 
1. World Council of Churches, Wadham College Conference, nThe 
Responsible Society, n [Printed in the United States by the 
World Council of Churches in November, 1949 .] , p. 7. 
2. The Evanston Report, p. 113. 
3. Duff,~· cit., 191. 
4. The Evanston Report, p. 5. 
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the government must be based as concretely as possible on 
the responsible nature of man~ and be subject to popular 
C«Rttlrol; criticism of the government, and channels for its 
peaceful change~ should be available for the~·people; 
economic institutions should be subject to the standards of 
justice; "centers of power must be subject to law and tradi-
tion and should be distributed widely through the entire 
community": freedom of religious belief and practice; partici-
pation in community decisions; free access to truth; and 
opportunity for propagating one's own ideas. 1 
The Memorandum on the Responsible Society in a 
World Perspective stressed the ideas that (1) the state's 
leaders should be continually reminded of their subordina-
tion to the community and to the corporate conscience of 
that community's constituents; (2) there should be checks 
on the power of the state, particularly through the freedom 
of individual citizens to criticize existing forms and to 
organize politically; (3) the states should be ruled by 
law rather than through arbitrary procedures; (4) since 
the state is not identical with the community or nation, 
forms of association having their own foundations and prin-
ciples should be respected, and although they are to be 
regulated by law in a certain measure, they are not to be 
1. Duff, .2:.2.· ~·, 118. 
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controlled by the state in their inner life; (5) there 
should be channels for political expression; and (6) all 
national powers have a right to self-determination, so 
that colonial powers should txansfer authority to national 
units, when consistent with the ideas of the responsible 
society. 1 
d) Balance between participation and non-identification in 
political affairs 
A fourth principle regarding the organization of 
the state is more a focus of discussion than a real princi-
ple. Should political parties be sponsored by the churches? 
The general sentiment within the World Council is that 
Christians should refuse to organize themselves into par-
ticular political parties, although they are urged to 
responsibility in political affairs. This reticence about 
sponsoring or participating in such political parties 
rests upon the Movement'~ unwillingness to identify the 
gospel with a particular social program, and to further 
delimit the church's sphere of influence. 2 "The churches 
agree in excluding from church action matters of party 
politics; no church would regard it as proper, in principle, 
1 .... Memorandum on 'The Responsible Society in a World 
Perspective,•n The Ecumenical Review, VI, 1 (October, 
1953), pp. 10-1. 
2. Visser 't Hooft, The First Assembly of the World Council 
of Churches, p. 81. 
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to espouse the cause of a particular party or candidate.nl 
Oldham states that the church s~ould have no special 
political program of its own aside from the platforms of 
existing parties. "It is both the strength and the weak-
ness of Christianity that it has no specific political 
program.n2 
This balance between participation and non-
identification is paradoxically articulated in the follow-
ing statement: nThis will mean in some cases the creation 
of healthy secular political movements; however, under no 
circumstances should Christians organize themselves into 
reiigious political parties .... n 3 In another report the 
attempt to maintain the equilibrium between identification 
with, and aloofness from, pali~tas ts,Ja.gain evident. 
The Church as such should not be identified with 
any political party, and it must not act as though 
it were itself a political party •••• Neverthe-
less it may still be desirable in some situations 
for Christians to organize themselves into a 
political party for specific objectives, so long 
as they do not claim that it is the only possible 
expression of Christian loyalty in the situation.4 
1. Brown, Church and State in Contemporary America, p. 155. 
2. Visser.'t Hooft and Oldham, £a• ~., 224. 
3. "Ecumenical Chronicle -- The Responsible Society in· 
South East Asia,tt The Ecumenical Review, V, 3 (April, 
1953)' p. 303. 
4. Visser 't Hooft, The First Assembly of the World Council 
of Churches, p. 81. 
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In a later statement of the same report it is suggested. 
that such an expression of religious concern in political 
affairs, if engaged in, should be certain to terminate 
activities as soon as its raison d'etre has ceased. 
The whole principle here under discussion appears 
to be a valid expression of the dialectic between invo~e­
ment and aloofness in political affairs. Some people think 
it makes a too facile distinction between individual 
Christian's political activity "from a Christian perspective," 
and involvement of the church with a particular program. 
For a person to act upon the conviction that a certain 
platform is the nchristian" answer to a particular problem 
implies the belief that this cause should be espoused by 
all Christians, which is the church. 1 
·A few words of conclusion about the'brganization 
of the staten are now in order. With regard to existing 
forms of state, there have been specific criticisms of all 
forms of state as well of all state forms in general. 
Historically it appears that the Stockholm Conference found 
many who enthusiastically endorsed the democratic organiza-
tion of government and the democratic principles as most 
completely fulfilling the Christian ideals of the state. 
Capitalism, to be sure, was criticized, but the political 
1. The question of political parties and the church will be 
discussed more fully under relations between church and 
state. 
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democracies which supported capitalism were generally ac-
ceptable. 
Agitation for socialism in the 1930's was primarily 
an attempt to find political means for the alleviation of 
economic problems rather than a condemnation of a democracy 
which maintains its balance. In the 1930's the Movement 
threw its weight against the totalitarian state because it 
usurped the role of the church and militated against the 
rights of individuals, and men like Karl Barth, from whom 
one would least anticipate a strong political stand, 
denounced the evil state of National Socialism in Germany, 
or Hitlerism. 
The Amsterdam Assembly of 1949 found itself torn in 
the struggle between East and West, and wished exclusive 
alliance with neither. Its criticisms of both Communism 
and Capitalism repeat some classical Christian objections 
to these systems. But though there is an implicit denunci-
ation of the United States and the democratic state in the 
criticisms, the four points of condemnation made are 
economic rather than political. Condemnation of communism 
was both political and economic, but basically political. 
For example, communism was criticized for its utopianism, 
its materialistic metaphysics, its methods of dealing with 
opponents, its unrealistic conception of the virtue of the 
working class and the turpitude of the bourgeoisie; and its 
----
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exclusivistic claim to loyalty of party members -- a loy-
alty which belongs only to God. 1 
Following the Amsterdam Assembly members of the 
Christian churches in Russia spoke of the Ecumenical 
Movement as a political force pronouncing under the guise 
p£ Christianity, because it spoke too much of political 
and international issues, and pecause the tenor of its 
statements seemed too Western. 2 Partly in an effort to 
escape involvement in the East-West political controversy, 
the churches refined the notion of the Responsible Society 
still further, and it expanded into a movement about which 
there is little literature called the "Third Force.u This 
movement was most evident among delegates from the younger 
churches, but found support from such men as John Bennett 
of the United States. Once again the church reasserted 
the danger of identifying the Christian message with any 
earthly movement, so that the idea that the ttresponsible 
societyn was not proposed as an alternate political system 
but a judgment upon all systems. Some objected to the 
.negative character of the ttthird force" movement, claiming 
that it simply repudiated two existing systems but gave no 
l .. Ibid., 79. 
2. [W. A. Visser 1 t Hooft], nThe Moscow Patriarchate and th.e 
First Assembly of the World Council of Churches," The 
Ecumenical Review, I, 2 (Winter, 1949), pp. 192-19~ 
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positive direction for the Christian. 
Among delegates to the Evanston Assembly there was 
some indication of a renewed appreciation of decentralized 
states with manifold centers of freedom, and decentralized 
economic groupings with diverse centers of control. This 
appreciation for some aspects of democracy and capitalism 
raised protests of ttreactionismu from some quarters, which 
others, like Walter Muelder, deem unsupported. This 
development demonstrated that the World Council is trying 
to walk a dark and uneven road between many poles of tension. 
It must not only navigate between East and West, between 
freedom and authority, between centralization and decentral-
ization, between the danger of becoming too closely allied 
with a social movement and refusing to have anything to do 
with it; it must also avoid the danger of being so abstract 
that it provides no guidance in concrete situations, or so 
concrete that it becomes involved i~ the issues of strife 
between men and becomes affiliated ith one or another 
party in that contention. the Ecumenical Movement 
is threatened with this last dil , since the idea of the 
Responsible Society and rce Movement need sub-
stance and content if they are to end genuine guidance t .o 
Christians with concrete political problems. 
exists 
6. General Principles f State Action 
Profound and persistent theoretical disagreement 
among Ecumenical Movement ~legates concerning the 
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principles by which a state must act. These disagreements 
are nourished by fundamental theolog~cal controversies, 
notably between the delegates uW:i.o':.,tress the discontinuity 
between the present ttfallen" world artd the world which God 
I 
created, and those who maintain that creation is still 
governed by God's initial intentions. 
A basic contention by many i that since the world 
is fallen, it can no longer be a sphJre of love, but justice 
must govern relations of men and societies on earth. It 
I 
is proposed that group morality mustlbe distinguished from 
individual morality. 1 Thus Brunner nsists that to expect 
institutions to operate on. the princlples of the Gospel --
1 
on love -- is absurd, for they must fct on the principle of 
justice. Both those who emphasize tie corruption of man in 
the 11fallu and those who distinguish between group and 
private morality center their ethicai statements around the 
poles of.ulovett and ttjustice.u Justice is avowedly the 
highest principle of group morality,/while love is the 
guiding principle of personal morality. Others, however, 
I 
1. ttThe norm for the subjects of collective life is not 
love but justice, which corresponds to their God-given 
task of preservation.n Wiesner, bp. cit., 5. 
"Group morality, in which the achievement of justice 
is the highest norm, must always differ from individual 
morality in which, in the Christi~n view, love is the 
guiding principle. tt Oldham, "A R~sponsible Society," 
P• 298. 
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refuse to make such a·rigid distinctLon, averring that 
justice is an expression of love, a~~ that the highest 
justice actually seeks love. 
These differences will be e~Lcidated by consider-
ing reasons postulated for proposin~ a special order of 
principles for the state which diff~ from the principles 
which should govern the lives of indtvidual Christians. 
I 
Can love be the principle of state ~ction? 
a) "The Fallen World" J 
It is contended that in thi fallen creation the 
motives of man have become so corru4ted that the original 
harmony of the earth no longer exists. Sinful men char-
acteristically seek private advantaJe. Men do not respond 
in love as they would have in a perJect world. It is the 
function of the state, therefore, tJ preserve the world 
. I 
through justice. In this view, were the state capable of 
''ruling through love," its very exiltence would be unneces-
1 sary, since the state is a 
man's sin. 1 
concession by God to the fact of 
I 
I 
I 
1. "We frequently encounter the stahement that the great 
failure of our society has been ~at it has not. the 
courage to apply the ethical principles of the Sermon 
on the Mount to our common life kd our relations with 
the State. Such a view finds nol support in Luther. He 
is against it: it is contrary tb the will of God to try 
to rule the world through the Go~pel. God has ordained 
an entirely different authority o rule the world. It 
is in accordance with His will t at power and the sword 
I 
--
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b) Function of the state 
Since the state's function to co-ordinate vari-
ous elements of society, and since t s co-ordination is 
I 
impossible to achieve without frustrrting the selfish 
interests of individual members, the! state is obligated 
to exercise force or coercion. Siner it is also maintained 
that exercising compulsion violates fhe principle of love,· 
the state is fundamentally a negatio~ of the Christian 
affirmation of the. centrality of 1oJj. The state cannot 
be self-sacrificing and self-abnegaling; it must continu-
ally assert its superiority through fower. This necessity,. 
it is frequently contended, precludJJs its Chriitian 
character. Furthermore, it is main ,ained, the state should 
not be concerned with the realm of Jrace and of the spirit, 
for this is the function of the chuJch. 
c) "Ethic of inspiration versus eJc of conse<J!lence s'.' 
I 
I J. H. Oldham contends that i basic reason why the 
state cannot be governed by the same principles as an indi-
vidual is that the state must, in ltne with its obligation 
to further the common good, orient its activities around an 
I . 
"ethic of ends,n i.e. an ethic whicJ seeks to calculate the 
I . 
are.used to that end, and the world is under sway of 
that authority, and not of the Gbspel." Anders Nygren, 
"Luther's Doctrine of the Two Kihgdoms," The Ecumenical 
Review, I, 3 (Spring, 1949), P• ro6. 
consequences of its actions. It pos ts specific goals 
which it proposes to realize. "If adtion is to be ef-
1 fective in the social sphere it is of course essential 
that there be definite objects of atiack and pursuit. 
Without specific programs nothing will be done. nl 
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On the other hand, Oldham asierts, the individual 
Christian must govern his moral life by an ttethic of 
'inspiration." It is the ttduty" of individual Christians 
to act upon the motive of ttlove11 wiJout detailed consider-
ation of the consequences of his act ons or decisions. The 
ethic of inspiration finds 
rather than consequences. 
d) Lack of corporate morality 
stone in motives 
Oldham further reports the I ew that in the present 
condition of society the state could not be governed by 
Christian principles because not all persons would accept 
these principles as relevant. This view differs from the 
first, which despairs of the state acting on "Christian" 
grounds because of the sin of man, in that it does not 
judge the diversity of individual perspectives to be 
solely a result of man's sin. It is not intimated that 
such concurrence could never be attained. 
1. Visser •t Hooft and Oldham, The Church and its Function 
in Society~ p. 222. 
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As things are at present, nation and state are 
not subject, like the individual, to a higher 
authority or to the reign of law, nor does 
there exist among different peoples any living 
consciousness of community on which a world 
order might be based. Therefore the affairs of 
states must be guided by principles quite other 
than those which regulate the conduct of indi- 1 viduals in their relations with other individuals. 
There are others within the Ecumenical Movement, 
however, who deny this radical distinction between the 
principles of individual and social ethical principles. 
Frederick Lynch, an American, made the following statements 
at the Stockholm Conference: 
I do not think that I am wrong in saying that the 
conviction has become particularly nation-wide 
in our churches, that nations are bound by ex-
actly the same Christian principles that are 
bindin~ upon individuals in all their relation-
sb1lps. 
We have had this double standard, Christian for 
individuals and pagan for nations, up to very 
recent times. We have said that the nation had 
the right to do what the individual should not do, 
We have said that it was unchristian for an indi-
vidual to steal, but perfectly right for the 
nation. We have said it was unchristian for an 
individual to kill his neighbor, but perfectly 
right for the big nation to destroy the weaker 
nation. We have said that 'might makes right• 
was a barbaric idea for a man to hold, but the 
principle by which nations should live and act.3 
·1. Ibid., 169. 
2. Frederick Lynch, ••christian Fellowship, n The Stockholm 
Conference, 1925 (London: Oxford University Press, 1926), 
p .. 339. 
3. Ibid., 338. 
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Bishop Charles Brent also seems to believe that poltical 
and social affairs can be governed not only by those 
principles which are obligatory for individual Christians, 
but that it can operate on the principles of the Sermon on 
the Mount. 1 Wishart appeals to the application of the 
ideals of Jesus in international affairs, 2 and Gulick, 
also speaking at the Stockholm Conference, states: 
The ethical ideals and principles of His Kingdom 
include the relations and conduct of nations and 
races no less than those ofi individuals. • • • 
Goi's eternal, immutable and inescapable moral 
laws apply to nations ••• that the Golden Rule 
and the spirit and conduct of the Good Samaritan 
must be practised by entire nations and peoples.3 
To the contention that a "fallen world" can be 
governed only by justice, rather than love, it is replied 
that (1) this stress on the ltfallenness" of the world i.s 
an exaggeration that minimizes the continuing presence of 
God in his world; (2) the distinction between the demands 
of justice and love are unclear; and (3) practical consid-
erations m~e this theory dangerous. The first reply is 
1. 
2. :(barlJes Wishart, "The Purpose of God For Humanity, n The 
Stockholm Conference, 1925 (L·ondon: Oxford Univers1.ty 
Press, 1926), pp. 79-85. 
3. Sidney Gulick, "For Peace and Against War,u The Stockholm 
Conference, 1925 (London: Oxford University Press, 1926), 
p. 494. 
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self-explanatory; of the second and third a further comment 
is necessary. 
It is contended by many that justice is an expres-
sion of love, although not a complete expression. 1 
Devadutt sees justice as giving a man his. due, but he con-
tends that love is not giving a man what is his due, since 
there is no consideration of what is due a man -- that 
becomes too legalistic because it is involved in claims and 
counter-claims. Others might reply to this position, 
however, that such an assertion has already asked, and 
answered the question of what is man's due, because it 
has chosen to see man in his relationship to God. To give 
a man his due as a Christian, then, would be as demanding 
as giving him love, since both amount to the same thing. 
Another serious criticism of that theological 
position which distinguishes between the justice of a 
fallen world and the love of a regenerate people is based 
on an external and practical challenge. Archbishop Temple 
fears that this type of thinking leads to the dangerous 
practice of dismissing the actions of the state from the 
judgment of the Christian perspective. In one of the 
preparatory volumes for the Oxford Conference he states: 
1. Vinjamurt Devadutt, "A Baptist Contribution," Biblical 
Authoritl for Today, ed. Richardson and Schweitzer (Philade phia! Westminster Press, 1951), p. 78. 
It is sometimes said, for example, that the 
national community and the state belong to the 
order of nature, while the church and the faith 
of the Christian belong to the order of grace. 
~is sharp distinction leads to the view that 
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the state has its own principles of action with 
which the church has nothing to do, while equally 
the church has its principles with which the 
state has nothing to do. • • • If once more it 
is held that nature is so far fallen as in no 
way to manifest its Maker, are we to say that 
God has abandoned it and left it to remain fallen 
and lost? Is not this a denial of the whole 
gospel?l 
It is contended by some that since the functions 
of .the state differ from those of the church; the state 
must act on different principles. To this it is responded 
that such thinking is based upon a static and unrealistic 
understanding of sociological institutions. The.function 
of the state may be defined differently from that of other 
institutions, but sociologically it::possesses character-
istics similar to the church, the school, and other social 
institutions because it is organized and regulated by the 
same kinds of people. The force which is employed in the 
fulfillment of its function cannot be construed as less 
moral in itself; immorality would consist not in the use 
of power, but in its misuse -- which would occasionally 
mean failure to use that power. Against the charge that 
power is inherently evil, it has been answered that power 
1. Temple, Christian Faith and the Common Life, p .. 54. 
in itself is ethically neutral, but the illegitimate use 
of that power which is evil. 
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To those~ like Oldham, who make a distinction 
between the ethic of inspiration and the ethic of ends, 
asserting that the former is impossible for the state, it 
is proposed that individual ethics should encourage a.con-
sideration of consequences. Oldham himself advocates that 
the church adopt specific policies for the alleviation of 
social evils; 1 others wwld seek to extend this "programmingtt 
and consideration of consequences to all spheres of ethical 
action. Indeed it is contended, part of the ethical 
motive and decision is willingness to weigh the conse-
quences. Upon these considerations, then, that position 
Which distinguishes sharply between the ethic of institutions 
(and the state) and that of individuals is often sharply 
. challenged. 
It is sometimes suggested that the ethical princi-
ples of the state should differ from those of theindividual 
because not all individuals within a culture, arid throughout 
the world, have the same ethical values. Against this 
position it is contended that the Christian moral imperative 
is valid even when it is not clearly perceived or accepted. 
Oldham anticipates a time when concurrence in recognized 
1. Visser 1 t Hooft and Oldham, 2E• cit., 222. 
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moral standards might be attained, at which time it is sup-
posed that moral principles for the state would correspond 
with those of individuals. 
Aside from the debates about the relevance of love 
and justice for principles of state action, a vital debate 
over such principles centers in the discussion of middle 
axioms. This discussion rests upon, and is a further 
extension of, the discussions of love and justice. The 
need for keeping all middle axioms flexible enough to adapt 
them to varying cultural situat~ons has been constantly 
affirmed. Even as "love" finds expression through diverse 
media, so justice cannot be concretely defined for all time. 
Reiterating an expression of Amsterdam, Muelder comments 
that "true justice is dynamic and its forms must vary to 
meet changing needs."1 Alexeievsuggests the same idea 
when he avers, 
Das Obengesagte bestimmt unsere Einstellung zur 
Idee des Rechtsstaates. Ein Staat, der auf der 
Polarisierung der zentralisierten sozialen Krifte 
aufgebaut ist, ist imm.er ein "rechtlichestt 
Ph!nomen.2 
Or the comments of Ehrenstr8m, representing still another 
confessional unit, add weight to this position of .the 
variability of state's principles. "Die rechtlichen Norman 
1. Muelder , . .2E.• cit., 8. 
2. Alexeiev, "Gesellschaft, Staat u.nd Kirche," p. 19. 
fUr das Handeln des Staates sind aus der Botschaft der 
christlichen Kirche zu entnehmen. Wahl gibt es kein fUr 
alle Zeiten gUltiges System • • • nl 
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The recognition that the principles of state action 
vary, with the necessity of applying principles in one so-
ciety which are not opportune in. another, has led to the 
current discussion of ttmiddle axioms," which, in themselves, 
are attempts to provide for both stability and flexibility. 
John Bennett has defined middle axioms as: umore concrete 
than a universal ethical principle and less specific than a 
p;rogram that includes legislation and political strategy."2 
He accepts Oldham's idea that, 
They are an attempt to define the directions in 
which, in a particular state of society, 
Christian faith must express itself. They are 
not binding for all time, but are provisional 
definitions of the type of behavior required of 
Christians at a given period and in given cir-
cumstances. 3 · · 
Through the postulation of "middle axioms, u the 
Ecumenical Movement has asserted principles which are 
neither nabsolute" (and perhaps affording no concrete 
. 
direction, ·though not irrelevan~, nor specific (perhaps 
1. Ehrenstr8m, "Diskussionsbericht," p. 158. 
2. John Bennett, Christian Ethics and Social Policy (New 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1946), p. 77. 
3. Ibid., 77. From Visser 't Hooft and Oldham, The Church 
and Its Function in Society, p. 210. 
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providing no normative standards and not universally valid 
or applicable). Middle axioms are somewhere in the center 
of the continuum between absolutes and specific policies. 
Although these axioms provide a norm of judgment, they are 
not to be identified with the full Christian message. A 
few examples of "middle axioms" indicate their nature, and 
suggest some substantive thought in the Ecumenical Movement 
about the nature and work of the state. 
1. There is a need for the community to accept its 
share of guilt in resvonsibility for social 
evils and individuals sin. Social problems are 
the concern of the total community, working 
through its agencies, including the state.! 
2. The ssate should seek to steer a cour~e between 
national bigotry and cosmopolitanism. 
3. nit follows from the emphasis laid by the New 
Testament upon brotherhood that a Christian 
society is under the obligatmn to use every 
means at its disposal to bring within the reach 
of all members the material, as well as the 
ethical, conditions of spiritual growth and 
vitality."3 
4. The state is one of the institutions ordained 
by God, but not any particular form of state. 
The state derives its authority and power from 
God, in order to pr~ote (or further) justice 
and peace among men.4 
1. John Turnbull, Ecumenical Documents on Church and 
SocieU (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1954), p. 3. 
[Stoc olm) 
2. Ibid., 3. 
3. Ibid., 9. [From the Jerusalem Conference, 1928.] 
4. Ibid., 44. [From the Rengsdorf Conference, 1934.} 
5. The state may not destroy the institutions of 
family and Church, because they are directly 
ordained by God.l 
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6. "The relative and departmental standard for all 
social arrangements and institutions, all 
economic and political systems, by which the 
life of man is ordered, is the principle of 
Justice.";G 
7. "The relation of the comnandment of love to the justice of economic and political systems is 
twofold. It is an ideal which reaches beyond 
any possible achievements in the field of 
political relations, but it is nevertheless a 
standard by whi§h various schemes of justice 
can be judged." 
8. Justice and law are the main foundations of 
human society because they are a witness within 
it to the divine law. 4 . · . 
9. The exercise of political power must not be seen 
as an end in itself, but as a means to human 
fulf!llment under the jurisdiction of a sovereign 
God. 
10. nThe necessity for the use of force, however 
difficult and morally ~uestionable it may be, 
must be admitted in pr1nciple, since without 
it the state would not be able to maintain the 
system of law and order which it protects.u6 
1. Ibid., 44. [From the Rengsdorf Conference, 1934.1 
2. Universal Christian Council for Life and Work, The 
Churches Surve! Their Task, p. 9 3. [From the Oxford 
Conference, 19 ?.} 
3. Turnbull,~· cit., 58. [From the Oxford Conference, 1937.] 
4. ~., 58. [From the Oxford Conference, 1937.} 
5. Ibid., 47-48. [From the Oxford Conference, 1937.] 
6. Oldham, The Oxford Conference, p. 262. 
11. nWhile the trustee responsibility of states 
differentiates their duty from that of 
individuals, it remains true that righteous-
ness exalteth a nation and that nations, like 
individuals, are under the judgment of God.ttl 
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12. nA state which destroys human personalities or 
human associations, or subordinates them to its 
own ends, is therefore incompatible with the 
Christian understanding of life."2 
13. nAny ·tendencies in State and society depriving 
man of the possibility of acting responsibly are 
a denial of God•s intention for man and His work 
of salvation.n3 
14. ttA responsible society is one where freedom is 
the freedom of men who acknowledge responsibility 
to justice and public order, and where those 
who hold political authority or economic power 
are responsible for its exercise to God and the 
people whose welfare is affected by it."4 
l5. •'Man is not made for the State, but the State 
for man. Man is not made for production, but 
production for man. For a society to be 
responsible under modern conditions it is re-
quired that the people have freedom·to control, 
to criticize and to change their governments, 
that power be made responsible by law and tradi-
tion, and be distributed as widely as possible 
through the whole community.u5 
1. Universal Christian Council for Life and Work, The 
Churches Surve! Their Task, p. 171. [From the Oxford 
Conference, 19 7.} 
2. Turnbull,~· cit., 270. [From the Oxford Conference, 1937.] 
3. World Council of Churches, The Church and the Disorder of 
Society (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), p. zoo. 
[From the Amsterdam Assembly ·volumes, and part of the 
official report.] 
4. Ibid., 200. 
5. Ibid., 200-201. 
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16. "It must be recognized that the state is not 
·identical with the nation or with society and 
· that many forms of association within society 
which have their own foundation and principles 
should be respected, and to a certain extent 
regulated by law, but not controlled in their 
inner life by the state. The Church, the 
family and the university are quite different 
examples of this non-political type of associ-
ation.nl · 
17. ttThe rule of law which excludes arbitrary ac-
tion by government is necessary to protect 
these rights2of individual citizens and of minorities." 
18. "Freedom of the citizens to express their moral 
and political judgments and freedom for minor-
ities to organize golitically are essential 
checks upon power. '3 
19. nThere must be developed channels of political 
expression for the people by which they can 
peacefully change their governments. This in-
cludes effective participation in political 
parties, and in other groups with political 
influence, at all levels. The right to vote 
should be extended as rapidly as possible, be-
cause there is always the tendency of those 
who do not have the right to be victimized 
by those who do."4 
1. "Ecumenical Chronicle -- The Responsible Society in a 
World Perspective,tt The Ecumenical Review, VI, 1 
October, 1953), pp. 82-3. 
2. Ibid., 82-83. 
3. Ibid., 82-83. 
4. ~., 82-83. 
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20. nOne basic principle· needs to be affirmed: 
while it is true that the state is sometimes 
the enemy of freedom; it is also true that 
under many circumstances the state is the only 
instrument by which real freedom for large sec-
tions of the population becomes a possibility. 
For that reason it should be recognized that 
there are advantages in the existence of many 
private centers of economic activity, because 
they favor freedom, flexibility and efficiency. 
There is no single criterion by which we can judge exactly how far the state should go in 
extending its functions in the economic sphere. 
• • • The state should act to prevent any 
center of economic power which represents par-
tial interests from becoming stronger than 
itself, for it is the only institution with 1 power that is trustee of the society as a whole.u 
21. "We oppose aggressive imperialism -- political, 
economic or cultural -- Whereby a nation seeks 
to use other nations or peoples for its own 
ends. We therefore protest against the ex-
ploitation of non-self-governing peoples for 
selfish purposes; the retarding of their prog-
ress toward self-government; and discrimination 
or segregation on the ground of race or colour."2 
22. The Lucknow Conference of 1952 states the follow-
ing. as characteristics of a responsible society: 
a) Social justice is actively promoted 
b) Fullest development of natural resources is 
pursued 
c) Fullest share possible of natural wealth 
guaranteed·to all 
d) Human rights and freedoms effectively guar-
anteed 
e) People shall have sovereignty for their own 
affairs 
1. "The Responsible Society in a World Perspective," The 
Ecumenical Review, VI, l (October, 1953) p. 83. [From 
the Begnins (Switzerland) Conference, 1953.] 
2. Richard Fagley, "Our Ecumenical Heritage in International 
Affairs,n The Ecumenical Review, VI, 1 (October, 1953), 
p. 68. 
f) Principles of social and political life 
are in accordance with concept of man as 
a person call~d to responsible existence 
in counnunity.l. 
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23. "The State should regulate as little as neces-
sary for the assurance of good order and 
security •••• uL . 
24 • .,The question at issue is not whether there 
shall be control [by the state] or not, but 
whether the control is to be exergised with 
real respect for the individual."::s 
25. nThis does not mean that the Christian has one 
simple criterion by which he can make slick judgments of political alternatives. There 
is • • • at least a triple criterion. Justice, 
freedom and security are all part of the neces-
sary condition of man's life in society ac-
cording to the will of God.n4 
26. ttThe State, therefore, is not to exercise ab-
solute domination over these other societies 
but rather to harmonize and co~ordinate them 
so far as necessary. Under such a view the 
Church has freedom to live its own life ac-
cording to its own genius.u5 
1. Turnbull, on. cit., 150. [From the Lucknow Conference, 
1952.] .=...;.. -
2. Joseph Chamberlain, nThe Mutual Obligations of Church 
and Stat:e," Church and State in the Modern World, 
Van Dusen, et al. (New York and London: Harper and 
Brothers, 1~5}7 p. 112. · 
3. Temple, Essays in Christian Politics and Kindred Subjects, 
p. 41. 
4. Alexander Miller, Biblical Politics: Studies in Christian 
Social Doctrine (London: Student Christian Movement Pres~ 
Ltd., 1943), pp. 39-40. 
5. Samuel Cavert, "Points of Tension Between Church and State 
in America Today, .. Church and State in the Modern World, 
VanDusen, et al., (New York and London: Harper and 
Brothers, 1'9"3'5J;" p. 198. 
27. 11We must be ever alert to seek a greater 
measure of justice in social and political 
relationships, and to do battle against 
every unjust discrimination against class 
or race, and every denial of human rights, 
whether political or economic."l 
28. ttA Government which is not guided by love 
for the people, and is not solicitous for 
the welfare of the starving, sick and 
defenseless, can no longer fulfill its func-
tion and '?an bring no real blessing.n2 
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Many middle axioms are advanced for areas other 
than the state, e.g. economics, war, family, etc. One 
difficulty in locating middle axioms, aside from the fact 
that there is seldom unanimous endorsement of even Assembly 
Reports, lies in the fact that statements are not labeled 
as "middle axioms. n One is obliged to use his own criteria 
for determining the general principles which are being 
proposed. 
Historically, then, a few generalizations put the 
discussion of principles of state action into perspective. 
At the Stockholm Conference, pervaded by a fear of theolog-
ical disputes, many social evils were paraded before the 
representatives, but it was apparently assumed that these 
~lls could be alleviated by a more stringent application 
1. nEcumenical Chronicle - Report of the Advisory Conmission 
on the Main Theme of the Second Assembly," p. 461. 
2. Temple, Christianity and the State, p. 41. 
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of the law of love in society. Few concrete principles 
for the state's responsibility in areas of social evil 
were propounded. A mood of earnest optimism permeated the 
Conference. 
Preparations for the Oxford Conference on Church, 
Community and State began to unveil not only the need for 
theoretical foundations, but also to reveal the vast number 
of problems in discussing the role of the state and its 
legitimate methods of fulfilling that role. Pessimism 
filled the air. Discussions of the tension between Gospel 
and Law led to emphasis upon the tension between justice 
and love in social affairs. Those who would make the 
principles of love relevant to social problems were con-
fronted by others who felt that because love was impossible 
of giving guidance in social conditions, justice should be 
the normative principle. This discussion persisted until 
the preparations for the Amsterdam Assembly provided the 
framework for a dynamic dialectic between justice and love, 
and between polar elements in society (e.g. freedom and 
authority) through the iniddle axioms. This udialectic" 
is at the forefront of current discussions of principles 
of social organization and action, and therefore, of the 
proper functions of the state. 
